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This thesis focuses on the U.S. military/Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) relationship in times
of humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it examines the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC), or
the variant thereof, and its ability to facilitate collaboration and coordination between the two communities.
Accordingly, this work examines the relationship in the following four case studies: I) Operation Provide
Comfort (southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, April 1991); 2) Operation Sea A ngel (Bangladesh, May 1991);
3) Operation Restore Hope (Somalia, December 1992); and 4) Operation Restore Hope (Rwanda, July
1994).
While no case is exactly the same, conceptual themes have emerged. Humanitarian intervention is
a political process. There is a· continuum of effort. Each community should generally operate according
to its comparative advantage. The principle of altruistic self-interest governs the relationship: it must be
mutually beneficial in order to succeed.
The successful CMOC is not so much a designated spot as much as it is a function of personnel
living and working together. It is the military's only institutional means to provide feedback on whether
or not the humanitarian mandate is being met. During humanitarian interventions, it should be the focus
of the military's effort. Ultimately, it is through the CMOC that the military has the best change to craft
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This thesis explores the nature of the relationship between American
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the American military during
times of humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it uses the Civil Military
Operations Center (CMOC) as the vehicle of analysis to examine the process
of collaboration and coordination between the two communities. Importantly,
this work considers the political context, the emergency situation, and the
various international and indigenous players that shape the NGO/military
relationship.
The following four case studies are presented: 1) Operation Provide
Comfort (southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, April, 1991); 2) Operation Sea Angel
(Bangladesh, May, 1991); 3) Operation Restore Hope (Somalia, December,
1992); and 4) Operation Support Hope (Rwanda, July, 1994). While each case
is different and never to be repeated again, some common conceptual themes
emerge. First, humanitarian intervention is a political process. Paradoxically,
success only takes place when this fact is acknowledged by keeping the
humanitarian intent primary. Once military or political concerns dominate,
confusion, if not failure, comes quick. In a humanitarian intervention, the
political and military tasks are implicit within the humanitarian intent. Second,
there is a continuum of effort that takes place. Usually, the military with its
logistics, infrastructure, and security is better in the beginning of a crisis while
the NGOs with its humanitarian expertise, cultural awareness, and sustained
xiii
commitment are better once the emergency has been stabilized. Consequently,
the relationship tends to be based on the principle of altruistic self-interest.
Each offers the other the sexvices of their comparative advantage in an
exchange that is mutually beneficial. The reward is that NGO has access to
means far beyond their budget while the military quickens stabilization in a
process that it cannot inherently address. The end result is that the military
goes home quicker, leaving the humanitarians to their professional calling.
The CMOC is the fulcrum of this relationship. It is not so much a
designated place as it is a function of personnel. It is most successful when:
I) its participants are aware of the local political impact and strategic
accumulation of their actions; and 2) their forum has been isolated from the
"politics" of the situation at hand. In northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and Rwanda,
for different reasons, the CMOC, or its equivalent, was isolated from the politics
of the situation. This isolation did not take place in Somalia, however, as the
CMOC became many things to many people, eventually handling humanitarian
coordination and local policy issues.
Furthermore, all the case studies indicate that the CMOC is most
successful when the military and NGOs sit at the same table, making decisions
jointly. The more surveyors of "reality," the more a certain and accepted truth
emerges. Moreover, once exposed to each other on a consistent basis, there is
less room for institutional stereotype.
If these are the traits of the context and the relationship, one further
point must be made. In a humanitarian intexvention, the CMOC must be the
xiv
focus of the military's effort. The CMOC is the military's only institutional
means of registering whether or not the humanitarian mandate is being met.
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"No one serving as a soldier gets involved in civilian affairs -- he wants to
please his commanding officer."
Paul; 2nd Timothy 2:4
A. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, the American military has been
increasingly employed in engagements where traditional national security
criteria have been loosely adhered to or largely ignored. A quick perusal of
recent operational titles suggest the humanitarian nature of these efforts:
"Provide Comfort" (northern Iraq); "Sea Angel" (Bangladesh); "Restore Hope"
(Somalia); and "Support Hope" (Rwanda). These emergency situations have
been so overpowering -- characterized as sudden, overwhelming, with the near,
or actual catastrophic loss of life -- that the traditional humanitarian response
from the international civilian community is not enough. As a result, the
American military -- according to its ability to provide logistics, infrastructure,
and security -- has been called upon to enable the relief effort.
It is within this setting that NGOs and the American military have had to
work together towards a common goal. It is not a natural relationship. The
former are used to autonomy and operating according to their own charters and
1
core values. The latter is an instrument of a national polity and follows its orders.
Yet the two have worked together, and mostly with great success.
Irrespective of personal opinions, past definitions, or formerly agreed upon
boundaries, the interaction between the NGO community and the military will take
place. In fact, contrary to St. Paul's advice to Timothy, the soldier will do well to
get "involved in civilian affairs." While the lamb is not yet lying with the lion, each
is beginning to recognize the other's intrinsic value during these humanitarian
emergencies; indeed, they need each other.
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the operational interface between
American non-governmental organizations2 (NGOs) and the United States military
during humanitarian interventions. The thesis focuses on the infrastructure that
is established or utilized to collaborate and coordinate with the NGO community
during the first thirty to sixty days of a humanitarian intervention. Specifically, it
analyzes the use of the Civil-Military Operations Center, or the variant thereof, and
its effectiveness as a mechanism for facilitating collaboration and coordination
between the NGO community and the U.s. military.
2NGOs refers to any non-governmental organization that is involved in humanitarian work. It does not include
International Organizations (lOs) such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). It does include private voluntary organizations (PVOs), an American term for what the rest of the world
calls NGOs. Th,.~ thesis avoids the term humanitarian relief organizations (HROs), because it is inclusive of lOs
and does not necessarily incorporate NGOs who (also) focus on development or human rights.
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C. APPROACH
This thesis will comparatively analyze the NGO/military interface through
the following four cases studies:
1. Operation Provide Comfort (northern Iraq, April, 1991);
2. Operation Sea Angel (Bangladesh, May, 1991);
3. Operation Restore Hope (Somalia, December, 1992); and
4. Operation Support Hope (Rwanda, July, 1994).
Using historical analysis as its primary methodology, the thesis will focus
on the CMOC as the last point of coordination before the implementation of the
humanitarian response.
For the purposes of this work, each of the case studies is defined as a
humanitarian intervention. While a uniform definition does not yet exist, all share
a single, essential element: the presence of near-term or actual catastrophic loss
of life within an uncertain threat environment. This prospect is so great that the
local and international humanitarian response community cannot handle the
situation by themselves. In other words, American military intervention -- vis-a.-vis
its logistics, infrastructure, and security capabilities -- is absolutely needed to
enable the relief effort.:>
3 These humanitarian interventions are often the result of a pre-existing complex humanitarian emergency.
While debate surrounds the precise definition of this term, it can be reduced to the following: 1) multiple
causation (Le. economic failure, drought, etc. and usual1y conflict); and 2) a significant increase in population
mortality. ([his basic definition courtesy of Dr. Michael Toole, October 23, 1995 correpespondence with author).
With the exception of the Bangladesh case, each of the case studies meets this basic criteria. As a result, complex
humanitarian emergency and humanitarian intervention are used interchangably in the other three studies.
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How this intervention unfolds is completely dependent upon the uncertain
threat within the fluid political and emergency context of the day. Importantly, the
term "threat" is not always related to security. "Threat" refers to impediments,
natural or man-made, to stabilization and/or resolution. Threat may be defined as
an impending cholera or measles epidemic; armed belligerents; or the creation of
a dependency mindset among the aid recipients.
It should also be recognized that this analysis is rather U.S.-centric. In fact,
more attention might have been paid to the United Nations, other international
organizations, other NGOs, the proper medicinal and technical approach, cost-
effectiveness, and the critical role of the people being helped. Nonetheless, it has
seemed reasonable to focus on the ideas and actions of U.S. participants -- U.S.
government, military, and NGOs -- because the collaboration and coordination
among them, although much improved, still needs considerable work. We must
first understand ourselves and our proper role before examining other factors. As
a result, this work is most decidedly a 1995 snapshot into the ever-evolving
problem of complex humanitarian emergencies and the role of NGO/military
coordination therein.
D. CONTRIBUTIONS
This thesis intends to make three contributions to the U.S. military and the
humanitarian response community. Its greatest contribution may be that it
presents the four major humanitarian interventions next to each other. At a
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minimum, such straight-forward. juxtaposition should allow all parties, no matter
their expertise or experience, to take something away from the narrative.
Each case study can be viewed as an independent element with its own
lessons, which may serve as a reference point for a similar emergency in the
future. While overarching themes are developed, the case studies are presented
in their own terms, with their own unique characteristics. Such a process
encourages the reader to develop hislher own opinion about events as they "get
their arms around" this complex subject.
The second contribution is to develop a greater awareness of how
interaction between NGOs and the military actually takes place. In an age of
coordination conferences, emerging humanitarian-speak, and peacekeeping as a
growth industry, acronyms and wire-diagrams are pristinely proselytized without,
please excuse the expression, the smell of gunsmoke. Terms like Humanitarian
Operations Center (HOC), Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) ,
and CMOC can come to dominate a discussion without an appreciation for how the
process actually unfolds on the ground during the crisis itself. This paper makes
an effort to describe and understand the daily dynamics of interaction. How is
collaboration, consensus, and coordination achieved in this type of environment?
The thesis consequently focuses, to a large degree, on the development of
some principles of coordination between the two communities. It is written, as far
as possible, from the point of view of those who operate at ground level, where,
no matter the official positions of governments or organizations, a working policy
is usually created out of nothing.
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Finally, this thesis seeks to examine the armed forceslNGOs relationship
within the ever-evolving concept of national security. Today, national security is
many things to many people. To some it is simply the age-old criteria of nation
survival and traditional vital interests. To others, it embodies trans-national issues
such as health, environment, narcotics, and refugees. Depending on one's
definition of national security, expectations as to the respective roles of the
military and the NGO necessarily vary. Ultimately, this relationship and its
analysis reflects how one understands national security in a transitory age.
To reduce the relationship between the military and the NGOs to purely
bilateral terms -- focusing solely on its operational aspects while ignoring the
intrinsic interaction of other participants as well as the influence of the political
and emergency context -- is to render the analysis artificial. Without grappling
with the larger influences that shape and manifest themselves in the NGO/military
relationship, failure, with all its implications, will loom large for both the
relationship and the national security.
Such an awareness ultimately challenges both communities in their shared
tradition of claimed apoliticalness. In an age of trespassed boundaries where
traditional parameters and definitions must be re-examined or completely
discarded in preparation for a new era, tough questions must be asked. This thesis
contends that the emerging U.S. militarylNGO relationship is not some
happenstance of a transitory time. Rather, it is a fundamental trait of a completely
new era.
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E. APPROACHING HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE NGOIU.S.
MllITARY REIATIONSHIP
Understanding the relationship between NGOs and the American military
requires an understanding of the complex dynamics at work. The case studies first
reveal that the parameters of the NGO/military relationship are most definitely
formed by the political context of a humanitarian intervention as well as by the
conditions of the emergency situation. This relationship is further delineated by
the participants, according to the shared moment itself. Moreover, there are basic
principles that govern the relationship.
Additionally, this relationship is a fundamental trait of a new era.
Consequently, the old mindsets of each community are rarely appropriate, making
the conceptual framework with which one addresses each complex humanitarian
emergency that much more important. The NGOs, for example, must comprehend
the crying need for a comprehensive and integrated response, sometimes
subjugating their charter for the good of the overall effort. On the other hand, a
linear military mindset is also generally inapplicable. With no two crises exactly
the same, the only way to address any given situation is to use a conceptual
checklist as a reference point, being fully prepared to throw it away if it does not
work. Humanitarian intervention is not a matter of "x" amount of input, for "y"
amount of days, to achieve the definable and finite "z."
In both cases, it is best to think of these situations within the conceptual
context of a protracted game of multi-dimensional chess. Every chess piece has
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its contribution to make, primary for a time, yet yielding appropriately to the other
integral components within a continuum of effort.
F. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
Coming to grips with which chess piece to play within the proper dimension
first requires us to grasp the political context of the situation. "Political," in this
sense, refers to the dynamics of the domestic (both in the U.S. and in the
intervened state), international, and host region players. There is a political
dynamic and effect within every dimension of an effort that falls under the
deceptively simple rubric of "humanitarianism."
The decision to intervene is extremely political. There are short and long
term domestic ramifications for the President and his administration. Building
international support for such an effort involves sustained political will and a
willingness to make trade-offs. Implicitly, such actions involve national prestige.
Once assigned, the military's mission reflects its political mandate. The
deployment of a foreign force to a region/state/former state is inherently political
since its presence demonstrates that there is something which the affected state
cannot, or will not, do for its own people. The presence of forces is political: they
cannot help but affect the daily life and political course of a country. These forces
also -- no matter how limited the mission -- also represent a chance for significant
change in the condition of a country. The expectations of an afflicted people make
for potentially devisive tensions once the situation stabilizes or, may prohibit
stabilization.
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Aid itself is politica1.4 It is not always the good and right answer; aid can
even exacerbate an existing crisis. In Somalia, the most complex of emergencies,
food itself became the currency of political power. He who controlled the food
controlled everything else. Even the distribution of food is an arena of "city
politics." Who gets what and when increases/decreases the political power and
prestige of local leaders.
Despite their traditional apolitical stance, NGOs are political. They have
their own agenda and their own turf. With a tradition of organizational autonomy
and a liberating perspective that allows them to act when and where they want,
they are not used to external direction, let alone the possibility that they could be
political players. Additionally, as in any other community, they compete with one
another for fund-raising purposes -- a process that, depending on an organization's
resources, can be tied to the media coverage of a complex humanitarian
emergency.
Moreover, every actor, to include the U.N. and regional actors, quite
naturally has its own self-interests. Hopefully benign in their effect, they are not
unknown to have a deleterious affect on everyone involved.
What does this context-awareness mean to those who participate in the
NGO/military relationship? In short, that they are political beings responsible for
the consequences of their actions. These case studies suggest that, even in the
presence of a clear political strategy for a humanitarian operation (which has yet
., See unpublished paper, "International Assistance and Conflict: An Explanation of Negative Impacts," by Dr.
Mary B. Anderson; and African Rights paper No.5, "Humanitarianism Unbound."
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to be the case), the leaders in the field, through their purposeful and/or aggregate
action, create and establish policy.
An anathema to the military and NGO alike -- who pride themselves on their
apolitical stance -- this awareness must be appreciated and understood. In fact,
the CMOC, as the center of civil-military collaboration and coordination, assumes
that much more importance because this center represents the intersection of both
communities' efforts. This research argues that the CMOC, or its conceptual
equivalent, must be the focus of the entire military effort and that the traditional
Tactical/Combat Operations Center should support it.
Such an understanding allows the humanitarian intervention to combat the
greatest threat resulting from its inherent political context: a short-term mentality.
A complex humanitarian emergency almost always demands a protracted
response. It requires a sustained commitment if a significant difference is to be
made. This logic is not to suggest that the American military should be
responsible for any such long-term commitment. Even in the short-run, however,
effective military action requires a long-term understanding of the situation and
the impact of short-term actions.
A CMOC as the fulcrum of an effort allows the humanitarian intent to be
kept primary as the transition to a purely civilian effort is planned from the very
beginning. Ironically, this awareness may just create greater stability in the long-
run.
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G. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION
"Emergency" refers to how the actual problem is addressed. No matter how
complex the situation, there is always a basic and common understanding of the
nature of the problem. Even in Somalia, everyone knew that it was a question of
security and food distribution. The hub around which every dimension of a
complex humanitarian emergency eventually turns is whether or not this common
understanding is translated into a shared vision of how to address the situation.
The dilemma, however, is that the translation from a common understanding to a
common sense-purposeful strategy takes time.
It takes time to determine the needs of the situation. It takes time to
understand the dynamics that impede or accelerate certain actions. It takes time
to understand the comparative advantages of other participants. It takes time to
figure out just how one's own organization fits into the continuum of effort.
Yet, as in war, time is short in the face of the need for decisive and
sufficient action. It is clear from the case studies that once a common sense
emerges from a common understanding, the process of coordination becomes
much more simple. This logic eventually points to the imperative need for an
integrated, yet flexible strategy from the beginning.
However, the case studies also clearly indicate, that the more complex a
situation the less likely it is that a shared vision, and an integrated strategy, will
result. Even assuming sustained and correct attention from the highest policy-
making circles, a shared vision is extremely difficult to develop in a complex
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situation. The implications for the NGO/military relationship are enormous. First,
it emphasizes again that the decisions of the "on-the-ground" operators carry that
much more weight: like it or not, they will collectively create a policy. Second,
they must be empowered by their respective headquarters to act with wide latitude.
It is only vis-a-vis their presence and understanding of the situation that an
overarching shared vision might present itself.
Implicit within this discussion is the fundamental prerequisite for the above
process to take place: the creation of a secure zone or area in which to conduct
relief operations. Without such a zone, not only is grasping the essence of the
emergency situation impossible, but there will be no opportunity to implement a
shared vision. Without security, there is no stability. Without stability, there is no
enduring humanitarian effect.
Creating such a zone will always be a political as well as a military act,
which, for better or for worse, will link the emergency situation irrevocably to the
political context from which it arises. Accomplishing this objective will often be
the initial focus of military effort, and the starting point for cooperation between
the armed forces and the NGOs. It, too, will take time.
The process of establishing security and restoring a tenuous stability in
order to address humanitarian needs is inherently political and almost necessarily
protracted. To accept this logic is to accept that there is no such thing as pure
humanitarian action within an inteIVention. While a common humanitarian goal
may unite all interested parties, all parties bring their own self-interest to the
proverbial table. To take account of this self-interest is not necessarilyjudgmental.
12
Rather, it accepts the process forwhat iUs: even the most altruistic individuals will
conduct themselves according to their own values. If one accepts the notion that
the first part of wisdom is addressing something by its proper name, this
awareness is paramount.
Both NGOs and the military have to "work hard at coordination, because you
will never have complete agreement."5 This assertation assaults the notion that in
order for coordination to take place, there must be prior agreement. In an
emergency situation where time is short and memoranda of understanding do not
exist, it is that much more important that the operators conceptually approach the
situation from the perspective of collaboration and consensus instead of with an
insular or hierarchical mindset.
H. THE OPERATORS
This work accepts as normal that organizations and the people in them act
according to the way they have been trained and that their values have been
enhanced as a result of being associated with a particular organization or
community. At the same time, unduly rigid ideas about institutional cultures and
organizational behavior contribute little to our understanding of how the military
and the NGOs interact in practice. In general, cultural and organizational norms
that may weigh heavily at higher echelons have far less saliency for operators in
5 Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oaklp.y (ret), National Defense University, 9 August 1995.
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the field (although the Somalia study proves something of an exception). For the
operator in the field, it is about problem-solving; it is about people.1i
Which brings us to the most essential element of the backdrop against
which these events take place: nowhere will you find more selfless, dedicated, and
professional people than you will find at the operator level in the military and the
humanitarian response community. The more research one does, the more respect
one has for the personalities involved. For most, their work is not a profession,
but a calling.
I. THE MOMENT
The final element that shapes the parameters of the NGO/military
relationship is the moment itself. At once it encompasses the polar experiences
of being human: from the idyllic of humans helping humans to the reality of
humans grating on humans in an environment that makes tremendous physical,
emotional, intellectual, and spiritual demands on its participants.
In general, there are two elements that anchor both ends of the spectrum
of experience in a humanitarian emergency. The first is the undeniable Power of
the Moment. Time and time again, individuals interviewed for this thesis recalled
how meaningful it was to participate in such an event. No matter their personal
political orientation or the perspective of the organization they were representing
(i This work does not make an attempt to analyze the actual dC!cision-making and coordination procC!ss above
the level of the operators in the field. In general, the further one is removed from the emergency at hand, the
more likely individuals are to act in the sole interest of their institution.
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at the time, most were moved bythe monumental suffering of the people they were
helping. All were happy that they contributed to alleviating the problem. Most
recognized that they were "in it together." Thus, it cannot be forgotten that these
endeavors touch the very root of human behavior. It remains important to recall
this point when one wants to dismiss certain observations as "touchy-feely."
At the other end of the experience, there is the Exhaustion of the Moment.
The operators involved in these events are not reflecting on some nine-to-five
experience pursuant to their company's quarterly business plan. It is an
experience that entails sixteen hour days, no showers, extreme conditions, and a
decision-making process that carries life-and-death implications with it. It is an
endeavor that one eats, drinks, and sleeps. It is an emergency and that mindset
shapes the agenda. Consequently, there is an ineluctable wear-and-tear on body
and soul. As in war, friction applies.
J. THE PRINCIPLES OF ALTRUISTIC SELF-INTEREST AND
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Given the situation, the operators, and the moment, we return to the most
fundamental observation of this research: that in order for the NGO/military
relationship to work, there must be an exchange of services: the relationship must
be mutually beneficial. It is in the name of humanitarianism that both
communities act. Yet the manner in which individuals of each community pursue
this "common" humanitarian goal depends on how he/she thinks and where he/she
sits; Le. their personal values and the core values and purposes of the
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organizations they represent. NGOs, by definition, are autonomous organizations
and act according to their charters. The military, by definition, is an instrument
of national policy, and therefore a political actor. Superficially, one could not ask
for two more disparate partners. While the case studies reveal many nuances to
these descriptions, it remains true that such polar partners must develop a
relationship with the clear understanding that information and services must
operate as a two-way street. Otherwise, they each act as they would anyway: the
NGO pursuing exclusively humanitarian purposes and the military providing its
own solution according to its self-contained infrastructure.
Operating according to comparative advantage in a mutually supportive
manner leaves both parties happy. Each community has something unique to
offer. The NGO usually brings humanitarian expertise, a familiarity with the
affected area, and sustained commitment. The military brings an infrastructure
that provides communication, logistics, and security. In its most simple form, the
equation works like this: the military's infrastructure leverages the NGOs into
collaboration while the NGOs provide the military their ticket home. In other
words, NGOs are willing to participate in collaboration and eventual coordination
because of the need for a comprehensive effort, not to mention that the military
will sometimes move their relief supplies and personnel for free. The military, on
the other hand, needs to transition to civilian agencies in order to withdraw
quickly -- something on which all agree.7
7 "Quickly" i!'; a relative term that will alway!'; be defined according to the !';ituation. In all case!';, however, the
military'!'; primacy in ~ continuum of effort must be relatively !';hort in duration.
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Given this mutual need, both communities must work to understand each
other prior to the crisis. Both must seek a basic agreement upon which to build
future contingency coordination.
K. RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES Mll..ITARY
That the primary mission of the American military is not humanitarian
operations remains self-evident. Nevertheless, the present study takes for granted
that complex humanitarian emergencies will continue to happen and that the
American military, when called upon, will playa part in them. It is also taken for
granted that American intervention in these situations will increasingly be viewed
as consistent with our national interests. The need to understand and master these
types of deployments must be regarded as an important, even paramount, strategic
priority.
While the military exists to represent and defend the nation's interest, to
include fighting and winning its wars, those wars are fewer and farther-between.
In the meantime, we must come to grips with the phenomenon of humanitarian
intervention. We are good enough to do both. The case studies agree.
Nevertheless, we -- along with the rest of the humanitarian response
community -- must not lose sight of a basic truth: military operations are military
operations. One of the essential contributions that armed forces can make in a
complex humanitarian emergency -- the establishment of security -- often entails
some degree of violent action or other form of direct intimidation. It is this
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process of credible coercion that prevents would-be instigators from disrupting the
humanitarian effort.
To label the military's efforts as "peace" or "other-than-war" operations,
however, is to create false expectations. Such a label automatically "lowers the
threshold of violence," to the point where these operations appear risk and
casualty-free.s How, the American public asks, can there be casualties in
operations that are about "peace" or "humanitarianism," or are "other-than-war?"
Humanitarian intervention should not be conceived of as a bloodless
exercise. The inherent risks in such an operation must be envisioned by the senior
American leadership and fully articulated to the American people. Policies that
cannot bear the risk of casualties cannot be advanced by the use of the armed
forces. That casualties in humanitarian operations may mount to a point where
an operation ceases to be worth the cost is of course true; but it is no less true in
all other forms of military action.
To lower the threshold of acceptable violence is to lower the chances of
operational success. If no casualties is the paramount concern -- something
subliminally reinforced by the "other-than-war" categorization -- then the rest of the
effort is, by definition, subordinate to it. Moreover, if the consequences of "failure"
(taking casualties) is not adequately considered, then the credibility of the nation
itself could be undermined. The fact that America disengaged from Somalia in the
" Interview with Major Geneml .James L. .Jones, USMC, ThE'! PE'!ntagon, Washington D.C., 2 August 1995.
Ge\1oml .Jones was commander of the 24th MEU (Marine Expeditionary Unit) in northern Imq during OpE'!mtion
"r :wide Comfort.
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wake of eighteen fatal casualties is more likely to have longer-term negative
implications than any other aspect of that operation, including its humanitarian
origins.
By acknowledging military operations for what they are -- military -- a
second, more subtle, truth is kept in perspective: humanitarian operations are the
pursuit of policy by other means. The humanitarian need must be the driving
vision, and political purpose, that unifies the entire effort. The specific military
objectives are implied tasks. If the military's needs, what Clausewitz calls the
"grammar" of military action, becomes preeminent, then means and ends have
become confused and failure is imminent.
The most common complaint against the military, particularly in the Somalia
case, is that security becomes an end in itself rather than an enabler to the broader
humanitarian goals. On the one hand, there is no commander alive that does not
think his first priority is bringing his troops home. This mindset is one that every
troop commander takes to war with him, fully recognizing that they will not all
come back. On the other hand, if casualties as such are intolerable, then the desire
to bring them home is amplified to the point of distortion. The humanitarian intent
of the larger policy is now a distant second because the soldiers themselves have
become a political chess piece as opposed to a political implementor.
If strategic policy-makers cling too tightly to the humanitarian label, while
ignoring the local political realities of humanitarian intervention and
implementation, they in turn force military personnel to develop their own tactical
solutions. Instead of implementing a higher policy that accounts for on-the-ground
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political realities, the military operator must now make political decisions in order
to simply address the humanitarian need. He is no longer a tool, but a creator, of
policy.
In fact, military personnel have been severed from any higher political
purpose, because that purpose has not been articulated by the senior policy-
m'akers who view humanitarian operations as separate and different from
traditional political concerns. Separated from their political purpose in an
environment not their own, it becomes much easier for the military to operate
according to its needs. It now becomes quite possible to confuse military means
with humanitarian ends.
Hence, if one accepts that militaries do military things (and may take
casualties) in pursuit of a larger policy, then there should not be a problem. This
traditional understanding demands that senior decision-makers consider
humanitarian interventions with the same rigor of analysis that they would any
wartime deployment of armed forces. There will be an irreconcilable problem,
however, if the threshold of violence is lowered to the point where military
instruments of policy have been separated from a political purpose. If there is no
high-level consideration of the political reality on-the-ground and the possible need
for credible coercion, then the deployed soldier or Marine has simply become a
target -- a direct link to a United States policy change.
Also clearly evident from the case studies, is this corollary: that the military
can never be in charge. If it is in charge, then it inevitably denies the
humanitarian effort and, ironically, prevents its own departure. If the military
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conceives of its role from the beginning as a means to an end, and acts to support
civilian efforts, then civilians will remain responsible for the overall strategy and
for the end-state that results. If the exigencies of military action are allowed to
predominate, however, one of two things will happen: 1) the military will leave too
quickly (because it is afraid of nation-building); or 2) the military will stay too long
(because no one else can do it, the military takes on the task of nation-building).
Ultimately, decisive results are the realm of the NGOs in conjunction with other
lOs and the indigenous authorities. Logically, theirs is the dominant role, and the
larger responsibility.
L. THE CONTINUUM
This balance of mutually supporting comparative advantages suggests that
there is a continuum of effort. In military terminology, this continuum moves from
the left, "humanitarianism," to the right, "nation-building," the latter being a mission
that the post-Vietnam military has fiercely rejected. One thing that is apparent
from these four case studies, however, is that they are strongly inclined to occupy
the "grey-area" between humanitarianism and nation-building. It is also clearly
evident that the proper role of the military is, in fact, to help move the continuum
from band-aid humanitarianism towards conditions which may allow for nation-
building. It short, its job is to enable "marginal self-sufficiency."!>
" Telephone interview with Andmw Nat!iio!i, 23 AugtJ!it 1995.
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Once a relative stability has been achieved in the local environment, it is not
the job of the military to be involved in full-time restoration and/or reconciliation -
- to be involved in nation-building. But, to simply say that we only do
humanitarian operations while we do not do nation-building, is to ignore the reality
of the in-between and of those who will remain behind once we depart. If we
recognize that reality and its corresponding actions, only then will we have a
chance to make a lasting impact.
Once the military has recognized its proper place, it must adjust its concepts
of "time" and "decisiveness." Even under the best of circumstances, humanitarian
operations are likely to be protracted, more likely to be measured in months than
in weeks. Likewise, the NGOs must accept a role for the military while they also
adjust to the need for a comprehensive effort and the other-than-humanitarian
impacts of their actions. In any case, there will be no single event or one day
when decisive "victory" is achieved. That day will come long after the military has
gone. The military must realize that it is its aggregate actions in the early stages
that are most important in the long run. In the short term, success is measured
according to the identification of 1) our contribution to the continuum of effort;
and 2) the process by which we will transition to civilian agencies.
Both of these measures of effectiveness are determined, in part, by how well
the military and the NGO communities understand each other; and, by how well
they square-dance together.
The following maps have been included in order to give the reader an
overview of the areas discussed in the case studies, as well as a point of reference.
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ll. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
A. INTRODUCTION
Encouraged by American radio-casts to rise up against their dictator, the
Kurds of northern Iraq rebelled against a nominally defeated and certainly
weakened Saddam Hussein in March of 1991. Although enjoying initial success,
the rebellion was quickly and ruthlessly crushed by the Republican Guard. In the
vacuum of the Kurdish military collapse between March 27th and April 2nd, over
a million Kurds fled Iraq. By the end of the first week in April, there were
approximately 800,000 Kurds in Iran, 300,000 in southeastern Turkey, and another
100,000 along the Turkish-Iraqi border. On April 5th, President Bush ordered the
military to assist the Kurds, primarily through airdrops. As the situation grew
worse, with somewhere between 500 and 1000 Kurds dying each day in 8000 foot
mountain passes, it was readily apparent that something else had to be done. On
April 16th President Bush, in conjunction with European allies, announced the
creation of a security zone in northern Iraq. A multinational military force would
stabilize the situation and work to return the Kurds to their homes in northern
Iraq from the Turkish mountains. Transition to civilian agencies -- the United
Nations and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) working in the area --
would take place as quickly as possible. This effort became known as Operation
Provide Comfort. 10
In Provide Comfort would deal only with the Kurds that had gone into Turkey. The Kurds that fled into Iran
were allowed to assimilate or develop sustainable camps there.
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By May 13th, the UN had taken ceremonially control of the town of Zakho,
the primary transition site in northern Iraq between the mountain refugee camps
and the original homes of the Kurds. By June 1st, CARE had taken over the
distribution of food. By June 4th, the population of the Turkish mountain refugee
camps was almost non-existent. By June 7th, the original US forces sent in
support of Provide Comfort began to pull out. By July 15th, most coalition forces
had been withdrawn, leaving a small contingent force behind. Operation Provide
Comfort continues to this day.
Universally deemed a great and continuing success, Operation Provide
Comfort hinged on the ability of coalition military forces to transition to civilian
agencies, particularly the United Nations. 11 One relationship absolutely critical to
this process was that between the American military and the NGOs present.
Unprecedented in its scale and scope, this relationship's necessity surprised both
communities.
With one community hierarchically organized for decision and the other
decentralized according to need and individual charter, this seemingly
dichotomous relationship proved to be one of the linchpins of success. An Army
Lieutenant Colonel, responsible for NGO coordination in Diyarbakir, Turkey,
acknowledged unequivocally that the NGO personnel in Kurdistan were ''very
talented" people who knew the humanitarian business: "we don't, they're the
11 Although slow in the initial response, it has been the U.N.'s presence that today has allowed for continued
stability and the withdrawal of even the NGOs.
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experts."12 This respect found reciprocation among the NGOs. The use of the
military, according to one NGO worker, particularly its inherent logistics
capability, was "phenomenal." Overall, the militarylNGO relationship was "pretty
remarkable [in] how well it worked."l~ Indeed, one NGO representative suggested
that the reason this relationship worked so well was because the "military and
NGOs had things common: that can-do attitude."14
Given the nature of their organizational structures, not to mention the
respective cultures that result from these structures and the polar purposes that
drives them, the above comments are truly "remarkable." This chapter argues that
in the unique circumstances of April-May 1991, several factors allowed for the
success of the NGO/military relationship. Strategically, almost by default, the
humanitarian intent was kept primary throughout the entire operation. With no
time to react, no doctrine to act by, and no governments able to formulate a
directive policy, the political and military tasks were left to be discovered by those
on the spot. If the action supported the saving of lives and the return of the Kurds,
it was done. Whether it was a Special Forces soldier administering direct aid or
the inclusion of Dohuk into the security zone, the action took place. Ultimately,
this lesson of a humanitarian intent kept primary is the most important one.
12Telephone intetview with Colonel.John Petrella, USAR, 12 May 1995.
1:1'elephone intetview with Mark Gorman, 16 May 1995. Mr. Gorman worked for the International Refugee
Committee (lRC) at the time.
l4Telephone intetview with Kevin Henry, CARE, 17 May 1995.
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Operationally, there were five factors that contributed to success within this
strategic scope. First, despite the fact that the American military was in charge of
the coalition responsible for Provide Comfort, the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (0FDNU.S. Agency for International Development) DisasterAssistance
Response Team (DART) was, in effect, managing the situation and establishing
strategy. Second, the military commanders on the ground recognized the DART
expertise and utilized their judgment. Third, the Special Forces (SF) initially sent
into the Turkish mountains were absolutely critical in stabilizing the situation (to
include the establishment of an initial rapport with the NGOs). Fourth, the Army
Civil Affairs (CA) officers responsible for NGO interaction/coordination,
particularly in Zakho, were exceptional people with a clear understanding of the
situation at hand. Fifth, that the NGOs had the same caliber of people leading
their effort to address the humanitarian emergency.
This chapter will focus on the fusion points of coordination between the
NGO community and the military. It pays particular attention to the Zakho CMOC,
which proved to be the pivotal point of coordination. Moreover, the narrative will
demonstrate that the CMOC, in terms of NGO liaison, is not so much a military-
designated place and time, but a "floating" and continuous process. Finally, as with
the following case study on Operation Sea Angel, very specific attention is given
to the actual meeting of the two communities in order to witness the process of
collaboration and consensus. The reason for this concentration on the dynamics
of the relationship -- to include its stereotypes -- is twofold. First, along with
Bangladesh, which happens more or less concurrently, these operations represent
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the first time that both communities encounter one another. Neither side was in
anyway prepared for such interaction. Second, the NGO/military dynamics prove
to be relatively the same in the Somalia and Rwanda case studies. Consequently,
not as much time is spent in these chapters on the coordination process itself and
the stereotypes that existed beforehand.
B. POLITICAL CONTEXT
As late as April 4th, the official position of the Bush Administration, was to
condemn the Iraqi repression of the Kurds (vis-a-vis the U.N.) and encourage relief
agencies, but basically present a "hands-off policy in the failed anti-Saddam
uprising."15 Despite the initiation of airdrops on April 6th, the administration was
not inclined towards the commitment of U.S. troops into southeastern Turkey and
northern Iraq. Proceeding cautiously, the administration had some acute concerns:
1) an open-ended engagement; 2) affecting the regional balance of power by
empowering an ethnic group that had no state; and 3) the issue of Iraqi
sovereignty. On April 10th, under increasing European pressure to put
humanitarian concerns above political ones,16 the White House issued a warning
to Iraq that it should not interfere with the relief effort of the Kurds in northern
Iraq. Senior administration officials said that the warning would "rely on the
15 Tony Caplan, "U.S. Presses U.N. Condemnation, Urges Relief," UPI, BC Cycle, International Section, 4 April
1991.
'"Particularly the British and the French. It was Prime Minister John Major who originally made the Kurds
an international issue and suggested the formation of a "safe enclave" in northern Iraq. ([he British announced
on 4 April 1991 that they were pledging 35 million dollars for Kurdish reliet).
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presence of international emergency relief workers to deter Saddam's forces from
attacking," thereby creating a de facto safe zone. 17 White House Spokesman
Marlin Fitzwater, in a separate statement, emphasized that "we're not doing
anything to violate territorial integrity. Nobody wants to establish another country
inside Iraq."11>
The administration was very sensitive to the delicacy of Turkish desires.
Turkey had been a great ally during the war. Not only had it allowed "Proven
Force" to take place,19 it had shut off its oil flow, at great cost, to Iraq. This
support had to be carefully balanced against traditional Turk-Kurd relations and
the crisis at hand. Two significant events, however, quickly changed the nature
of addressing the problem. On April 15th, Hayri Kozakcoglu, the emergency-rule
governor, or "super-governor," of eastern Turkey announced that Turkey would
officially support the Kurdish relief effort. This decision soon transformed the
border-town of Silopi (a hajj pilgrimage way station for Muslim pilgrims) into a
relief hub. Publicly inviting the UN and private relief agencies to assist in the aid
effort, Kozakcoglu explained, "we do not claim that we have done the best."
Because the plight of the Kurds was approaching catastrophic proportions, Turkey
17.John E. Yang, Ann Devroy, "U.S. Seeks to Protect Kurd Refugee Areas; Iraq Warned Against Air Operations
in North," The Washington Post, 11 April 1991, p. AI.
,. Rita Beamish, 'White House Says Northern Iraq is Safe Haven for Kurds," AP, AM Cycle, 11 April 1991.
'" Proven Force was the operational name for the air campaign, based in Turkey, against Iraq dUring the Gulf
War.
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could not handle it alone. "Turkey should not be left alone with this problem ...
all the world is responsible."20
Secondly, afterconsultation with European allies, President Bush announced
the following plan on April 16th: 1) Due to the difficult logistical access to the
remote mountain refugee camps, other refugee camps would be established in
more negotiable terrain and managed by coalition military forces; 2) The UN (and
the NGO community) would take over administrative control of the camps as soon
as possible. Bush stressed that this action was "purely humanitarian," was not a
step towards a long intervention in Iraq, and that it was in keeping with UN
resolution 688.21 It was under these auspices, on April 19th, that Combined Task
Force (CTF) Provide Comfort -- already established in Incirlik, and Silopi, Turkey,
to support the airdrops -- moved its military forces into northern Iraq.
C. EMERGENCY SITUATION
The Kurds are the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East. There are
estimated to be some ten million in Turkey, five million in Iran, 600,000 in Syria,
and 300,000 in the former Soviet Union. They are a tribal-based and highly
educated society whereby clan and patriarch often take priority over any pan-Kurd
ideas. Because of this proud parochialism, and the larger established states
211 Blaine Harden, ''Turkey to Move Iraqi Refugees; Effort Would Ease Harsh Living Conditions," The
Wa~hington Post, 16 April 1991, p. AI. The article also mentions that the word "Kurd" was never used in any of
the official Turkish documents announcing the change in policy.
21 Facts on File World News Digest, "Aid to Kurds Stepped Up as Refugee Crisis Escalates," [nternational Affairs
Section, 18 April 1991, p. 269, AI.
35
around them, the Kurds have never achieved an independent state. Due to their
resulting minority status within the aforementioned states, the Kurds have often
been the victims of severe oppression. Beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it
to say that there is deep enmity between the Kurds and the Turks, as well as
between the Kurds and the Iraqis (who had gassed Kurd villages as recently as
1988).
The scale of the March uprising had taken the traditional Kurd guerrillas,
the Peshmerga ("those who face death"), aback as they had no chance to direct or
even channel this spontaneous outburst against long oppression. The Iraqis struck
back quickly and it was soon a matter of armor and artillery against AK-47s. "All
of a sudden, we found ourselves trying to be a government, an army, a police
force, a judiciary and a relief organization facing a major catastrophe. We just
didn't have the experience or the capability. We couldn't cope.,,22 Such was the
immediate retrospective opinion of Massoud Barzani, leader of the Kurdish
Democratic Party.
Almost immediately, entire city populations fled with only that which they
could carry. As they entered the snow-covered mountain passes, the journey
began to take its toll. Elderly Kurds died and were left unburied by the roadside.
As their condition weakened, Kurds quickly became susceptible to disease. Most
importantly was the lack of potable water. Bad water inevitably means the advent
of dysentery, diarrhea, and cholera. Kurds were literally defecating themselves to
U .Jim Muir, "Kurds Assess Why Revolt Against Saddam Failed," Special to The Christian Science Monitor, 6
May 1991, p. 1.
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death. On thin roads in steep terrain, sanitation was soon as much a problem as
the lack of water. Adding injury to injury was the prevalence of land mines.
Crowded, weakened, disease-ridden, and walking through their own waste and
over their own bodies, the Kurds were on the brink. As one American observed,
"the Kurds were in a humble, humble, situation."z3
D. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: THE NATURE OF COMPLEX
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
Given the context of this overwhelming and complex emergency, there was
only one organization in the world that had the capability to comprehensively
address the need. "Logistics is the name of the game. There is no institution in
the world better equipped for this than the military."Z4 Echoing this common
understanding was Congressman Matthew F. McHugh, who led a Congressional
fact-finding mission to the Kurdish refugee camps on April 18th. In a remarkably
prescient commentary, the members of this trip, in their hearing before the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, laid out an accurate description of the nature of
complex humanitarian emergencies that result in humanitarian intervention.
These points suggested by Representative McHugh, in one form or another, are
the common traits of post-Cold War humanitarian intervention. Quoted at length
from the actual hearing, the points have been categorized by the author.
2' Telephone interview with Colonel .John o. Easton, USMCR (retired), 25 May 1995.
*[Note: All ranks used in the case studies are those held at the time of the operation.]
245 Daniel E. Conway, then the Ankara representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
As quoted by Clyde Haberman, "U.S. Presses Military Relief Effort; Hungary Kurds Await Rescue From Mud and
Cold," Special to The New York Times, 14 April 1991, p. 10.
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1. [Sudden and overwhelming emergency]: These numbers are not only
large, but came together in just a few days. This is unprecedented, and
indeed, it overwhelmed the capacity of the neighboring governments
and the international and relief agencies to cope with it ...
2. [No one else can do the job]: The simple truth is that if our military
were not doing it, many more people would die . . . because these
people are so remotely located, because no other agency has the
capacity to reach them, it is appropriate that we respond with our
military forces today.
3. [The need to incoffiorate the professional humanitarians]: We also
believe that it's important for the traditional international humanitarian
organizations to assume responsibility for this humanitarian relief as
soon as is practical ...
4. [A common understanding of the nature of the problem]: It is also
unanimously agreed that these people have to be brought down off the
mountains into lower-lying areas because they cannot adequately be
helped ...
5. lThe undeniable political dimension]: But for the most part Turkey is
unwilling or unable to absorb more refugees ... And it's for that reason
that the camps are going to be established in low-lying areas in northern
Iraq. This, of course, poses certain political as well as technical
problems. If we expect the humanitarian agencies to take over
providing humanitarian refugees in Iraq, there is the question of Iraqi
government consent ... there would have to be at least informal
consent by the Iraqi government before the UN agencies, working with
private voluntary organizations, could take over from us this
humanitarian effort. So there is the political problem ...
6. [The fundamental building block: Security]: But perhaps more
seriously in the long run, there is the question of security. Because in
order to get the Kurds to come down from the mountains, to say nothing
of allowing them to go home, they must be assured that they have
security ... But we do not think that the United States military should
be a long-term provider of either humanitarian relief or security in Iraq.
And yet the Kurds will need that kind of assurance.
7. [Transition and U.S. exit strategy]: So the question becomes, who
replaces the United States and our other friends in providing the
security arrangements as well as the humanitarian assistance ...
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8. [The need for strongptesidentialleadership and unity of command at
the operational level] : We think this requires strong political leadership.
.. if we expect the UN and other international agencies and private
voluntary organizations to assume responsibility for the humanitarian
assistance, for example, they will need more money ... the President
should consider the possibility of appointing a high level official within
his administration to facilitate the movement of these requests and help
the interagency processes move rapidly. This is an emergency, and it
may be that this is one of those cases where the President should have
a person with political clout acting for him to clear the traps within the
bureaucracy ...25
These traits manifest themselves in each of the case studies. The politics of
sovereignty, security, transition, and leadership within a complex emergency
problem directly affect, if not define, the context of, and the decisions made
therein, the NGO/military relationship. In southeast Turkey there was thus a clear
and common understanding of the problem. The question remained, however,
how was it to be translated into an effective plan, a common sense that provided
guidance to all participants?
E. MISSION
The mission given to the US military, according to the President Bush's 16
April announcement, was threefold. The immediate objective was to stop the
suffering and dying, stabilizing the refugee camps' population to as normal
conditions as possible. The second objective was to move the Kurds from the
refugee camps in the Turkish mountains to transition camps around Zakho, in
2S Representative Matthew F. McHugh, Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 23 April 1991. Federal
Information Systems Corporation. FClderal News Service.
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northern Iraq. The third stage called for the return of the Kurds to their original
villages and towns.Zfl Lieutenant General John M. Shalikashvili was appointed to
oversee the effort. This mission statement accurately described, as in Congress,
a common understanding of the nature of the problem. Imperatively, it did not
delineate specific military tasks, nor did it account for any political goals. The
"how" would have to come out of the field according to the only guidance provided:
the humanitarian intent of saving lives and returning the Kurds home.
F. RESPONSE STRUCTURE
By April 22nd, the basic structure that was to facilitate the movement of the
Kurds back to northern Iraq was in placeP The Combined Task Force
headquartered itself at Incirlik Air Force Base, Adana, Turkey. Two subordinate
joint task forces (JTFs) were established to facilitate mission accomplishment.
Spread throughout the mountains of southeast Turkey, JTF "Alpha" was
headquartered in Silopi and largely responsible for the first component of the
mission: stop the dying and suffering while stabilizing the situation. Commanded
by Brigadier General Richard Potter, USA, Alpha was composed primarily of the
lOth Special Forces (SF) Group.
2" Lieutenant General.John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Opening Statement Before the Subcommittee on Readiness,
House Armed Services Committec, U.S. House of Representatives, 31 March 1992.
27 US forces were able to respond 50 quickly because the infrastructure was already there to support the Gulf
War. European Command was still running Proven Force and the reservists, particularly thc Civil Affairs
personnel, were still activated and in southern Iraq.
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Sent in, at first, to coordinate drop zones and food distribution on April 6th,
the Green Berets were soon involved in much more than that. With little to no
initial NGO presence, they quickly became an integral part of such traditional
humanitarian tasks as census taking, camp organizing, and food distribution. As
NGOs (based out of Diyarbakir, Turkey, just to the north of the camps) began to
trickle in, the Special Forces looked to hand-off their responsibilities to them as
the SF troops focused on facilitating the movement of the Kurds down to Zakho.
The 10th accomplished this task by setting up way-stations, or Humanitarian
Service Support Detachments (HSSDs), along the primary routes to Zakho from
the eight major refugee camps.2R
The second component formed was JTF "Bravo." Commanded by Major
General Jay Garner, USA, Bravo's mission was to prepare Zakho for the incoming
Kurds and facilitate their eventual transfer back to their homes. More specifically,
Bravo was to integrate civilian agencies into the second and third elements of the
military's mission statement, thereby providing for a seamless transfer. This effort
took form when JTF Bravo moved its headquarters from SHopi to Zakho on April
20th, setting itself up at the old headquarters of the 44th Iraqi infantry division.2!l
This time period witnessed NGOs slowly coming to Zakho from Diyarbakir, and
later, directly from Incirlik. It also marked the first time in the operation that
2>l ThClre WClre a total of forty-threCl refugee sites in the Turkish mountains. The ei~ht largest camps ranged in
sizCl from 5,000 to 120,000 pCloplCl in one location.
2" Bravo soon movCld to thCl ~rain ClIClvator complClx on the outsidCl of town bClcause the complex was closer to
the transit camps later built 1.5 miles away; it had better and more space for the command element; and because
it was more secure.
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NGOs and the military were formally working hand-in-hand in a loosely structured
and agreed-upon format.
While Alpha's mission was imperative, Bravo was the fulcrum. Assuming
the Kurds decided to come out of the mountains at all (1) if they were not handled
properly in transit; (2) or did not feel safe and secure upon arrival; (3) the situation
risked an indefinite state of affairs. Moreover, if the preceding three conditions
were met, how to transition to the UN and the NGOs? These tasks were easier
said than done; especially when one considers that Provide Comfort was the
largest and most complex humanitarian operation attempted by the military since
World War II.
Finally, before discussing the humanitarian implementation of such a
structure, it is extremely important not to lose sight of the dual nature of this
operation. The humanitarian effort was successful only becasue a secure
environment was created and then sustained. Bill Coops, formerly of IRC and now
of Northwest Medical Teams, provides the most telling evidence of this logic.
Coops, who is of the philosophy that true relief and development means a
commitment to the community after the emergency, stayed on in northern Iraq for
another two years. He unequivocally states that "everything [from relief to the
continuing development effort] is made possible because of that F-15 or 16 that
flies overhead" and the power that it represents. "Nothing is possible without it;
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all the relief on the ground is nothing without security ... relief work is a creative
act, it is much easier to destroy: anyone who has the freedom to destroy it, will."30
G. oFDA: EMPOWERED TO FIND THE "HOW'
Within two weeks of the first US troops deployed to the region, there was
the skeleton of a structure to facilitate the three goals of the coalition effort.
Thanks to the universally acclaimed efforts of the 10th Special Forces Group, the
stopping of the dying and suffering was well on its way to being accomplished, as
NGOs complemented the response in an ad hoc manner. Situated in Zakho to
effect the transfer of the Kurds to their homes as it prepared to transition to
civilian agencies was JTF Bravo -- but a problem remained. The Kurds were still
in the mountains and were not going to come down until they felt safe to do so.
It was impossible, however, to maintain that number of people in the remote
mountain passes. To begin with, the snows would soon be melting, thus removing
a significant source of water. In the opinion of an OFDA expert, it just was not
economically feasible to bring in water and food for 400,000 people.31 Additionally,
the Turks, despite conducting diplomacy in the name of humanitarianism, did not
want the Kurds there.32 Finally, as David Jones, then Deputy Director for Oxfam,
30 Telephone intelView with Bill Coops, 5 June 1995.
31 Telephone intelView with Ronald Libby, OFDA, 19 May 1995.
32 For instance, according to multiple sources, the Turkish government, vis-a-vis the Turkish Red Crescent
Society, did not stop NGOs from coming, but they "certainly did nothing to facilitate" them either. Most NGOs
ended up, for example, doing their banking through a private oil firm because the Turkish government insisted
on everything being done in cash.
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UK, relates, the Kurdish condition was the result of the Gulf War and "we were
morally responsible. The only option was to get them down."~~
But how to bring the Kurds down? The military had no doctrine of how to
conduct such an operation. The NGOs had not been in place prior to the crisis;
nor had they any experience in working with the military. They also did not have
any collective or comprehensive experience with an emergency of this magnitude.
It was a new world for both parties. It was a new world for the OFDA DART as
well. Although recognized for their professionalism and emergency expertise,
OFDA had almost no experience working side-by-side with the military in the
field.~4
It was not, however, a new world for Fred Cuny, an emergency expert that
OFDA had specifically contracted for this situation. With decades of experience
in these matters, to include working with militaries around the world, Cuny would
prove to be the center of gravity, a touchstone of vast expertise, that allowed
everything to fall into place.35
The OFDA DART team had arrived at Incirlik on April 11th. They had
several things going for them. First, they were recognized as experts in their field
""Telephone interview with David .Jones, 10 May 1995.
:l4 This inexperience did not manifest itself tactically. Beyond the purpose of this paper, there were, however,
strategic manifestations of this inexperience. Incirlik and European Command were not quite sure what the
DART's relationship was to the command structure. There was also consternation overthe relaying of information
back to Washin~on. DART had a direct line to the Department of State. The military, by definition, had several
layers of bureaucracy through which to sift its information before it got back to the Pentagon. The resulting
disparity witnessed State finding out things before the Pentagon.
:.., His recent death in Russia is not only mourned by friends, but by those future complex humanitarian
emergency victims who would have been helped.
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and were well-known to the NGOs. Second, they commanded universal respect
based on their past efforts. Third, they were comparatively small, initially only
twelve people (the DART later grew to nearly thirty, the biggest team ever sent to
the field by OFDA). Fourth, due to their expertise and numbers, they were able to
identify the crucial nodes of coordination and establish appropriate "liaisons" in
Incirlik, Diyarbakir, Zakho, and in the camps themselves.3fi Moreover, the DART
was generally self-sustaining. For example, their organic satellite communications
enabled real-time information to one another and back to Washington D.C.
Finally, their credibility was immeasurably enhanced by the money behind
them. By law, once a region has been declared a "disaster area" by the Department
of State, the DART can spend United States government money on the spot.
Importantly, they are not implementing funded programs themselves; instead, they
are selecting and funding NGOs according to the area need and the expertise of
the NGO. Rare is the NGO that has not taken money from oFDA. In any
humanitarian emergency, the DART is a powerful force and instrumental to a
successful resolution. Mao's famous dictum, revisedfor humanitarian consumption,
is more than appropriate: "power flows out of the barrel of a checkbook."37 The
DART would spend close to twenty-seven million dollars.
36 "Liaison" is a relative term because it only manifested itself as a permanent position at the most important
levels, Le. Incirlik and Zakho (and even then, as necessary). Otherwise, the team members were "floating," keeping
a pulse on the situation and tapping into all the various sources of information.
37 Telephone interview with Bill Coops, 6 June 199:;.
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The DART was headed by Dayton Maxwell, a career foreign service officer,
and assisted by Fred Cuny, the president of Intertech, a humanitarian emergency
consulting firm. It was Cuny who came up with the strategy of ensuring that the
Kurds came out of the mountains while Maxwell, who had the equivalent rank of
Major General, approved the strategy and had the final say. As Maxwell points
out, it was much more a matter of strategy than common sense or even a specified
plan. The plan can change from day-to-day and the common understanding of the
situation can be obvious, but if there is no over-arching strategy, or conceptual
end-state to delineate daily operations, then there can be no success.38
H. CUNY'S STRATEGY
The "how" of moving the Kurds off the mountain was a delicate political
issue. As mentioned before, the Turks did not want them there. The Kurd leaders,
on the other hand, had publicly stated that they were not leaving until their
security in northern Iraq could be assured.39 If this position were allowed to
become cast in bronze, there was no way the proud Kurds would come out of the
mountains. As long as Saddam Hussein was in power and they were not protected
from him, they were guaranteed more death below in northern Iraq than above in
the untenable camps.
"B Telephone intelView with Dayton Maxwell, 26 May 95.
3" Lieutenant Colonel Ronald .I. Brown, USMCR, the Marine historian in northern Iraq with the 24th MEU,
quotes an anonymous Kurd: 'We would rather live like dogs than be slaughtered like pigs." (Unpublished
manuscript, 'With Combine!d Task Force Provide! Comfort: U.S. Marine! Se!curity and Humanitarian Operations
in Northern Iraq, 1991," p. 74.J OriginaIly, the! Kurds had stated that the!y would not come down until Hussein
was removed from power.
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Before describing Cuny's actualization of the "how," the obvious should be
stated: that it was not premeditated, but emerged spontaneously over a few weeks;
and that it had to be approved by higher authorities. But make no mistake, this
strategy of operationalizing the common understanding came from Cuny.40 The
strategy was fivefold, based on the conceptual end-state that the Kurds had to be
returned to their homes and that the continuing operation had to be run by the
UNHCR and assorted NGOS.41
The first step was the placement and construction of the transit camps. As
originally intended, American forces were to build the camps directly across the
border in a traditional military grid. Cuny pointed out that this location was poor
for two reasons. The closer the camps were to Zakho, the easier it would be to
extend municipal facilities like water and electricity. Additionally, the closer the
camps were to Zakho the more likely it was that actual Zakho residents returned
to their former homes. This process would build immediate local stability and
make further room for Kurds in the camps who were not from the Zakho area. 42
Moreover, Cuny was the primary designer of the camp itself. The basic
configuration -- an eight tent square, with two a-side, centered on a common space
-- encouraged relative privacy and the strong familial ties of the Kurds.
.,,, Blaine Harden went so far as to call Cuny the "chief designer" of the allied plan. "U.S. Troops Order Iraqi
Police Away; Marines Step Up Work on Tent Camps; Kurds Remain Wary," The Wa.~hington Post, 23 April 1991,
p. AI.
·11 This plan necessarily assumed that SF would indeed be successful in stabilizing the situation in the Turkish
mountains.
42 Maxwell, 26 May 1995.
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Second, the Kurds had to want to come out of the mountains. There was
only one key to this locked door: the Kurds had to feel that they would be safe
back in northern Iraq. It was not enough to announce a security zone and state
that it was safe; nor was it enough to build transit camps and assume that they
would come. The Kurds had to be convinced. It had always been Cuny's
philosophy to work with the leaders of refugee groups and utilize and invigorate
their existing internal infrastructure. 43 This concept was applied in two ways.
Kurdish men were invited down to help construct the camps. Ostensibly to include
them in the solution, the main objective was to demonstrate the safety of the area.
Of the some 872 men brought down, very few stayed to help construct the camps.
Most went back to the mountains to get their families. 44
The second step towards solving this dilemma came in the form of
Peshmerga leaders approaching General Gamer, seeking to establish how they
could help. General Gamer directed them to Cuny and Maxwell.45 Cuny invited
them, and eventually other Kurd leaders, to see the camps for themselves. Soon,
the military was flying Kurd leaders down from the refugee camps to visit Zakho
and the transition camps. This effort had a tremendous impact. After two to three
weeks of just sitting in the mountains, doing nothing, and watching other people
43 Natsios, 16 January 1995, Washington, D.C. This philosophy had been unknowingly complemp.nted by the
SF practice of seeking and working with village eldp.rs wherever they went.
44 Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Michael Hess, USAR, 11 May 1995. LTC Hess commandp.d the
CMOC in Zakho.
4[, This simple act of General Garner's is symbolic of his understanding of the situation. He left the refugee
problems to the refugee experts. In other words, he did not attempt to provide answers to problems with which
he was not experienced.
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support your own people, it was a big deal to be a part of the solution -- not to
mention the prestige of being singled out as a VIP by the military and given access
to the helicopters.4fi
Even with the apparent safety of the transition camps, the presence of the
24th MEU, and an eastward expanding security zone, there remained the problem
of the 300 Iraqi regular police who were still in Zakho. As long as they were there,
the Kurds would not feel secure. Cuny's solution, based on his experience with the
Kuwaiti Task Force, was simple. If the police were publicly identified, to include
wearing an ID badge, then they would be accountable. This concept worked
perfectly as the 300 Iraqi police soon fled the area.
The fourth measure taken to operationalize the common understanding was
the inclusion of Dohuk into the security zone at the end of May. (As many as
300,000 of the refugees were originally from Dohuk). Maxwell necessarily took
the lead here as the senior government official on hand. If Dohuk were not
included, then a permanent, 'winterized' refugee camp of 300,000 would have to
be established around Zakho (something far more costly). This possibility not only
directly influenced Zakho's ability to return to normal, it also brought up political
questions of how long the camp would stay there and who would administer it.
Eventually, Dohuk was edged into the security zone.
Finally, Cuny would eventually be responsible for drafting the transition
plan to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
40 Telephone interview with Major David Elmo, USAR, 14 may 1995. Major Elmo, was a Civil Affairs officer
working up in the refugee camps and had been there from the beWnning.
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No matter the organization represented, the rank held, or the contribution
made, one and all had the same two words for the role played by the OFDA team:
they were absolutely "pivotal" and "integral" to the success of Operation Provide
Comfort. It was their efforts that laid the groundwork for a successful
NGO/military relationship. Cuny should be singled out. As Andrew Natsios, then
director of OFDA, recalled, Cuny was "the mind behind it ... he [was] the premier
master strategist in complex humanitarian emergencies.fl47
I. NGOIU.S. MillTARY COLlABORATION AND COORDINATION
Given the political context and the emergency situation, it was the above
structure and, more importantly, strategy that framed the relationship between the
NGOs and the U.S. military. Again, it should be emphasized that both
communities had no previous experience working with the other or with an
emergency of this overwhelming nature. As Lieutenant Colonel Hess remarked,
"I didn't know what a NGO or DART was -- never heard of them before."48 The
NGOs certainly had no idea either about the American military. This discussion
now examines the various NGO/military fusion points before focusing on the all-
important NGO/military coordination in Zakho.
47 Natsios, 16 January 1995.
48 Hp.ss, 9 May 95.
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J. IN THE MOUNTAIN CAMPS
When the military and the first NGOs arrived, the death rate was
somewhere between 500 and 1000 deaths a day. The Special Forces companies
were assigned refugee camps and instructed to stop the dying and suffering.
The SF deployment evolved into what was, essentially, a four-phase
program. The Assessment phase lasted about five days as Operation Detachment
Alphas (ODAs) deployed to figure out just what was going on in the forty-three
different refugee sites. The second phase witnessed the creation of infrastructure
support such as communications, security, and landing/drop zones (LZsIDZs) for
supplies. This phase was approximately two weeks in length. The sustainment
and support phase included working with the Kurds, getting to know the clan
structure and its various leaders, as well as integrating the NGOs. It also meant
the development of technician teams, engineers or medics, in support of the
humanitarian effort. (Often, NGOs would simply attach themselves to these teams
and nominally become a part of the infrastructure). The final stage was the
relocation stage as the Kurds were escorted off the mountains.49
Simply by their presence, the Green Berets provided reassurance and an
instant infrastructure through which to alleviate the suffering. This presence was
imperative to the effort's success. The SF cultural training, particularly their
understanding of peoples, and reputation did much to diffuse tensions between
-to IntClview with Captain Askold Kobasa, USA, Monterey, California, 31 May 1995. Captain Kobasa was a
member of Bravo Company, 2nd Battalion, 10th SFG. These phases descriptions were terms Kobasa used to paint
the conceptual picture. They are not official doctrine. They do, however, serve the purpose of describing how
order is brought out of sheer chaos.
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and among the Kurds, and between the Kurds and the Turks.50 By addressing
basic health concerns and working intimately with the local leaders, the SF were
able to ascertain needs and prioritize them as food and medical supplies were
airlifted into the camps.
As the NGOs began to trickle in, two different types of people and
organizations came into contact for the first time in the post-Cold War era. NGOs,
according to their charter, interests, expertise, and personalities essentially set up
wherever they wanted. The military's first impression was not a positive one. SF
officers trying to administer would inform NGOs that they were in their "sector."
The NGO response would be: "What sector? Who are you? So what?" And thus,
the military was introduced to the greatest strength and greatest weakness of the
NGO community: the ability to go anywhere anytime with no one's approval,
linked to an initial inability to come to grips with the crying need for coordination
in the face of such an overwhelming situation.
Military personnel tell of NGOs 'Just appearing," wanting to help. Human
rights inspectors would show up, seeking to examine the SF methods. A typical
uniformed response was "Who are these freaks? I'm an American trying to do my
job." Moreover, these "disaster junkies/groupies" all seemed to know each other
from someplace, some other crisis. There was also the feeling that the NGOs
needed to go where the media was and that this need sometimes drove where and
50 Libby, 19 May 1995. "Rambo movies have done wonders for the military." People all over the world, for
better or for worse, watch these movies and associate them with the Green Berets -- making for an immediate
impact on a situation.
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how they set up instead of the refugees themselves. Military officers found it
ironic that these altruistic organizations were very much aware of the politics of
raising money back home (hence the pursuit of the media) and the development
of their own "turf" ("here is what our organization is doing in the present crisis").
The NGO dynamics were clearly as political as they were humanitarian.51
The NGOs had some concerns as well. There was the fear that the military
would bring a "big, cumbersome bureaucracy that couldn't learn quickly." There
was also the general feeling that the introduction of the military would be a
"disaster." Given the general political leanings ofthe NGO community, incumbent
perceptions were still manifold. One NGO representative described himself as a
"child of the '60s and '70s." He had been in college during Kent State and his
resulting impressions of the military were "extremely negative." A generation that
had come of age after the TET offensive now made up "a lot" of the NGO
community. Negative impressions were inevitable.
These mutual stereotypes were overcome the same way other stereotypes
are overcome: one-on-one interaction. While there may have been some initial
tension, it was dispelled in the face of the task at hand. The worker-bees of each
community had to work together. It was the individuals at the lowest level who had
a common enemy, organizational red tape, and a common purpose: stop the
51 Bill Coops notes that the "relief business is a business· and that there is "clearly a political angle" to it,
something confirmed by several NGO interviews. (felephone interview, 5 June 1995).
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suffering. As LTC Jim Powers, USA, obseIVed, life-saving is still an inherent skill
of soldiering.;;2
The coordination involved in this common purpose was extremely
decentralized. To illustrate this process, it is useful to consider the camp at
Isikveren, where Major David Elmo was the Civil Affairs officer who helped in the
NGO coordination.;;:> As the NGOs came in, the SF interfaced with them according
to the people they met in their sector. After a few days, it was established that all
concerned were welcome to attend a meeting to be held at 1000 every morning.;;4
There was no name for this meeting nor a structure into which it was tied. The
meeting was convened under the auspices of the UNHCR (U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees). At best, this meeting was an exchange of
introductory and location information. "Hi, rny name is so-and-so, and I'm with
... We're located up there." It should also be noted that these meetings were not
just for civilian agencies. Major Elmo also interfaced with other military units
unfamiliar with the various civilian processes in order to facilitate their efforts.
All meetings were completely voluntary. In the first weeks, there were
always new faces as the various NGOs began to come in. Different organizations
would send different people or they would not send anyone at all after their first
52 Telephone intelView with Lieutenant Colonel Jim Powers, USA, 25 May 1995. Powers was the operations
officer for .JTF Alpha in Silopi.
5:' Elmo, 14 May 1995. In actuality, the terms "coordination" and "collaboration" may be a euphemistic
description for the first week or so in the mountains. Because the situation was so fluid, it had not had a chance
to settle into even a nominal structure.
54ln Cucerka, for example, the NGO meeting evolved into a weekly one, meeting on Friday to discuss the next
week's events. (Kobasa, 31 May 95).
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meeting. Consequently, there could be no structure to the 1000 meeting in camp
number one at Isikveren. Each meeting was a free-for-all, whereby the
conversation worked its way around the meeting, ensuring that everyone present
had the opportunity to participate. Major Elmo relates that this type of thing was
"personality driven. It has nothing to do with rank, organization, or position."
This basic process took place throughout the camps. Slowly but surely, the
individual "comfort zone" of the two communities began to increase. Dague Clark
of Save the Children found the SF to be "much less military than I thought."55 He
was particularly impressed with SF cultural sensitivities like drinking tea with the
clan leaders before talking business. Dr. Michael Toole, a long time disaster
assistance expert for the Center for Disease Control (which is a part of the U.S.
government), remarked that in Yekmal "I was impressed by the willingness of
field people to listen, take advice on prioritizing public health, and then get on with
the job with the extra enthusiasm, discipline, and muscle that comes with military
culture."5C, Or, as Henryka Manes, of the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee (JDC) put it: the military was "reliable, on time, [they] report ... [they]
do it all."57
The military had the same awareness and appreciation for the NGOs as well.
"As the chaos normalized and people got to know one another," relationships
55 Telephone interview with Mr. Dague Clark, 6.June 1995.
5(; Dr. Michael Toole, fax to author, 8 June 1995.
f>7 Telephone interview with Hemyka Manes, 24 May 1995. Ms. Manes is the Program Director for .IDe.
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improved.5R Indeed, Colonel Stanley Florer, who made a point to pursue NGO
integration from the very first day, recollects that the "NGOs were wonderful;" their
only problem was logistics and communications, something the military could
provide.50
Eventually, as attitudes changed and the situation normalized, a pseudo-
structure began to emerge, This emergence was closely tied to the SF ability to
pf0duce accurate risk assessments of the population. Because the NGOs did not
have t.he assets or personnel to be everywhere, the SF reports provided a
cornprehensive continuity to the situation and its progress. The SF information
would then be compared to the NGO information. The synthesized information
allowed everyone to track what was needed (food, shelter, clothing, etc.) to
stabilize the situation. The result then was a prioritization-of-sorts in which
coordination manifested itself in the following basic manner: "OK, here's the
greatest need, this is the job, who can do it?" According to need, interest,
expertise, location, etc., an NGO would then take the job.
It is in this simple description that the leading and most fundamental tenet
of NGO/military first appears: coordination requires that something be exchanged.
NGOs will not come to a meeting unless there is something to gain (i.e. logistical
support or information). The converse is also true: the military hopes to gain
efficiency and economy of effort from the NGOs.
". Elmo, 14 May 1995.
"'J Tclephonc intclVicw with Coloncl Stanley Florer, USA, 9 June 1995. Colonel Florer was the 1/10 battalion
commander and thc very first clement into the Turkish mountains.
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While information was the general currency of exchange, the real asset that
the Special Forces had to offer the NGOs was the mobility and logistics of the
military aircraft (and, later, trucks). These aircraft -- from H-60 Blackhawks to C-
130 Hercules -- provided free pick-up and delivery of NGO supplies to a degree
that no NGO could hope to match. Thus, if the NGO was willing to be associated
with the military, it gained immediate credibility with the refugees for delivering
aid rapidly, and long term credibility with donors as their projects materialized
overnight. In return for information and logistical support the NGOs would come
to the "table," (the tent, really) with their own information and de facto accept the
infrastructure of the military. The military had no problems with this exchange
since NGOs doing the humanitarian job faster meant the military going home
sooner.
Thus, friends were friends even if the relationship was based, at least
inititially, on self-interest. While the two communities did not always warmly
welcomed each other, relationships emerged once each community recognized the
comparative advantage of the other.60
K. DIYARBAKIR
Diyarbakir, Turkey, was a natural center of activity for the various players
involved in the relief effort. The closest town to the refugee camps, it was also the
'" Colonel Florer tells the story that durin~ the first week thp. MSF (Doctors Without Borders, a French NGO
supportp.d by the French governmp.nt) doctors had absolutp.ly nothing to do with thp. Green Berets. Once they
witnessed thp. SF medics savin~ lives, the soldiers (cross-trained by the medics) administerin~to basic health
needs, and some speaking French, the situation chan~ed dramatically. By the end of the first week, the MSF
doctors had invited them over for dinner.
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provincial capital, accompanied by a military base and an all-important airstrip.
The NGOs positioned themselves there to help stabilize the refugee camps in the
mountains to the south. By the end of the second week, the chaos of the situation
was beginning to settle: UNHCR was in town and the NGOs were taking count of
their interactions with the Turkish government as they simultaneously began to
figure out the coalition military forces.6)
It was about this time (April 17th) that Lieutenant Colonel John Petrella,
USAR, and Lieutenant Colonel Jean Ronsick, USAF, were assigned to Diyarbakir
to liaison with civilian agencies. They were to assist in the stabilizing of the
refugee camps by working with the regional Turkish government and interfacing
with the NGOs. LTC Ronsick assumed the more traditional role of civil-military
relations with the Turkish governor. In this role, he functioned as a "two-way
window."62 LTC Petrella assumed the non-traditional role of NGO collaboration
and coordination. Both civil-military "tracks" contributed significantly to the
coordination effort.6;>
til The Turkish government required all NGOs to coordinate through the Turkish Red Crescent Society, an
administrative challenge.
(>l Telephone interview with Colonel .Jean Ronsick, 2 June 1995. Ronsick worked directly with the Turkish
"super-governor." Thus, the governor had a view into exactly what the coalition forces were doing in his realm.
Ronsick's role also gave the US military an eye into the governor's office and what they were trying to do (or not
do).
,,:< Both men operated under the full blessing of Major General William N. Farmen, USA, the head of the Joint
United States Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (the "JUSMAT''). Both were given full-rein to accomplish the
mission.
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When Petrella arrived, there were no coordination meetings taking place,
besides very informal NGO meetings in the downtown hotels. It was in this arena
that Petrella would act as a "one-man CMOC."64
Petrella, according to his understanding of his new job, had one mission:
"to put myself out of business."65 This awareness indicates a second tenet of the
NGO/military relationship: that it was "OK" not to be in charge, as the military is
accustomed and trained to do. In short, it was Petrella's job to facilitate the
humanitarian expertise of the NGOs with the logistics and infrastructure of the
military. Consequently, he established himself with the American embassy team
in Diyarbakir as the military point of contact for the NGOs.
The Turkish government had granted the American team a run-down office
building in downtown Diyarbakir. It was here that all interested participants were
invited to attend. As in the refugee camps, this meeting was voluntary and open
to anyone who wanted to come. Regular attendees included UN organizations
(UNHCR, UNICEF), as well as the most involved NGOs (CARE, IRC (International
Rescue Committee), Save the Children, MSF, etc.). Speaking to a full-house every
night, the head of the embassy team orchestrated the meeting. The structure of
the meeting amounted to going around the room, listening to the various
reports/observations, as a current situation was developed by the group for that
morning. The multiple sources of information indicated where the greatest need
C>4 Hess, 12 May 1995.
65 Petrella, 14 May 1995.
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was. This process resulted in group agreement on prioritization and how to
maximize resources. Once completed, the comparative advantages of the NGOs
and the military were matched with the needs in the field.
Petrella would never sit at the head of the table nor would he ever lead the
discussion. ''You have to be very diplomatic and aware of the political implications
-- never create the impression that you're in charge ... in essence, we were, but
you can never give that impression. "66 Petrella's success hinged on the proper
demeanor and personality he put forth (being user-friendly) and the assets he was
able to bring to the table. 67
While this particular meeting may be termed the unofficial CMOC, or, more
properly, as NGO access to the Civil-Military Operations Cell within the embassy
team, the need for collaboration and coordination did not take place only there.
For example, Petrella made it a point to stay ''very close" to the Red Crescent
Society and the projects on which they were working. He also spent time down
at the tarmac, where Ronsick operated when not with the super-governor (he had
set up a tent in order to stay abreast of as much information as possible). By
staying here during the day, Petrella was able to stay current on any "news" while
simultaneously having a feel for exactly what materials were being flown in. In
66 Petrella, 14 May 1995.
&'7 Beyond representing the military's logistics, Petrella was able to occasionally bring people to the table that
could help the NGOs. For example, both Cuny and Maxwell spoke at different times up in Diyarbakir (OFDA
equals money). Also, Major General Farmen, the senior logistician in theater and the "JUSMAT," would also come
by. Having a two star logistics general in a logistics dependent exercise at the table will always increase the
credibility of the liaison officer.
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the meantime, he and Ronsickwould cross-coordinate between their two civil-
military tracks.
Finally, there was also interaction with other military units. For example,
Petrella had to have a very good relationship with the SF Blackhawk pilots in order
to produce at the nightly coordination meetings. While there was some initial
ambivalence, they soon bought the Petrella logic: 'We need to get the NGOs
downrange to let them do their thing; otherwise, we will continue to do our thing."
This coordination circuit suggests the obvious: that there is no one single
point of coordination in a system that, by definition, has no structure except for the
one the military artificially, and temporarily, supplies. Because money, food, and
related supplies are literally coming in from all over the world, there can be no
comprehensive response structure. As a result, there can be no single point of
contact through which all coordination is done. Some of the best coordination
done, for instance, was when Petrella and Ronsick had dinner at the local hotel
where all the NGOs were staying.nR
The successful CMOC then, is inherently a "floating" concept. While there
may be a designated spot, the process naturally occurs according to the moment
and the personalities. If this is the case, particularly in an initially fluid
environment, a pre-conceived wire-diagram will hinder coordination before it
begins.
hI< General Farmen also worked to encourage this process. He would invite the NGO leaders over, one at a
time, to encourage, convince, and exchange information. This process did much to contribute to the NGO/militmy
coordination.
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The overall coordination network established in Diyarbakir and the
mountain refugee camps proved most conducive to the common purpose of
stopping the dying and the suffering. But, a purely humanitarian effort could not
go on indefinitely. The continuing NGO/military relationship would reflect the
political dynamics of bringing the Kurds out of the mountains.
L. TRANSmON TO ZAKHO
On April 18th, at 1800, General Shalikashvili had met with Iraqi generals to
inform them of the coalition's intent to move into northern Iraq, according to UN
Resolution 688, and that they should not interfere. On that same day, UN
Executive Delegate Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan signed an agreement with the Iraqi
government permitting the UN to provide humanitarian assistance in northern
Iraq.69 On April 19th, JTF Bravo moved into Zakho (with Iraqis still in the
surrounding hills). The next day, to demonstrate their humanitarian intent, the
Marines began building the first temporary refugee camp. By late April, the
security zone was pushing eastward in order to accomodate the returning Kurds.
If the Kurds had not been initially ready to go to Zakho, neither were the
NGOs. "It was clear from the beginning that non-governmental organizations were
reluctant to work in the operation. They especially feared being made pawns in
American political policy and were fearful of the consequences of too close an
69 This higher diplomacy was necessary in order to allow UNHCR to work in northern Iraq. According to its
charter, the U.N. must be invited in by the host nation. Eventually, this logic rang true for the Iraqis if for no other
reason than it was preferable to have the U.N. occupy their country over the long-term instead of a full-fledged
coalition force.
62
association with the Coalition process."70 NGO credibility rests on the ability to act
independently. This independence is integral to the NGO identity and cannot be
ignored. To be identified with the American or European governments, let alone
their militaries, immediately brings to mind questions of motivation and purpose
for the host government and its people, as well as an association with past
imperialism.
Moreover, by mid-May, a well-established system of immediate relief had
taken root in the mountain camps. Many of the NGOs felt that the refugee
population was not medically or psychologically ready for movement. 71 "Where the
military and NGO cultures may have clashed most was when the political decision
was made afar to move the refugees back to northern Iraq. The military put all or
most of their efforts into that task, whereas the NGOs were still, quite rightly,
concerned with the actual situation in the mountain camps."n The NGOs also had
concerns about their own safety. Indeed, as the original JTF Bravo Deputy
Commander for Civil Affairs, Colonel John O. Easton, recalled, "it was difficult to
blame the NGOs for not coming down from Diyarbakir earlier.'173
70 "Kurdish R~li~fAnd R~patriation: DOD/AID-OFDA Partnership, The Kurdish Response After-Action Report,"
Op~ration Lessons section, p. 2. Washington D.C., D~cember, 1991. (Hereafter cited as OFDA AAR].
71 This subj~ct remains debatabl0 among the participating military p0rsonnel. One member of ./TF Bravo
distinctly remembers that ./TF Alpha V0ry much had a "push" mentality (trying to get th0 Kurds out of th0
mountains, without waiting for th0 "pull" (establishing the right infrastructure to facilitate the entry and ~ventual
departure of the Kurds from the temporary transit camps). It should also be noted that international law prohibits
the forced movement of refugees.
n Dr. Tool~, 8./une 1995 fax to author.
7J Easton, 25 May 1995.
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On the other hand, according to several military observers, the Kurds were
becoming more "picky" about the type and amount of aid given, particularly food
stuffs. 74 Open to argument, what such an interpretation suggests is that the
suffering and dying had been neutralized and that in order to prevent dependency,
it was time to move the Kurds.
Ultimately, and to their credit, what brought the NGOs out of the mountains
was the continuing need of the Kurds once they eventually decided to return to
Zakho. This process was initiated by OFDA. As memories have already begun to
blur regarding the specifics of time and words used, on or about May 2nd, and
maybe over two to three visits, the DART's Ron Libby, Fred Cuny, and LTC Mike
Hess went up to Diyarbakir to talk to the NGOs at the Majestic and Touristic
Hotels. The strategy applied was one of Libby and Cuny doing most of the talking
as they tried to persuade the NGOs to come to Zakho. (They were tough to ignore;
Libby was a senior USG representative and Cuny was already internationally
respected for his handling of previous emergencies). Second, and of equal
importance, they were civilians trying to convince fellow civilians. Hess, as
uniformed personnel, remained in the background.75
This psychology was reinforced by a powerful reality: OFDA's checkbook
and the military's logistics. OFDA, according to section 491 of the 1961 Foreign
74 These types of requests from the refugee population suggest an intangible measure of effectiveness and
transition marker for such operations. If the refugees have the strength and desire to complain about how they
are being helped, then, perhaps, they are no longer in an unstable position and should therefore be encouraged
to move.
75 This background role becomes ironic later on because of the universal respect that Hess wins from the NGOs
for being the military interface. However, in any initial interaction, stereotypes are ever present.
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Assistance Act, is authorized to spend money on the spot to help alleviate a
disaster. In short, with no regard for who gets the accolades, OFDA funds NGOs
of their choosing in order to save lives in a cost-effective manner. 7f> The military,
on the other hand, offered the capacity to transport the relief supplies and build
the transition camps for free. 77 Working with OFDA and the military could have
its advantages.
For the American government and its military, the money was a small price
to pay for a quick transition to civilian agencies and the exit of American military
forces. The relationship, therefore, remained mutually beneficial to both the NGOs
and the military. Thus the concept that Elmo had witnessed in Isikveren; the
lesson that Petrella had learned in Diyarbakir; was also true in getting the NGOs
to Zakho: leveraging the NGOs into the coordination game involved a subdued
military presence as the money of OFDA, DOD, and the military's logistics and
infrastructure presented its own additional logic through the personalities of key
leaders.
M. ZAKHO TOWN
It was in Zakho that a unique phenomenon in the NGO/military relationship
occurred: the NGOs established their own internal coordinating committee (to
which Cuny and Hess were invited as observers). This congregation of NGOs was
76 For example, OFDA gave a grant of $1,336,174 dollars to the International Refugee Committee and $821.340
dollars to CARE. "OFDA Situation Report No. 25 (Final)," July 17, 1991, p. 3. (Hereafter cited m; OFDA No. 251.
n As of July 17, 1991, DOD had spent $328,320,000 dollars on operation Provide Comfort. "OFDA No. 25," p.
4.
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officially established on May 8th and became known as the NGO Coordinating
Committee for Northern Iraq (NCCNI). The first chairman of the NCCNI was
elected by vote (Mark Gorman of IRC). 7P.
IRC, in keeping with the NGO stereotype, had come into the Kurdish
mountains of its own accord during the third week of April. IRC was somewhat
unique in that because it deals specifically with refugee issues, its knowledge base
is not limited to one specialty (as it is with some other NGOs). Their command of
such issues as camp administration, water purification, and sanitation earned
immediate respect with the military. Moreover, IRC was unique because, contrary
to all military stereotypes of NGOs, it provided a tactical capacity for NGO
coordination. This development was of the utmost importance because it was at
the NCCNI that NGO/military coordination actually took place.79
N. THE NCCNI
When the plight of the Kurds first made the international headlines, Mark
Gorman was in Thailand. He was IRC's representative to the refugee situation
along the Cambodian border. He also happened to be the Chairman of the
Coordination Committee of Displaced Persons (CCDP).p.o Given this experience,
7. This process was, in part, facilitated by Stefan DeMistura, the U.N.'s special coordinator.
79 Although a CMOC was established on May 4th at the .JTr headquarters at the outskirts of Zakho near the
granary complex, the coordination of NGOs and the military took place 1.5 miles away in refugee camp Number
One (also known as Camp .Jayhawk).
><11 The CeDI' met daily with anywhere between forty and sixty NGOs participating. It also met monthly with
other civilian agencies such as the Thai government and the UN. (Gorman, 16 May 1995).
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Gorman called IRC's headquartetsin New York and volunteered his services at the
end of April. By May 3rd he was in Zakho and by the 8th, the NCCNI had been
established under the auspices of the UNHCR. 81
Because of its unprecedented use with American military forces, it is
important to quote some of the NCCNI by-laws:
• NCCNI Goal: To ensure that returning refugees and displaced persons
are provided coordinated and appropriate services until that time that
indigenous systems can assume primary responsibility.
• NCCNI Objectives:
1. Coordinate with Non-Governmental Organizations, International
Organizations, International Military Forces, Embassies, and the Host
Country Government to ensure that the level of services are appropriate
and coordinated.
2. Provide a mechanism which evaluates assistance needs and makes
recommendations as to how those needs can most appropriately be met.
3. Foster an environment which encourages collaboration rather than
competition between the implementing agencies.
4. Establish a system which agencies wanting to become operational in
Iraq can interface in order to capitalize on resources and avoid
duplication of services.82
The NCCNI also established basic by-laws for meetings, chairmanship, and
the processes by which decisions were reached. Essentially, issues were decided
by votes with the NCCNI Executive Committee resolving any particularly
contentious issue.
•, Gorman's quick results were made possible because of Fred Cuny's and Mark Frohardt's (of Cuny's Intertech)
initial endeavor to organize the NGOs already present in Zakho. (Gorman, 9 May 1995).
• 2 "NGO Coordinating Committee -- Northern Iraq Charter and By-laws," & May 1991, p. 2. Courtesy of Mark
Gorman.
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The conceptual and tactical importance of the NCCNI, then and now, cannot
be emphasized enough. This mechanism allowed for a single NGO voice with
which the military could coordinate. It is in the NCCNI and the resulting
collaboration and coordination that a model for the future presents itself.
o. THE CAMP
First and foremost, the NCCNI was located in Camp Number One, not at the
JTFheadquarters. Additionally, the material support for the NCCNI, as well as the
NGO personnel who lived in the camp, came from the military.8:> Absolutely
critical to the collaboration process was the fact that Hess and Cuny lived in the
camp itself. In fact, they shared the same tent next to the NCCNI. In so doing, the
people responsible for coordinating could not help but get to know one another
outside the professional responsibilities they represented at the coordination
meetings. For example, all interviewed remember shaving at the "water bull,;'
fighting for cold water in the morning, and standing in the mess lines together.
While there was inevitable tension as everyone grew accustomed to each other's
living habits, the stereotype walls quickly came down.
Gorman, for instance, had had a previously negative impression of all
militaries. Based on his extensive experience in the third world, he associated
military personnel with oppression. "Militaries," he observed, "are usually party to
Il3 The NCCNI tent was later moved across the street to the UNHCR compound.
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creating refugees."84 By the end of his month-long experience of living with the
military he had the following impression: "If they hadn't have been there, it would
have been much different. They provide horsepower and efficiency . . . [The
relationship was] a real honest partnership [and I have] a profound respect for the
military."85 On the other hand, Hess reflects that the NGOs are "dedicated, caring,
unselfish, and very giving."86 It was during the meetings of the NCCNI that this
emerging mutual respect further delineated itself.
P. THE MEETING
Meetings were held every night at 2000. Much like the other NGO meetings
described, it was voluntary and any participant was welcome to comment.
Gorman, as the first chairman, acted as orchestrator in an action-oriented
atmosphere. The various NGOs presented reports, unmet needs were decided
upon, and surfacing problems/potential issues were discussed. Hess also provided
situational reports to the NCCNI. This information proved important because it
presented the bigger picture and a certain continuity and connectivity to the rest
of the emergency effort.87 Both sets of assessments were compared against each
other for veracity.
.... Gorman, 9 May 1995.
..., Gorman, 9 May 1995.
H6 Hess, 11 May 1995.
• 7 Initially the military assessments reflected the number and condition of the refugees still in the mountain
camps; later, they were about the status of villages in the rest of the security zone and their readiness for refugee
return.
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Based on the synthesized information, priorities became apparent. Then it
was simply a matter of assignment: "who would like to provide food/water
distribution for Camp Number Two? Who can do sanitation for Camp Number
Three?"88 Within this framework, another phenomenon took place: NGOs
developed "joint" support teams according to the need. For instance, sanitation
experts from different NGOs would combine to maximize their efforts. A very
unique act for the NGOs, it was welcomed by the military as essential to a
comprehensive effort.
However, the evolution of the NCCNI, the sharing of information, the
prioritizing of needs, and the 'Jointness" of the NGOs were encouraged by two final
factors, both equally human. First, the NGOs were driven together out of
necessity. As Gorman notes, the UNHCR was very weak and did not take any lead
role in organizing the NGOs. Consequently, the NGOs were the only ones there:
the common sense of a need for a comprehensive effort could not be ignored.
Complementing this fact was a simple shortage of NGOs. Because the need was
so great, they did not have time to worry about inter-NGO rivalries or the
development of turf.
Finally, a weak UNHCR and lack of NGO competition aside, all participants
were brought together by the power of the moment. Realizing the precarious
precipice that the Kurds had been on, it was nothing short of miraculous to witness
AA As the Kurds came out of the mountains, Camp Number One qUickly filled up (20,000 people by 10 May).
Camp Two was full by 18 May. Eventually, four camps were built although the sole point of coordination remained
with the NCCNI in Camp Number One.
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them come out of the mountains. One and all remember the feeling of watching
the Kurds coming home. This feeling in and of itself was enough to make for a






































By the end of May, CARE had set up in the actual CMOC in Zakho as they
prepared to take over all food distribution on June Ist.90 In the camps, the Civil
Mfairs personnel were turning over the administration of the transition camps to
the NGOs. On June 4th, the CMOC shut down. Operation Provide Comfort, now
in stage III, continues today.
"°30 May 1991 Operation Provide Comfort Brief for General Colin L. Powell, lncirlik AFB. Courtesy of LTC
Patrick Murphy, USAR. Murphy ran the CMOC at lncirlik. The camp at Cukurca had the most refugees and was
located the furthest east. Its drawdown necessarily took a little longer.
00 Almost five years later, this seemingly insignificant event becomes very symbolic. Certainly there was a
transition plan and it involved a number of fusion points. However, when Kevin Henry and Paul Barker of CARE
physically move into the CMOC in late May and begin to assume the responsibilities ofthe military's infrastructure,
it is here that the "transition to civilian agencies" actually takes place.
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Q. CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS
What can we learn from this first case study of the CMOC and NGO/military
relations? The lessons learned, like the above story told, are a matter of placing
the collaboration and coordination of the NGOs and the military within the proper
political and emergency context. Only by understanding the impact of military and
NGO pre~ence within a continuum of humanitarian effort can one truly grasp the
strateg.L , operatIonal, and tactical lessons of bilateral coordination between the
NGO community and the military.
R. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE
CONTINUUM OF EFFORT
Security and humanitarian efforts will inevitably encourage a people,
creating various expectations. How these expectations manifest themselves
depends on the people being helped. For example, Jalal Talabani, the leader of
one of the largest Kurdish factions, stated that "We are closer than ever to
autonomy, this is the best chance [for autonomy] that we've had this century."91
This opinion was exactly what Turkey and the United States feared most.
Talabani's statement materialized in Dohuk where the Peshmerga were
emboldened to take military action against the Iraqis at the end of May.
Also, remember again the general SF perception of the NGOs in the
mountains: that the outside aid was beginning to encourage complacency and
9' The St. Plitf!r.~b...r~:{ Tim~s, "In Iran, PoHtics Thwarts Efforts To Hdp Refugees," 9 May 1991, p. 3A.
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dependency. In every humahitarian intervention, the overall effort creates
different expectations and interpretations among the helped as well as those
helping. It can sometimes be a world of unintended consequences. At a minimum,
the NGOs and the military have a responsibility to repeatedly state the limits of
their efforts to each other and to those they help. False expectations are easily
created, and dangerous, if not confronted daily with the simple basic truth.
The example of CARE illustrates this positive awareness. "Establishment of
clear objectives and unacceptable risks was a key element of CARE's strategy. By
fixing such a framework early on, the project, paradoxically, had great flexibility
for being linked to goals and circumscribed by some parameters."92 CARE defined
its mission and refused to be involved in anything else. The following conditions
will require that CARE close down its Food Management Operations:
1. Lack of security for CARE's staff.
2. Lack of security of Stocks.
3. Inability to support North Iraq operation through Turkey.
4. CARE is able to accept its current lack of legal status for itself as an
organization and for its staff, provided it is able to support its staff and
operation in North Iraq through Turkey and that UNHCR continue its
presence.
The specifications of risks which CARE cannot accept will guide field
operations and help CARE ensure the safety of its staff. CARE is conscious of its
"2 CARE International, "Emergency Commodity Management Project, Northern Iraq, Final Report," July 30,
1991, p. 17. Unpublished report courtp.sy of Dr. Sandra Laumark, then CARE country director for Turkey.
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role as a "human shield" for the security of Northern Iraq. This role has definite
limits.93 By clearly stating its objectives and its awareness of the larger picture,
CARE protected its own self-interests while simultaneously making it easier to
incorporate CARE into the comprehensive transition (everyone knew where CARE
stood).
CARE's actions reflect a keen awareness of its responsibilities, to itself and
within a multifarious effort. The SF training and ethos also recognized this
necessity. Due to a distinct lack of NGO presence, the military, particularly in the
mountain camps and also in Zakho, was responsible for addressing the immediate
needs of the refugees. De facto, the military was handling the security and relief.
In many ways, the SF were an instantaneous continuum encompassing the role of
the U.N., OFDA, NGO, and military security.94
In part, this effort was handled so well because this phase of the emergency
-- life-saving -- is intrinsic to soldiering. It was also "pure humanitarian" and,
therefore, in keeping with the directives of the National Command Authority for
Provide Comfort.95 This "purely humanitarian" understanding of the situation,
however, begs the most difficult question of humanitarian relief: What to do when
!l3 CARE International, "North Iraq Food Management Operation, Strategy Paper," June 1, 1991, pp. 4-5.
Unpublished report courtesy of Dr. Laumark.
,,.. Dayton Maxwell remembers conversations with various NGOs about the superb performance of Special
Forces. Not only were the NGOs impressed with their skill in basic life sustaining skills, they were surprised at
the SF sensitivity to the refugees and the way they collected information for their assessments. (For example, the
SF asked the mothers for information, as opposed to the men. It is the women who are instrumental to assessing
the emergency health needs).
!l5 Powers, 25 May 1995. Also, remember President Bush's April 16th words: the decision to go into northern
Iraq was "purely humanitarian."
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however, begs the most difficult question of humanitarian relief: What to do when
the emergency has been stabilized? What does a military force and a
humanitarian community provide to a population that is politically emboldened
and possibly humanitarian dependent?
The "military didn't know what to do. It had been tasked to provide
assistance, but didn't know what that meant."g6 How would the military have acted
if there had been no OFDA DART or Fred Cuny? Could a transition to civilian
authorities have taken place so smoothly with the transit camps built right on the
border as originally intended in tight military grids? Could the military have come
up with the necessary carrots and sticks to motivate the civilian agencies and the
refugees to come down off the mountains? These are tough questions to which the
answer is: "probably not."
This hypothetical answer is not an indictment of the US military. There are
so many factors and components to a complex humanitarian emergency such as
this that no single organization could possibly account for them all. However, to
not be aware of these other factors -- to not realize one's place in a continuum of
effort -- is to not understand the inherent socio-economic-political-civil dimensions
of such an emergency.
"They still don't get what they did right; they talk in terms of logistics: the
number of tents put up, the number of latrines built ... the military thinks the goal
is feeding people, giving medical attention ... that's wrong, they must change the
,.. Libby, 19 May 1995.
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course of conflict in a way that saves lives. lm While the military may have
understood the immediate answer to the situation, it, as a whole, did not quite
comprehend how it should fit itself into the overall continuum of an effort that had
to be a building block towards a lasting solution.9R
The rebuttal to this supposition is that the military does not need to
understand this continuum, if it exists, because it is the instrument of the NCA.
True, theoretically speaking. However, recall that while there was a common
understanding of the nature of the emergency, there was no strategic end-state
coming from Washington. In fact, Washington, although playing catch-up with the
situation, viewed the situation much differently than those on the ground.
At a time when the major objective was getting people [U.S. Troops]
home, actions that could have accelerated the repatriation and
reintegration process, such as economic incentives, assistance with
harvest, etc., were often restricted or discouraged from Washington.
In extraordinary operations, extraordinary flexibility needs to be
granted. What appears to be "reconstruction" to Washington may be
practical or operational necessity at the field level.99
Substitute "nation-building" for "reconstruction" and the potential for a
significant problem begins to emerge. With the perception that a short troop
commitment was the key to success, the primary purpose of the troops and the
')7 Natsios, 16 .January 1995.
!Ill The obvious and significant exception to this generalization is Special Forces (even though they, too, would
have been hard-pressed to address the political dimension of a humanitarian continuum). Beyond the scope of
this work, what if a conventional force had been asked to do the job of the 10th SFG? The only reason that 1/10
was the first group in was because they happened to already be in the area of operations (Florer, 9 June 1995).
'" OFDA AAR, "Lessons Learned From Operation Provide Comfort," p. 3.
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duration of their stay now becomes political -- they must come home, soon. As a
result, any "reconstruction" (nation-building) impedes that possibility. "No
quagmires" thinks the Washington policy-maker. With such a position, the
military's humanitarian purpose becomes secondary because its primary political
purpose is to get out soon. Fortunately, this logic did not have a chance to
manifest itself as, with no time to waste, the military and humanitarian operator
on the ground was forced to solve the problem according to the humanitarian
intent.
Yet, while the NGO community or the military mayor may not be driving
the policy, as Cuny did, each has the responsibility to be aware of a conceptual
end-state. Dayton Maxwell suggests what all military commanders would
recognize in a "military" situation: that "strategic planning is absolutely necessary.
There must be a conceptual end-state. This end-state will dictate the day-to-day
operations. That definition may and likely will change as the realities of a
situation evolve, but that definition is essential to determining actions to be
taken."lOo The military and NGO must seek each other out pursuant such a general
definition as they both recognize the relief continuum and its relationship to their
individual and collective efforts. "It is also clear that the military is most effective
in the earlier stages than in the intermediate and longer term activities. By
IlH) Maxwell, 26 May 1995.
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coincidence, the NGOs tended to be less effective in the earlier stages and more
effective in the later period."lol
Regarding the military, specifically, it must be aware of the other factors
beyond the simple and relatively short stage of "pure humanitarian" work. If it is
not aware of the total civil dimension -- socio-economic-civil-municipal-and
political -- and the various bridges that must be maintained in order to reestablish
these facets of the total civil dimension (if for no other reason than to tum these
links back over to the NGOs, UN, or host nation), it may negate the overall
continuum of effort before it begins. If nothing else, the military will potentially
hurt its own endeavors once the humanitarian situation stabilizes as the
expectations and thoughts of the afflicted people return to other than life-
th:reatening matters. This conceptual end-state awareness should be provided by
the Executive Branch. As discussed above, this awareness may not always be the
case. 'f!? If there is no end-state awareness, then the military must work to create
it in conjunction with the indigenous and other humanitarian authorities at the
operational level.
lUI OFDA-AAR, "Operational Lessons," p. 6.
1U2 This brief discussion does not suggest that US forces be engaged in "nation-building" wherever it goes. It
simply suggests that the building blocks to recovery, rehabilitation, and restoration must be nurtured in the
immediate response stage. If not, the effort becomes little more than a band-aid that cannot be built upon by
those who replace the US effort. Natsios' words come to mind: [it is the opportunitYl "to change the course of
the conflict." If this attitude is not adopted or at least attempted, the problem wil1 simply resume course after US
:1eparture, eventually inviting its return.
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S. STRATEGIC IMPliCATIONS
Strategically, NGOs and the military must ensure that their senior decision-
makers are not only talking, but that they are encouraging their stateside
counterparts to be talking. There is no evidence that NGOs or the DOD was
making an effort to coordinate with one another. The only effort of this kind was
made by oFDA. 103
Secondly, there can be no solutions without security. The reader is
reminded that while this chapter's argument focuses on the humanitarian track of
the military's relationship with NGOs, the security mission existed simultaneously
throughout the effort. The Kurds would not come out of the mountains until they
were assured their security. The same went for the NGOs. Security is a critical
necessity for any US militarylNGO relationship to take place in an operation with
potential for a significant armed threat.
The final strategic lesson need not be belabored: the common
understanding of the problem was self-evident. The ability to actualize the "how"
and tum it into a strategic vision that is politically acceptable is the difference.
The NGO/military personnel can contribute to this process by actively participating
in their own "chains-of-command," pressuring their stateside leaders to advocate
for a certain policy, and by seeking each other out at the operational level.
103 Maxwell was calling back to Fred Cole at the State Department to solicit further NGO help. This interaction
produced positive results as CARE sent additional people directly to Zakho (Kevin Henry and Paul Barker, for
0xampl0, W0r0 pu1l0d from oth0r areas of th0 world to me0t th0 0mcrgency need).
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T. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
NGO/military personnel must realize that collaboration/coordination is
taking place everywhere within an affected area between and among the people
implementing the various policies of the participants. Implied herein is the
imperative assumption that there is no structure. Food, money, organizations all
fly into an emergency situation from all over the world. The military can present
a nominal infrastructure, but there are too many moving parts for it to be
coordinated from one spot, at least initially. Therefore, there must be an
extraordinary effort at redundant communication (which does not mean micro-
management) and the development of a 'network' that can comprehend the overall
emergency and response. The Civil Affairs and OFDA personnel personify this
understanding best.
At every significant fusion point -- in the mountains, at Incirlik and
Diyabakir, and in Zakho -- the Civil Affairs multi-layered presence did much for
the coordination process. Partly the result of infrastructure, partly the result of
foresight, the CA connectivity was essential to understanding the overall
situation. 104 Of course, this type of fusion is precisely what they are designed for:
"CA units are specifically structured to serve as the commander's executive agent
It,. An interesting vignette is Major General Campbell's encouragement of this process. John Petrella and Major
Ted Higgins were from the same reserve unit and knew each other well (Higgins had actually come at Petrella's
request). Undoubtedly a good team, Campbell quite consciously kept them separated, knowing full well that they
would talk to each other to make sure that each had the "real scoop." (petrella, 14 May 1995).
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for Civil-Military operations."lo5 It should be recognized, however, that the mere
presence of Civil Affairs officers did not guarantee the CA success. A liaison does
not constitute a relationship. They were also both personable and aggressive in
their effort. Largely because these men and women hold civilian jobs (making
them a natural bridge to other civilians) and have been trained to think about other
than military considerations in a military environment, they will always make a
considerable contribution to the success of a humanitarian operation. To ignore
these organic skills, is to considerably lessen the Department of Defense's
opportunity for success. 106
OFDA, due to its humanitarian expertise, remains the quintessential
example. Because they had a relatively large team, they were able to "plug" in at
almost every fusion point. Their greatest strength, however, was to stay "plugged"
in while "floating."l07 With their finger ever on the pulse of the situation, and
acting as a "mobile comptroller," they were able to anticipate problems and develop
a strategy.108 "If the role of DOD is to arrive first with the best capability, the role
'oS Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter, "Operations Other Than War, Volume I, Humanitarian
Assistance," NO. 92-6, December 1992, p. 13.
"'"Interestingly, they were almost not included in the operation. The original EUCOM plan for Provide Comfort
did not enlist the CA support. Because LTC Hess called it to the attention of Brigadier General Anthony Zinni,
CA was included. Zinni responded to Hess's suggestion by saying: "this is the glue that will hold it together."
(Hess, 9 May 1995; Zinni, 5 October 1995).
107 In the terminology of 1995, the DART team was a "floating HOC' (the Humanitarian Operations Center, to
make its debut in Somalia) that dovetailed quite nicely with the CMOC and its de facto coordination site, the
NCCNI.
108 Maxwell suggested one major mistake on his part in this floating structure. There needed to be a permanent
'senior' OFDA representative at the decision making level back in Incirlik. This step would have kept the CTF
headquarters better informed as to the pace of events and the strategy being devised. At the least, as Bill
Garvelink has suggested, the DART team leader should have been back in Incirlik three times a week.
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of OFDA is to expedite the transition from a unilateral government response to a
multilateral international one."109 All together, the DART was the "floating glue"
that transcended the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of play and
interaction. They are imperative. Both the CA and OFDA efforts serve as a
prototype for how to form an information network in response to such a spread-out
emergency.
A second lesson is that the military cannot be in charge. It must work with
the NGOs m o.rder to alleviate the suffering and quicken the military's departure.
"There is no structure; if you tell the NGOs what to do, they say piss on you and
then you've lost them; and that is the worst thing that can happen."IIO It is in a
spirit of accommodation and collaboration that coordination takes place. For
example, the acknowledged success in Diyarbakir occurred because "we [the
military] didn't come on like gangbusters ... we facilitated, swapped information,
and let them [the NGOs] know what we could do for them."1II It is this physically
subdued and attitudinally supportive presence that ensured success in Provide
Comfort.
This type of attitude and support sometimes invites the military snicker
against those doing the NGO coordination that "they've gone native." The response
of every Civil Affairs officer, for example, was the same: NGOs are the ticket
"" OFDA--AAR, "OFDA Joint Operations With DOD in Kurdish Emergency," p. 3.
II" Libby, 19 May 1995.
III Petrella, 12 May 1995.
82
home. Or as Major General Campbell said, "they [the NGOs and the other civilian
agencies] were the only thing that made sense."l1Z While this type of interaction
with the NGOs may seem "touchy-feely" to the warfighters of the military, this
interaction is also a calculating rationale. In short, the military needs the NGOs
to exit. To exit, the military cannot assume, assert, or act in control.
Moreover, the military needs to be aware that its very nature may present
a self-defeating byproduct: being "in charge" actually contributes to mission creep.
Four examples will suffice.
1. "The amount of money spent by the military on latrine in the Zakho
camps was more than the entire amount spent by UNHCR for sanitation
last year [1990] in its world-wide operations."113
2. In Zakho, military surgeons wanted to bring in three MASH units to
administer aid. There were already three Kurd hospitals in Zakho. 114
3. After initial points of contact had been established between and among
the various players in early April -- to a point that was comfortable to
OFDA and the NGOs -- the military embarked on what Dayton Maxwell
calls the "stacking phenomenon." Essentially, despite a comfortable and
appropriate number of coordination people in early April, the military
came in and built its stovepipe, layering or stacking the levels of
bureaucracy. Each new unit or layer had its own definition of
"humanitarian aid," had a tendency to start from scratch, and ignored
prior planning while coordination was inevitably hindered. These units,
in his opinion, "would charge forth from this perspective," making it
very hard to coordinate them with the original players who already
understood the situation. 115
112 Telephone interview with Major General Campbell, USAR, 16 May 1995. General Campbell was the Civil
Affairs component commander under General Shalikashvili.
113 OFDA--AAR, "Operations Lessons," p. 1.
114 Hess, 11 May 1995.
110 Maxwell, 26 May 1995.
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4. When some superior officers visited LTC Petrella in Diyarbakir, they
asked, "Lieutenant Colonel, why isn't this outfit better organized?"
(implying that there needed to be a neat, military structure with the
appropriate wire-diagram). Petrella's response: "My job is not to take
this thing over."J1(;
These examples reflect a conventional mindset that sought to develop a
familiar construct; one in which everything had its proper place and role. It also
reflects a mentality that will apply the tools available just because they are in the
tool chest -- as opposed to applying them because they are appropriate.
The military complains about "mission creep," but its very nature encourages
it. Why build one of the best refugee latrine systems in the world when your
admitted end-state is to transfer the refugees back home? Why bring in MASH
units and administer health problems with imported doctors when there was no
immediate emergency? If there is a minimal infrastructure in place that is
working, why add to it? Why organize a pristine flow chart if your desire is to be
there for as little a time as possible? Even General Garner admits that, if he had
to do it over again, he would have kept the 24th MEV staff as his primary staff and
not have brought in his own. 1I7
Ronald Libby drives the conceptual point home: "Don't try and do other
people's jobs ... Help those who are doing the job." Imperatively, he notes, "If you
[the military] take charge, you can't leave. Ifyou take charge? you Jose."118 As
llti Petrella, 12 Mi1v 1995.
117 Telephone inti'f"ew with Lieuten~())tGencral.Jay Garner, USA, 12 .July 1995.
llK Libby, 19 May 1995.
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Fred Cuny repeatedly told Michael Hess, the military "does infrastructure. No
programs."!!!)
u. TACTICAL IMPliCATIONS
Humanitarian intervention is a people intensive process. For example, the
successful role of OFDA and CA is not about institutional structure. oFDA, CA,
and the overall effort succeed because of the people involved. In short, the
personalities of key billet holders make an essential difference throughout the
relief effort. Although no news flash to those accustomed to leadership, this point
is an important one to make given the unique circumstances of the situation. Thus,
we should take some time to grasp the full impact of military leadership in this
type of environment.
This adaptive leadership style started at the top. General Shalikashvili's
guidance in the face of an unencountered phenomenon was simple: do the right
thing.!20 The right thing was a supportive style of leadership recognizing that
transition to civilian agencies was the key to the military's exit strategy. No one
better personified this than Major General Jay Gamer. Ron Libby notes that
Gamer repeatedly stated purpose was: "tell us how we can support yoU."121
According to Captain Lawrence Naab, Gamer "gave general guidance and didn't
110 Hess, 11 May 1995.
120 Campbell, 16 May 1995.
121 Libby, 19 May 1995.
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get into specifics [i.e., micro-manage]; he let the experts handle what they
knew."122 This attitude permeated the entire structure of the response. Kevin
Henry of CARE, who arrived in northern Iraq in early May, recalls that "every time
support was requested it was there. There was no, 'I'll get to it or that is not in
keeping with the regulations;' [they] made it happen."12:i Simply, if Garner had had
an "I'm in charge attitude, we'd still be there."124
In one sense, the situation demanded this type of personality from the
military's commanders. As Colonel Robert Beahm matter-of-factly observed of
General Shalikashvili's guidance, it was the right guidance because he "didn't know
what to do either ... They don't teach you at war college what to do when a 1/2
million people are dying. "125 The situation, however, did not necessarily dictate the
above type of personality with everyone. General Potter, for example, seemed to
fit the humanitarian stereotype of the military. According to several reports, he
did not care about Civil Affairs, nor did he hold the NGOs in high regard. There
was also the general feeling that all he wanted to do was shut down the mountain
camps and get out of there. If all of the military'S leadership, rightly or wrongly,
122 Telephone intetview with Captain Lawrence Naab, USAR, 24 May 1995.
I2:l Henry, 17 May 1995. Henry also adds that General Campbell even gave him a ride back to Incirlik once;
something he found atypical for a general. Bill Gatvalink relates how, as soon as he showed up, Garner took him
out in his helicopter for almost ten hours, getting him appropriately acquainted with the emergency.
124 Telephone intetview with Brigadier General Bob Beahm, 24 May 1995. Then Colonel Beahm replaced
Colonel Easton as Garner's Deputy Commander for Civil Affairs.
'2.' Beahm, 24 May 1995.
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had been perceived as such, the end-result of NGO/military coordination might
have been quite different. 120
An additional extrapolation results from this discussion of personality and
perception. Because personality has such a large role to play in a situation for
which there is no blueprint, the wire-diagram of coordination relationship is a
reference point, at best. In JTF Alpha, for example, there was no time, or
sufficient CA personnel, to set up even unofficial CMOCs. There were simply
meetings because necessity called for it. In JTF Bravo, the CMOC existed, but the
place where it had been set up was not the primary site to realize the transition to
civilian agencies. LTC Hess had taken the CMOC to the NGOs.
In doing so, Hess vitalized the "0" in CMOC. By attending the NCCNI
meetings with Cuny and living with the NGOs, Hess created a conducive
atmosphere through which to meet the needs of the NGOs. This simple point
cannot be overemphasized. If a traditional officer had waited at the CMOC 1.5
miles away, he would still be there waiting. Hess' proactive example of taking the
coordination to the field while simultaneously establishing a working rapport with
the NGOs is the proper conceptual model for all contingencies.
These points beg two questions: 1) Does Kurdistan succeed because of a
decided lack of doctrine; and/or 2) Does the development of doctrine up to 1995
Ilti General Potter's stereotype is held up in purposeful juxtaposition to illustrate just how much perception is
an important part of reality. To his credit, everyone agrees that he did consult Ronald Libby and Dr. Ronald
Walde man (of CDC) before making any humanitarian moves.
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prohibit the likelihood of such a response in the future, i.e., does it encourage the
military mindset of checklists over proactive personalities?
Although, at this point, the purpose is not to answer these basic questions,
some general thoughts should be noted. On the one hand, due to the suddenness
of the mission and the deployment of SF first, one has to wonder whether or not
the conventional military, despite the "stacking phenomenon," was stripped of the
opportunity to behave according to its organizational self: taking charge. With no
precedent and no chance to develop any checklists, did the circumstances of the
situation force the conventional military to be more receptive to the humanitarian
concerns?
Additionally, from the NGO perspective, did the circumstances strip them
of the opportunity to behave traditionally? Because there was no NGO presence
prior to the emergency and that there were only nine NGOs in Zakho on April
26th, were they not forced to work together because the need was so great (instead
of competing for "turf")? Because the UNHCR provided no infrastructure, did not
the NGOs have to come to grips with the situation themselves, even before the
CMOC suggestion? Has the NGO community, like the military, even attempted to
codify some of their experiences, at least within their own organizations, if not
community-wide? As we will see in Operation Support Hope (Rwanda), both the
military and the NGOs welcomed the chance to be their traditional selves.
While it is useful to raise these issues for future discussion, it is perhaps
more important to note the final two tactical, and most important overall, lessons
of coordination. First, there is the principle of "altruistic self-interest." This
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principle suggests that there is indeed an "invisible hand" to the humanitarian
effort. As the reader will recall, each time the NGOs and the military coordinated,
each side had something to offer the other. The NGOs offered expertise and
transition; the military offered security, an instant infrastructure to address the
situation, and the logistics to enable the response. Implicitly, the military also
offered, like OFDA, a lot of money up front to make the mission happen.
In return, the NGOs received help, in a supportive and conducive manner,
that they never could have developed or harnessed according to their corporate
community. Moreover, not only were they helped, but they were empowered to
remain and sustain. The military received a ticket home. By using their
comparative advantages of security, infrastructure and logistics, they leveraged the
NGOs into a comprehensive effort that is generally anomalous to their condition.
The way this exchange of services was achieved was at the meeting table,
tent, or area. Again, it was not achieved simply because both sides completely
trusted the other. It was achieved because the various players at the coordination
meeting meant one thing: transparency. Because there were so many methods of
receiving information -- OFDA, the various NGOs, the SF assessment reports, the
conventional military reports, and, later, UNHCR -- a clear picture could not help
but emerge. And even if it was not clear, someone pushing an agenda too hard
would be. By seeking to be all-inclusive and to invite the participation of all the
agencies that had something to offer, truth emerged at the coordination meeting.
Although speaking about the NGO/military effort in Zakho during May, Kevin
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Henry's summation is a fitting description of the entire initial stage of the
emergency:
All the parts fell into place. All had their own reason to cooperate --
personal, institutional, or altruistic -- and it fit together perfectly.
(Unlike Somalia). Hess was atypical military, not meeting any
stereotypes; the NGOs had good people; and oFDA, an important
part of the success formula, also had the authority on the ground to
spend money.127
v. OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT COORDINATION PRINCIPLES
It is helpful, based on the specific lessons above, to conclude this chapter
by signifying some emerging Principles of Coordination between the NGOs and the
military.
1. The military should not be in charge. Given a decided misunderstanding
of how it fit into the overall continuum of effort and its political role; its
own desire to "stack" layers of bureaucracy; and its desire to exit
quickly, the military must seek to help the helper as it works to ensure
that its relatively quick departure enables the overall humanitarian
effort.
2. There actually may be things in common: professionalism, can-do
attitude, respect for life, unity of effort in the face of the overwhelming
power of the moment, etc. These elements need to be carefully
examined as building blocks between two different types of
organizations. Interestingly, both organizations pride themselves on
their sensitivity to the cultures of the world, yet they did not initially
apply this type of sensitivity towards each other. In the end, success
resulted because individuals were able to shed old mindsets as the
situation itself stripped both organizations of a chance to be themselves.
127 Henry, 17 May 1995.
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3. The CMOC, or the idea of coordination, is a floating concept that may
even manifest itself individually (witness the Petrella scenario in
Diyarbakir). While ultimately manifested at a particular place and time,
this place and time may not necessarily be where military doctrine
appoints it to be.
4. The selection of the NGO/military interface personnel is critical. The
selection of the military commander is equally important. Although this
thesis has attempted to describe the key personalities in such a way that
specific lessons can be taken away and institutionalized, the intangible
of personality is undeniably a central factor.
5. The coordination structure is one of descending decentralization. The
CMOC in Incirlik had overheads and daily briefings; the CMOC in
Zakho actually coordinated with the NGOs in the refugee camps; in the
mountain refugee camps, the coordination with NGOs took place in a
catch-as-catch-can manner before it evolved into a regular meeting time.
6. In particular, the Zakho NGOlMilitary coordination succeeds because
there was a secure environment and the coordination structure (i.e.,
Hess) was trusted by higher authority to collocate and collaborate with
the NGOs.
7. Not to be expected, a viable NGO coordination center is extremely
helpful to the overall comprehensive effort. The idea of the NCCNI is
a powerful one that needs further examination from the NGO
community. 128
8. A relief/dependency mindset must not be encouraged at any cost.
Encourage self-reliance and be careful of creating dependency. Odd
measures of effectiveness become important. Refugees bickering with
the relief and military personnel over the food delivered, for instance,
could be a sign that they are ready to move.
9. Call it what you may, but the cornerstone of NGO/military interaction
is "altruistic self-interest." There is a common goal for different
purposes and ends. There is nothing wrong with this observation, in
fact, it is perfectly human. Each side must walk away from the
coordination process with something in hand.
128 Julia Taft, President and CEO of Interaction, suggests that this concept could easily be developed into a
"rapid deployment kit." (Telephone interview with Julia Taft, 11 July 1995).
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10. Transparency is the only way to guarantee that altruistic self-interest is
practiced. Truth will only emerge in the presence of multiple sUIveyors
of the same reality.
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m. OPERATION SEA ANGEL
A. INTRODUCTION
As the first Kurds began to trickle into Zakho, Tropical Cyclone 02B,
"Marian," battered the coast of Bangladesh from Chittagong to Cox's Bazar. For
eight hours during the night and morning of April 29th-30th, 140 mph winds
created and drove a twenty-foot tidal surge into a coast that is barely above sea
level. In a country possessing 2000 people per square mile, with thousands living
on chars Oiterally sand banks that are at sea level during high-tide), the
devastation was immediate and overwhelming. The final death toll was
somewhere between 139,000 and 152,000 people.
In the face of this catastrophic loss -- to include infrastructure, particularly
communications and washed out roads -- the newly elected Bangladeshi
government and its military struggled to meet the needs of its people. Equally
affected were the national and international NGOs, primarily based in the capital
of Dhaka, who could not get their supplies and foodstuffs to the coast, the outer
shore islands, and the hundreds of chars. On May 6th, American Ambassador to
Bangladesh, William B. Milam, officially inquired of Pacific Command in Hawaii
about the possibility of military support for the relief effort. On May 11th,
President Bush announced that a joint task force (JTF) would be sent to
Bangladesh to aid in the relief effort.
On May 12th, Major General Henry Stackpole, commander of III MEF
(Marine Expeditionary Force stationed in Okinawa,Japan), landed with an
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advance party in Dhaka, where they established a JTF headquarters. Already en
route back from the Gulf War, the 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade)
arrived off the coast of Chittagong on May 15th. The force, ultimately under the
guidance of Ambassador Milam and the Bangladeshi government, but directed by
General Stackpole, quickly liaisoned with the coordination center in Chittagong
established by the JTF forward command element. This center became the focal
point for the relief effort. 129 By May 29th, 5th MEB had sailed for home. On June
7th, the JTF forward element shut down operations in Chittagong. On June 13th,
the emergency over with, and the Bangladeshi government fully enabled to address
the remaining problems, the last American JTF personnel redeployed.
The NGO/military relationship would again prove pivotal in this
humanitarian relief effort. Despite little or no knowledge of each other prior to
their mutual effort, this relationship, like the one in northern Iraq, resulted in new-
found respect. "The NGOs proved to be highly efficient organizations, adept at
identifying needs and procuring needed supplies."J30 Indeed, "one of the greatest
lessons to come out of SEA ANGEL was the efficacy of [the NGOs]."131 Overall,
12" A coordination point at Cox's Bazar was later created (19 May 1991). This study docs not tak0- into account
the nine day effort there.
I~O Paul A. McCarthy, "Operation Sea Angel, A Case Study," (RAND), p. 15. (Hereaftp.r cited as OSA,
McCarthy).
131 Colonel Gary W. Anderson, "Operation S0-a Angel; A Retrospective on th0- 1991 Humanitarian Relief
Operation in Bangladesh," an unpublished Naval War College paper, p. 39. IHereafter cited as OSA, Andersonl.
Then Lieutenant Colonel Anderson was the .1-3 (in charge of joint operations for G0-neral Stackpole) in Dhaka.
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according to one senior NGO· representative, the coordination between the two
communities was "very successful."132
Operation Sea Angel was almost the exact opposite of Operation Provide
Comfort. In many ways, Sea Angel was a classic civil-military operation in which
the American military supported a sovereign state pursuant to its humanitarian
needs. As a result, there was an established national structure with clear
command and control relationships to support the relief process. Additionally,
there was an American embassy that provided guidance to the Joint Task Force
commander.
Although not nearly as complex as the situation in northern Iraq, to view
Sea Angel as just a logistics operation is misleading. Indeed, the great success of
this operation has, perhaps, nullified its own study, reducing it to just a "simple"
logistics operation. 133 While definitely not a complex humanitarian emergency, the
subtle complexities of this humanitarian intervention should not be ignored,
particularly in discussing the NGO/military relationship.
This chapter argues that there were several underlying tensions that could
quite possibly have been exacerbated by the intervention of US forces. The fact
that they were not is a testimony to the leadership of General Stackpole. By
communicating a clear, simple, and repeated intent for the Joint Task Force,
132 Telephone interview with Robin Needham, CARE, 8 June 1995. Mr. Needham was Acting Country Director
for CARE in Bangladesh when the cyclone hit.
J:I:J In general. most participants of these humanitarian interventions do not remember, or do not associate,
Bangladesh with the other case-studies. Operation Sea Angel, because it is understudied and underestimated,
commands little memory despite the important lessons it has to offer.
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everyone -- from his own men to the Bangladeshi government to the NGOs --
understood the purpose and scope of the American action. His diplomatic
methods, primarily his consistent effort to subordinate himself to the American
Ambassador and to Prime. Minister Zia, was integral to isolating the relief effort
in Chittagong from political considerations. Moreover, at the coordination level,
it was the overwhelming logistical leverage that the Americans brought to the
emergency that also reduced these political complexities to an inconsequential
role.
Relatively isolated from these underlying tensions, the coordination effort
witnessed the convergence of the two civil affairs "tracks" discussed in the previous
chapter: 1) the traditional civil-military relations with the established government;
and 2) the non-traditional civil-military relations with the NGOs. Both tracks took
place simultaneously in the same room every morning in both Dhaka and
Chittagong. Under the lead of the Bangladeshi government, as manifested in
government or military officials, both the NGOs and the American military worked
together to address the problem.
B. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
So far [the] international effort has yet to materialize on anything
close to the scale western aid experts believe is necessary to avert
another calamity. Aid has come in dribs and drabs -- the United
States, for instance, has provided $125,000 worth of water
purification tablets and medicines. Meanwhile, a few international
relief agencies, such as CARE, World Vision, and Oxfam are
struggling to assist cyclone victims ... [said one Bangladeshi official]
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'what the country really needs is the means of getting that food to the
people in the hardest hit areas.'134
This May 6th assessment in The Boston Globe provides several initial
indicators of the situation the US military would encounter in Bangladesh. The
first and most obvious is that the relief effort began without the United States
military. It was a full two weeks before the military joined the relief effort. As a
result, there would be NGO concerns that the military would come in with a "take-
charge" attitude while not being sensitive to the hard work already in progress. 135
Second, and equally obvious, was the limited response of the international
community, particularly the United States. When compared to the immediate
financial and military support made available to the Kurdish refugees, help for
Bangladesh was initially infinitesimal. There was even the feeling in Bangladesh
that the United States would not send any help, beyond some money, because it
did not have confidence in the new government. 136 The A.I.D. mission director, Dr.
Mary Kilgour, recalls the relative embarrassment of small European countries
being able to contribute more to the effort faster than the United States. 137
The Boston Globe story also reveals the missing ingredient necessary to
resolve the emergency: "the means of getting that [stockpiled] food to the people
''4 Colin Nickerson, "Misery Outstrips Relief in Bangladesh," The Boston Globe, 6 May 1991, p. 1.
'''s The A.LD. mission, for example, had been working extremely hard, with a very limited budget, to get
funds/grants to NGOs involved in the response.
'''6 Ambassador Milam's interpretation of Bangladeshi government officials' feelings. As described in Charles
R. Smith and Lieutenant Colonel Ronald J. Brown, USMCR, "Angels From the Sea: The Humanitarian Relief Effort
in Bangladesh," 1991, DRAfT, p. 20. (Hereafter cited as Angels From the Seal.
'''7 Telephone interview with Dr. Mary Kilgour, 16 May 1995.
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in the hardest hit areas." It was not a question of supplies or organization, it was
a matter of logistical infrastructure. That same article quotes a Bangladeshi
military officer who states, "Just a few heavy lift helicopters could mean the
difference between life and death for thousands and thousands of people. We are
able to throw only a few pebbles into an ocean of need because of lack of
transport." Given this sense of common understanding, a solution could not
therefore be operationalized without the necessary air and sea transport. Without
appropriate transport, the Bangladeshi government would have to wait until the
water completely receded. This patience, however, would be useless for the
thousands of people living on the islands and sand bars off the coast. Helicopters
and sea transport were the answer and it would take a decision by other states to
help Bangladesh in this way and magnitude.
The excerpt finally suggests that the NGOs were "struggling" to meet the
need. In fact, everyone was struggling to meet the aftermath of the tidal surge.
Although the cyclone had been devastating, the "struggle" to address the problem
was made worse by several underlying tensions that pre-dated the arrival of the
storm. To begin with, there were tensions in the Bangladeshi government itself.
Prime Minister Khaleda Zia had only been elected just thirty-nine days prior to the
storm. Zia was the first elected President since the end of the military dictatorship
of General Ussain Muhammad Ershad, who had ruled the country since the
assassination of Zia's husband, General Ziaur Rahmman, in 1981. This relief effort
was the first real test of the newly elected government.
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Commquontly, "there was no effective tradition of intergovernmental
c()()porntioll in the country as yet."138 Three months after the cyclone, at a
conforcmcc in Honolulu, Brigadier General Ibrahim of the Bangladeshi Army,
commented on the relationship between the new government and its army. In his
paper for the conference, he suggested that there had been "inadequate political
guidance" and that both the Bangladeshi military and the government "must
understand each other and workjointly to reduce the sufferings of affected people.
In the recent cyclone, the civil administration and armed forces worked together
but there is enough room for improvement and understanding."139
Additionally, the Bangladeshi public could not help but compare this disaster
with the one in 1988, when the military, under General Ershad was in control.
Whereas, in 1988, the death rate was low (it was a gradually rising floodwater) and
prices had been controlled, the 1991 disaster witnessed sudden and catastrophic
death coupled with a 30% price increase (in the affected areas). Collectively the
tension between the military and its newly emplaced democratic government (not
to mention the complete breakdown in the national communication system and
continuing bad weather) resulted in the following ineffectiveness:
No Bangladeshi official has been given authority to coordinate and
command relief efforts. No substantive assessment of damages has
been made. No evacuation of stranded people have been attempted
138 OSA, Anderson, p. 10.
139 Brigadier General Ibrahim and Colonel Moazzem, Bangladesh Army, "Disaster Preparedness in Bangladesh
and the Role of the Bangladesh Army in Disaster Management," pp. 3, 24-25. Presented at Pacific Command
conference, 16-19 September 1991. [Hereafter cited as Ibrahim, DPBl.
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· .. No comprohcnsive list of needs and priorities had been
diHll'lhulod to ombassies and international organizations. 140
An(>! hul' mucro-level tension was the Gulf War. During the war, there had
hoon protnHtH lll-{uinst America. A mob had even broken into the American Club
(ncar tho ombussy) in January of 1991.141 Moreover, once the American force
urrived, cortuin political parties raised the issue, on the parliamentary floor, of
American fOrC(1S trying to establish a permanent base in Bangladesh. l42 This
perception was one more tension that would dictate a delicate American presence.
At the operational level there were more underlying tensions. As is often
the case in the third world, the Bangladeshi govemment/NGO relationship (to
include national and particularly, international NGOs) was one mired in mutual
suspicion. A NGO, by definition, represents something mostly beyond the control
of the government. In a country like Bangladesh, where seven of the ten deadliest
tropical storms in history have struck, NGOs also represent a considerable cash
flow into the country. (CARE's annual budget, for instance, was $40 million
dollars), Consequently, the "control issue" looms larger in Bangladesh where each
disaster beyond the normal state-of-affairs brings an influx of millions of dollars.
140 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "Relief For Bangladesh Hampered; Lack of Coordination, Disease are Concerns,"
5 May 1991, p. lA.
141 Telephone interview with Ambassador Milam, 7 June 1995. Dr. Lisa Prusak, a family physician with ADRA
at the time relates that while the Bangladeshi government supported the U.S. lead coalition, the people themselves
supported Iraq. In their slum neighborhood, effigies of George Bush were burned in front of their house.
(felephone interview with Dr. Lisa Prusak, 25 July 1995).
142 The Baksal Party even held a rally in Dhaka with placards proclaiming, 'We Need Relief Not Foreign
Soldiers." St Louis Post-Dispatch, "U.S. Speeds Relief to Bangladesh; Supplies Finally Reaching Remote Areas;
Some Efforts Draw Criticisms," 19 May 1991, p. 6A.
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The influx of hard NOG cash makes for more tension at the local level,
particularly during emergencies. In this sense, "it's not so much [endemic of] the
third world, but more like Chicago: it's city politics."143 The distribution of
humanitarian aid will lend credibility to the local, provincial, or governmental
politician who seeks it. In this manner, politics is no different in third world than
it is in the United States. Someone will claim credit for the good being done in
hislher area.
Also, in the eyes of the more traditional members of the Bangladeshi
government, another element to be controlled was the perception that NOGs came
to Bangladesh to proselytize the population or empower the women. Hence, NOGs
were often perceived as a threat to cultural norms.
There were additional tensions between A.I.D. and the NOGs. Much like the
"control issue" for the national government, these tensions were inevitable and not
unique to Bangladesh. Because it has the power of the purse, A.I.D. factored
significantly in many NOG budgets. (CARE'S budget, for example, was 50% A.I.D.
money in Bangladesh). Inevitably, there was the perception, rightly or wrongly,
among the NOGs that A.I.D. had its favorites. 144 Moreover, according to its
mandate, the A.I.D. program (and mentality) was focused on development instead
143 Interview with Colonel Jon Weck, USAR, Mountainview, California, 3 June 1995. Colonel Weck was a
member of the Civil Affairs team sent over to augment the joint staff in Dhaka.
144 According to U.S. Statute, however, A.LD. can only work with financially responsible and operationally
proven NGOs. A.LD.'s unwillingness to work with any other type of relief agency also invited the "favoritism"
complaint.
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of relief. As a result, it was, in general, very conscious of spending tomorrow's
development on today's relief. Moreover, when the cyclone hit, the A.I.D. mission
was extremely limited in what money it could offer. It was unable to redirect
monies that had already been allocated to existing development programs. New
funds were needed from Washington for the disaster.
At the implementation/tactical level, there was also the underlying tension
of NGO competition. Due to the inherent possibility of disaster and the chance to
raise more money, there existed a competition, mostly healthy, among the NGOs.
Gerald Whitehouse, then country director for Adventists Development and Relief
Agency (ADRA), confirms that the "politics is there -- it is the most competitive
relief situation around." Whitehouse also rightly notes that this fact-of-the-matter
is not necessarily detrimental, but that it does have the potential to reduce the
effectiveness of a response. 145
Finally, despite the past disasters, there was no comprehensive plan for
responding to such an emergency. The Association for Developmental Agencies
of Bangladesh (ADAB, an umbrella NGO for national and international NGOs) had
tried to formulate a plan, but with little result. Although great efforts to improve
the disaster response had been made since a 1970 cyclone (in which an estimated
500,000 people died), and despite early warning issued by the government as to the
severity of the storm, the Bangladeshi government was simply overwhelmed. Even
if a comprehensive plan had existed, it would have been near impossible to
145 Telephone interview with Gerald Whitehouse, 30 May 1995.
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implement. Inevitably, there was some consternation among the Bangladeshi
people with its government. Mohammed Yunus -- known world-wide for his bank
program to empower entrenpeneurs of the poorest background -- demanded that
the government take control: liTo those who say NGOs are the only way out, I say
this is opting out, the government is supposed to do all these things. If the
government cannot serve the people -- if we say let's forget about the government
and call the NGOs and let them do this -- then why do we have to have a
government?"146
c. THE EMERGENCY CONTEXT
The political perceptions and underlying tensions aside, the magnitude of
the disaster remained. A full two weeks later, the initial survey of the scene made
an indelible impression upon General Stackpole: "I have seen combat, but I have
never seen greater carnage."147 Approximately 139,000 people were dead. Adding
insult to injury was the inability to bury the dead. The land itself, as long as it was
immersed, was not ready for the dead. Moreover, there were ten million affected
by a flood zone spread over the four coastal districts of Bhola, Noakhali,
Chittagong, and Cox's Bazar. The survivors were coping with numerous problems,
the most important of which was the water supply. Most local wells and water
sources had been contaminated by the saline surge that had only stopped after
146 Barbara Crosscttc, "Relief Officials Say Bad Planning Proves Calamitous in Bangladesh," The New York
Times,5 May 1991 p. 1.
147 Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole lll, as cited in Lieutenant Colonel Ronald .I. Brown's Occasional
Paper, "fhe 5th MEB During Operation Sea Angel," an unpublished paper, courtesy of Lt. Col. Brown, p. 4.
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moving three miles inland. Included in the tidal surge was the oil from a tanker
that had sunk in the storm. As in the mountains of southeastern Turkey, cholera
was rearing its ugly head. The tidal surge had an enormous impact on the crops
as well, damaging 3.5 million acres.
With little to no food, the stranded people became more and more
susceptible to disease. Their ability to provide shelter for themselves was
practically non-existent. When a population expands to build on the sandbars that
result from the 45 million tons of silt that the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Magma
rivers dump into the delta that is Bangladesh's coastline, the construction methods
and available material will never be enough to withstand any significant storm.
On one such island, only 37 houses were left standing of the original 700. Apart
from the basics of food, water, and shelter, clothing was also an issue. If
everything that they owned had not been swept away by the tidal surge, many had,
quite literally, had their clothes blown off their bodies. It was a very difficult
environment in which to have basic human dignity. By the time General Stackpole
arrived on May 12th, the conditions were almost overwhelming:
Water supplies ... were completely polluted by this point in time.
The toxicity of the bodies, now bloated, was a serious problem for us.
People were dying of cholera. They were dying of a variety of other
diseases. Simple scratches had become infected; amputations were
legend. We had many, many problems to solve. 148
14K Stackpo!f!, as citf!d in "An~ls From thf! $f!a," p. 42.
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In no way does this assessment imply that the American military arrived
with the solution to a problem that no one was addressing. What the military did
arrive with, which still did not exist two weeks after storm, was infrastructure. "If
the road and ferry infrastructure had not been destroyed, CARE and the Red
Crescent would have been largely capable of handling relief efforts with organic
and contract assets as they had built up adequate supplies of emergency food and
relief supplies for just such an eventuality."149 (These previously stored foods were
provided by A.J.D. before and during the first week of the cyclone aftermath).
But the infrastructure was not there. The government had lost eight ships
and 60% of its helicopters. Roads had been completely washed out. Chittagong's
port was clogged with sunken vessels. The city's airport was initially under six-feet
of water. The power supply system was non-operable. Perhaps most important,
communications were down. There was no way to assess the damage as there was
no way to get there and no way to hear about it. It was five days before the
Ambassador or A.I.D. Director could fly down to the coast to inspect the area from
the air. International communications were wiped out as well.
Combined with the aforementioned tensions, to include the absence of a
comprehensive response plan and a lack of funds, the destruction of the
infrastructure and communications system made for a response effort that could
only be, at best, sporadic.
149 OSA, Anderson, p. 40.
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D. THE BANGIADESHI RESPONSE STRUCTURE
Before discussing the Bangladeshi response structure and how the American
military and various NGOs "plugged into" it, it is very important to emphasize the
sovereignty of Bangladesh. It is all too easy, particularly within the context of
humanitarian intervention, to forget about the government of the people being
helped. Indeed, all too often, the host government and its military are perceived
as a hindrance. It is equally easy to assume away the government from the point
of view of the United States military. With its internal hierarchy and self-
sustaining capacity, it is almost a natural thing for the military to take charge.
Thus it is that much more imperative to note that the Americans -- under the
guidance of the ambassador and joint task force commander -- quite consciously
made every effort to empower Bangladeshi leadership. By insisting on deference
to the Bangladeshi government at every level, the American forces presented the
official position that it was just a tool of a Bangladeshi comprehensive effort.
What would result was an American advisory role to the Bangladeshi leadership
in Dhaka as the joint task force implemented Dhaka's guidance through its forward
command element in Chittagong. (Although the JTF forward was also
subordinated to a Bangladeshi official). 150
The Bangladeshi response effort was coordinated at two levels in Dhaka.
At the highest level, there was the National Coordination Committee (NCC). This
Ifi.. Obviously. givf!n its expertisf! and logistical capabilitif!s, the American force was mOrfl than a tool of the
Bangladeshi ~ovr!rn..;ent. Everyone rflco~'1i:wd the power and enabling prflsence of the Americans. Given this
fact, the mannet La which the Americu!'..' conducted themselves becomes that much mOrfl noteworthy and
conQIJcive to the llV,~mJI effort.
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committee met at the cabinet leVel and included such ministries as Health and
Family Welfare, Food, Agriculture, and Women Affairs. An American equivalent
to this committee might be a National Security Council, of sorts, dedicated solely
to relief efforts (a FEMA with greater clout due to the frequency of disasters in a
much smaller country).
Directly beneath the National Coordination Committee was a standing cell
known as the Relief Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC). "This
cell centrally headquarters all activities with all ministries, services headquarters
and all other civil agencies."151 Essentially, in the American analogy, it was a
standing interagency subcommittee to the NSC. General Shaffat headed the
RACMC and was the liaison back to the NCC. The RACMC was located in the
Presidential Secretariat at Zia International Airport. This cell implemented its
decisions through the various organizations represented at the council.
Besides the national ministries and other governmental organizations
represented in Dhaka and Chittagong, two other key players were represented.
The first participant, was the NGO community. Although any NGO was welcomed,
the NGO participants, largely due to size, numbered only three. ADAB, a nominal
representative of the NGO community was there, as well as the Red Crescent
Society. The Red Crescent Society was a quasi-government organization, enjoying
a status analogous to American Red Cross's relationship with the American
government and military. The third NGO represented was CARE. CARE, with its
'51 Ibrahim, DPB, p. 13.
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$40 million dollar budget and 1400 employees, was sure to be an integral part of
any relief effort. Finally, A.I.D. had a liaison desk officer present at the meetings.
It was according to this coordination structure that the Bangladeshi
government, largely without a plan and certainly without an infrastructure,
struggled to meet the overwhelming need of "Marian's" aftermath.
Eo THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY
DEPLOYiVfENT
On Mav 3rd, President Bush had sent his condolences to Prime Minister Zia.
'l..' . .
In the meantime, pressure mounted for some sort of reaction. Most compelling
was the universal understanding of the nature of the problem: the supplies were
already there, it was just a matter of distribution. That same day, Renny
Nancholas, head of the British Red Cross international aid department, stated the
plain fact: "no organization apart from the military has enough transport
available."152 Hamed Essafi, the coordinator for the UN Relief Organization, stated
at the time, "it is quite impossible for the [Bangladeshi] government to carry the
burden alone." The article continues, "Bangladesh has enough food to feed the
millions who lost their entire crops, most farm animals, their homes, clothing and
household utensils. But it lacks transport and medicine."153 On May 11th,
President Bush ordered the Department of Defense to respond.
152 Raymond Whitaker, "Disease Follows in Wake of Ban~ladesh Disaster," The Independent, 3 May 1991, p.
13.
153 Colin Nickerson, "Aid Slow to Reach Cyclone Victims; Red Tape, Chaos in Bangladesh," The Bo.~ton Globe,
8 May 1991, p. 1.
108
In less than a month, the Armed Forces of the United States were again
acting in the name of humanitarianism. "What is now changing, in northern Iraq
and Bangladesh, is sending the military to provide some relief directly. When the
military gets a mission, it's awesome. They have orders, command, resources,
planes. Others wouldn't do it as fast."154 The military was deployed so quickly that
General Stackpole, attending a conference in Manila, was in Dhaka with his
advance party assessment team, via Okinawa, within 24 hours. As the assessment
team flew in, they quickly realized that there was little in the way of doctrine for
relief humanitarian operations. They took the available information on Operation
Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, but found that it was not too applicable. 155
F. MISSION
General Stackpole was essentially given one command: help them. "My
orders were clear. I was to report to the U.S. Ambassador and provide
humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh, period. Nobody told me how to do it; no
one gave any additional instructions. As a matter of fact, the lack of real-time
intelligence was such that they really didn't know what we were standing into."156
'501 AI Panico, American Red Cross Director of international relief and development. As quoted in, David
Binder, "First U.S. Troops Arrive in Bangladesh to Begin Large-Scale Relief Effort," The New York Times, 13 May
1991, p. 3.
155 OSA, Anderson, 8. Also, interview with Colonel Anderson, 14 April 1995, Camp Pendleton, California.
Additionally, Admiral Clarey, the naval commander of the Amphibious Ready Group transporting the 5th MEB,
notes that they received no message traffic on current lessons learned in northern Iraq. (felephone interview with
Rear Admiral Stephen Clarey, USN (retired), 5 June 1995).
156 Lieutenant General H. C. Stackpole III, "Angels From the Sea," Proceedings, January 1992, p. 112. [Hereafter
cited as "Stackpole, Proceedings").
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Immediately after touching down in Dhaka, on May 13th, Stackpole's plan began
to emerge according to the simple humanitarian intent he had been given. The
advance party soon began to establish liaisons with the Bangladeshi government,
the American embassy team, and the NGOs. After his initial survey of the disaster
area, Stackpole decided upon a three-step plan, centered on the logistics of
distribution, phased over a period of 30 days.
1. Immediate efforts to stabilize life-threateningsituation (about one week)
2. Make limited efforts to restore infrastructure in manner that allowed for
the Bangladeshi government to take full control of effort (about two
weeks)
3. Preparatory for U.S. withdrawal and actual assumption of responsibility
by Bangladeshi government (about one week)
G. THE ART OF MAKING COMMON SENSE OUT OF COMMON
UNDERSTANDING
There were five essential elements to operationalizing this common
understanding into an approach that provided all participants with a common
sense. First and foremost, there was the clearly understood emphasis that the
Bangladeshi government had to be in charge.
Because of the fragility of the existing government, Ambassador
Milam and I talked ... and decided ... that we would continue to
provide our technical expertise under the control of the sovereign
nation of Bangladesh for this endeavor. We would support them, give
110
them advice, and encourage them, but the final decisions would be
theirs. 157
This deferential mindset respected the sovereign responsibility of
Bangladesh, emboldened a newly elected government, and kept the military's
mission limited to providing support to the humanitarian effort. (fo be discussed
later, such a purposeful and continuous effort inevitably set a democratic example
of a military's relationship with its elected leaders). Stackpole, in light of
Bangladesh's fragile democracy, even limited the presence of this humanitarian
support. Never were there more than 500 American military personnel ashore
each night. (Even the ships, for the most part, were kept over the horizon). This
point cannot be overemphasized. The consequences of an application of
"overwhelming force" in this situation could have been quite de-stabilizing.
The second element was continuum awareness. "The JTF commander
realized that the three phases of the campaign were being culminated at different
times. It was not possible to characterize the entire operation exactly into any
given time."158 This point is a rather remarkable recognition when one considers
that the military generally enjoys having standard templates and rules that can be
applied across the board. In allowing for this type of awareness, Stackpole
essentially said, 'I will provide the guidance, but it is up to you on the ground to
determine what phase your particular sector is in.' In establishing this precedent,
IS7lbid.
IS" OSA, Anderson, p. 19.
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the military operator on the ground necessarily did not define his mission
according to "so many bags of rice delivered" but according to the needs of his
sector. Thus, from the military's own point of view, there were multiple
continuums of effort in the country that could not possibly be gauged by one
standard.
The next means by which this strategy was operationalized was to split the
command between Dhaka, the capital, and Chittagong, the coastal city at the
center of the damage. 159 This strategy allowed the establishment of policy and
general coordination at the national level, while allowing the implementors to do
the final coordination in Chittagong. By May 17th, the JTF was headquartered at
the old international airport, about a mile away from the Presidential Secretariat
(the location of the Relief Activities and Coordination Monitoring Cell).
The fourth element of General Stackpole's guidance was to encourage the
NGOs. ''You must bring aid-giving agencies on board early. You must update
them and anticipate future requests. There is a natural distrust of the military
because, in most countries where they operate, these aid-giving [NGOs] have been
burned repeatedly by people in uniforms."160 This supportive attitude permeated
the JTF. As Lieutenant Colonel Bill Norton, the deputy operations officer in
159 There remains a minor debate among military pnrsonnel as to whether this measure should have been taknn. Some feel
that thn split did not facilitate coordination enough; that a staff. already limited to 500 people a night. was spread too thin; that
the focus should have been primarily on Chittagong. Others feel that thern had to be a ITF elemnnt in Dhaka and that it insulated
thn rnlief opnration from the politics of the capital. Research indicates that there had to be a staff element in Dhaka. Thn
government, the embassy, and the lead NGOs were all there. There also had to be an element in Chittagong becausn that was thn
focus of the operation. Thn question rnmains then as to the proper balancn of staffing.
1611 Stackpole, Proceedinifs, p. 116.
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Chittagong, remembers, "GeneralStackpole clearly stated that we were there to
support the Bangladeshi government and NGOs in the relief effort."wl
The fifth aspect of Stackpole's plan was how the American's handled and
implemented themselves in the name of Bangladeshi directives. Perhaps the most
delicate of matters, given the multiple and underlying tensions between and among
all the agencies party to the relief effort, the de facto coordination leverage and
power that the American military represented was obvious. Nothing was going to
happen, Bangladeshi government officials in charge or not, without the
accommodation and acceptance of the JTF. As one American officer declared "it
was the logistics that provided the impetus for everyone to show Up."162 Because
the American military effort represented an outside force capable of solutions with
no political ties to anyone, they quickly became the honest broker that could
suggest impartial priorities. As Brigadier General Peter Rowe, 5th MEB
commander states, the American infrastructure provided the "forum" and the
"mediator."163
This methodology of subdued presence and appropriate advice echoes the
personality of the commander. Everyone agrees that Stackpole's presence was an
essential ingredient to the mission's success. Robin Needham of CARE makes the
tactical point that Stackpole was never "locked up behind his sentries," but rather,
161 Telephone interview with Lieut<mant Colonel William Norton, 12 June 1995.
"'2 Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel John Frasier, USMC (retired), 3 June 1995. Frasier was the
JTF liaison officer to the A.l.D. cell at the embassy.
163 Telephone interview with Brigadier General Peter Rowe, USMC (retired), 30 May 1995.
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he was out and about "on the shop floor" with the men; something that made an
impression on the more rigid Bangladeshi Army.164 At the operational level,
Lieutenant Colonel Norton remembers clearly that Stackpole "ran things with a
light touch," always providing enough guidance and minimal control. "Problems
were not always solved the way you wanted them, but they were solved" in a
supportive manner. 165 Admiral Stephen Clarey, commander ofthe amphibious task
force carrying the 5th MEB, makes the strategic point that Stackpole "always felt
it was not his objective to take over the place," as he avoided the "easy trap of self-
aggrandizement."I 66 In short, he was engaged, understood the actual
implementation, but he did not micro-manage.
These are important lessons for any JTF commander. As Ambassador
Milam put it, Stackpole was the "epitome of the best officer to have in this type of
situation."I67 Or, as Mary Kilgour put it: a major reason for the success of the
operation was the "high quality of Stackpole's leadership; he was a sophisticated
and subtle leader who was a good listener;" his style anticipated and removed
antagonisms. 168 When one recalls the multiple and overlapping complexities that
existed prior to the JTF's entrance onto the scene, and that the JTF did exactly
what President Bush had told it to do in less than thirty days, it is hard to disagree.
1&' Needham, 8 June 1995.
IlC~ Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel William Norton, 28 May 1995.
166 Telephone interview with Admiral Steven Clarey, 5 June 1995.
1G7 Milam, 7 June 1995.
I"" Kilgour, 16 May 1995.
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H. NGO/U.S. MILITARY RElATIONS
Despite the plan put forth by the JTF commander in support of Ambassador
Milam and the Bangladeshi government, there remained the potential for conflict
between the NGOs and the American military at the coordination level. This was
not to be the case, in part because both parties accepted the logic and comparative
value of the other.
On the part of the NGOs, CARE recognized that despite its size, it and other
NGOs sometimes have an "inflated sense of our own logistic importance."169
Gerald Whitehouse of ADRA, too, recognized the need of the logistics, particularly
the military's, because of the implied prioritization process inherent in a
lift/transport scenario. The military is "impartial, because of the rational logistics
component."170 In sum, "the military brings a little leadership and brokering. The
NGOs will never have the organizational structure, command and control, the
delivery, that we do."17l
Ukewise, the military almost immediately recognized the innate strengths
of the NGOs. Colonel Gary Anderson describes this awareness best in his
observations seven months after the operation.
U.s. military personnel must learn to draw on these organizations as
assets; we should not be too proud to request their advice and
assistance. In Bangladesh, a synergistic relationship [emphasis
169 Needham, 8 June 1995.
170 Whitehouse, 30 May 1995.
171 Clarey, 5 June 1995.
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added] developed in which both the military forces and the NGOs
provided the talents they were each best suited to bring to the table.
The NGOs had the advantage of a sound day-to-day knowledge of the
area of operations, the trust of the locals at the village level, and
years of experience in disaster relief operations; all of this can be
invaluable in the initial assessment process as well as in actual
operations. 172
The above points are made prior to the discussion of NGO/military
interaction for two fundamental reasons. First, the research indicates that these
generally reciprocal feelings were felt and recognized from the outset. And while
some make note of competing "agendas" -- between and among the JTF, the NGOs,
A.J.D., and the Bangladeshi government -- they were relatively benign in the face
of the emergency. This second point, seemingly obvious, occasionally needs
reiteration. One can never forget the "power of the moment," and the subliminal
and uniting sense that everybody was "in it together." "Sure, people came with
baggage, but we soon moved to mutual respect instead of being protective and
defensive -- got beyond that in a hurry."I73
J72 Anderson, OSA, p. 40.
I7:lClarey, 5 June 1995.
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I. NGO/US Mll.lTARY COLlABORATION AND COORDINATION
1. Dhaka
The NGO/US military relationship that resulted in Dhaka was centered on
the Relief Activities Coordination and Monitoring Cell (RACMC). The Americans
interfaced with the RACMC vis-a-vis a JTF and Embassy representative. The J-3,
Lieutenant Colonel Gary Anderson, was usually the JTF representative at the
RACMC meeting. The Embassy representative was an A.I.D. officer along with
Lieutenant Colonel Jon Weck, USAR, a Civil Affairs officer. 174 Weck was the JTF
liaison officer to the A.I.D. NGO coordination cell at the embassy (about five miles
from Zia International Airport). This cell's basic function was to track information
and to gather NGOs requests. These requests were then taken over by Colonel
Weck to the Presidential Secretariat every morning, where they were prioritized.
In some ways, this cell functioned as a strategic-CMOC in support of the
RACMC. The cell kept track of all the relief efforts going on and served as a
liaison to the decision-making body of the RACMC. The charts kept at the cell are
indicative of the types of information they were tracking: 175
17. The Army Civil Affairs team arrived in country about the 16th of May. They were replaced by another Civil
Affairs team on the 27th of May. (fhey were included only because there was an Army representative at Pacific
Command when the mission was assigned).
m Colonel.Jon Week's personal operations notebook, pages unnumbered. (Hereafter cited as Week notebookl.
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1. Deployment of Armed Forces
2. Stock, at a glance
3. Stock Position
4. Market Price of Food Grains
5. Map: storing place and ports
6. Shipping Schedule
7. Position of Ships
8. Unloading Details
9. Food Movement Program
10. Internal Procurement




15. Foreign Relief Arrivals
Yet, this cell was also fulfilling a normal function for A.I.D., whether or not
the American military was there or not. Thus, to apply a hindsight label to its
function is somewhat misleading. Suffice it to say, that the A.I.D. cell acted as a
support mechanism for the RACMC as it forwarded NGO logistics requests for
transport to Chittagong.
The RACMC, consisting of representatives from the senior agencies and
organizations involved in the relief effort, met every morning at 0900. After some
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tea, General Shaffat would bring the meeting to order and discuss the prepared
agenda. Essentially, General Shaffat, with the advice of those present, would
decide on the priorities of need and then develop a general plan to meet those
needs. The priorities were determined according to the various assessments
presented -- from Bangladeshi, NGO, and American Special Forces sources. J7()
Emerging from this collective information was a comprehensive picture, as much
as possible anyway, of the emergency situation and where the greatest needs were.
These needs were then "married up" with the available transport.
A few examples from Colonel Jon Week's personal notebook illustrate the




NGO delivery of supplies to Zia Airport for
transportation to Chittagong
1) Who can authorize entry into Zia International
Airport?
2) What are the procedures?
ADAB will hire and organize labor force at hangar
20 tons from government need to go out;
- Care needs nine tons, 6 kilos x 2000 cartons
delivered; will bring to gate 8 between 1200-1600
- 6 C-130 sorties to Chittagong today
- Bangladeshi Army identifies ponds to be pumped; Care
asked to give pond information in Chittagong area




These are the issues of humanitarian coordination. It was a process of
identifying needs/problems and developing the solution/mechanism to solve it.
Importantly, as will soon be discussed, the RACMC represented strategic
awareness of the overall situation and a tactical discussion of how to move the
assorted supplies to Chittagong. The RACMC did not provide directive guidance
to the Chittagong effort because that effort was being run by the JTF forward
command element.
The face of humanitarian coordination proved to be amicable. Robin
Needham, the primary CARE representative as assistant country director, recalls
that all parties "tried hard to be transparent."m This effort is evident in the
relationship between Needham and Anderson, the primary NGO/military interface
at the Dhaka level.
Anderson, admittedly, came into the operation with a "U.S. in charge
attitude." However, according to Stackpole's guidance, he quickly realized the
delicate political situation, to include the tensions between the NGOs and the
Bangladeshi government. In this sense, the US had a definite role to playas
"honest broker." Yet, this role did not mutually exclude the US need to learn.
Specifically, CARE provided Anderson, and therefore the JTF, with several pieces
of advice. I?!)
17"Needham, 8.June 1995.
170 This discussion based on interview with Colonel Anderson at Camp Pendleton, California, 14 April 1995.
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The most important piece of advice concerned the Reverse Osmosis Water
Purification Units (ROWPUs). Wanting to help, and thinking it had the
appropriate answers, the military wanted very much to bring these ROWPUs to
bear on the emergency. ISO The problem was threefold: 1) What happens when the
military has to take its ROWPUs back? 2) While the ROWPUs were running, did
they not create dependency upon a system alien to the culture? 3) Even if the
ROWPUs were left behind, was the technology appropriate to the people and long-
term sustainment? Essentially, the ROWPU was a good idea but in the wrong
context. Deployed in large numbers, the ROWPUs had the potential to soon
exacerbate the situation. (Indeed, they might have even meant a longer US
military presence). Although a few were deployed, they were mostly kept out of
the effort.
CARE also advised the JTF not to get involved in the burial of dead
Bangladeshis. While the number of bodies was a health issue, it was first and
foremost a cultural one that the Bangladeshis had to solve for themselves. Another
lesson learned from CARE was its practice of making the healthy Bangladeshis
work for food. This process encouraged an already disciplined people to move
towards self-reliance.
Perhaps the most interesting advice that CARE provided was the role their
protein power bars played as a measure of effectiveness. In a crisis such as the
'A" Everyone remembers the "ROWPU ifisue." The gencral impression of thc reficarch ifi that the American
military wanted to asscrt its technology. This conccpt ifi directly analogous to the dCfiire to introduce MASH unitfi
into Zakho.
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aftermath of "Marian," food is not as important as clean water and shelter.
Consequently, the food-bridge to the time when regular staples can be distributed
is the high protein power bar. When these protein bars began to show up on the
black market as well as being used as a means to barter, CARE recognized that the
first stage of the crisis was over. If the people could physically afford not to eat
the bar and thus trade it, they were no longer in a life-threatening situation. It is
measures of effectiveness like this one that signaled the end of Phase One and the
transition to Phase TWO. 181
The type of relationship exhibited by Needham and Anderson demonstrates
several emerging themes. First, as Colonel Robert Schoenhaus has stated, "NGOs
are the most critical source of information. They tell you if you're meeting the
mandate."182 Second, it is not "the rule of law, but the rule of personality."
Moreover, it is at the common table that these personalities are brought together
"eyeball to eyeball" as issues/events/problems are thrown out "right in front of God
and everybody."18~ Thus, irrespective of members trying hard to be "transparent,"
transparency is guaranteed by multiple perspectives with their multiple
information sources. While there will always be political sensitivities to an
'81 Another point worth mentioning, and learned from the NGOs, was the concept of plastics. Plastic five gallon
containers were needed to transport fresh water back to homes; plastic pipes were essential in reestablishing wells;
plastic sheeting made for makeshift shelters and provided cover to relief materials on the tarmac. Telephone
interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, 16 May 1995. Colonel Blythe was part of the original Civil Affairs team sent
to Bangladesh.
182 Interview with Colonel Robert Schoenhaus, Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, 27 April 1995. Colonel Schoenhaus
was a member of the Civil Affairs team that replaced the first one deployed.
18.1 Telephone interview with Colonel.Jon Weck, 17 May 1995.
122
organization, personality, or government, in this type of environment, a clear
picture inevitably emerges as to the true state of things.
Finally, one point must be made clear regarding the CARE/J-3 illustration
used: contrary to the common perception held by those in the military now, CARE
did not represent, nor did it coordinate, the international NGOs in Bangladesh.
'We didn't seek a coordinating role for CARE precisely because we were the
biggest; if I had been a smaller player I would have resented [our] coordinating
role . . . we didn't look for a coordinating role, we only sought to encourage,
facilitate the coordination."Hl4
It is equally important to recognize why CARE came to be viewed as the
coordinating NGO. First, Phil Johnson, the President of CARE, happened to be in
country at the time and was present at General Stackpole's first meeting with the
NGOs. His presence, as CEO of a globally recognized NGO like CARE, might have
helped create the impression that the other NGOs would be coordinated by
CARE. 185 Additionally, the American military found a distant cousin in CARE.
Almost quasi-military, CARE has hardship tours, an established structure, and is
used to bureaucracy. Because it is the most institutionalized of the NGOs, it was
only natural that American military personnel viewed CARE as a kindred spirit.
In the end, CARE was "primus inter pares"186 because it was "only natural for CARE
'><' Needham, 8 June 1995.
""'Telephone interview with Sandi Tully, 12 June 1995. Ms. Tully was in Ban~ladesh from the end of April to
the third week in May. She was then Special Assistant to Philip Johnson.
'"6 Milam, 7 June 1995.
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to take the leading part. CARE was the most cooperative of any NGO, and with
their reputation, many of the smaller NGOs followed their example."187
2. Chittagong
"The real coordination took place in Chittagong."188 The relief effort in
Chittagong was headed up by the forward command element of the JTF. "Plugging
in" to this element were representatives from the Bangladeshi government, the 5th
MEB coordination cell (collocated at the airport), the NGOs (national and
international), and the various international helicopter components (the British,
Pakistanis, and Japanese all contributed helicopters to the effort; the Army
Blackhawks worked for the JTF). It was the JTF element's responsibility to
coordinate the response.
Although people remember this coordination cell with different titles, the
one that seems to work best is the Military Coordination Center (MCC). It was
from the MCC that supplies were transported to Distribution Points (DPs)
throughout the affected area. Linking the DPs with the MCC and the various
NGO/government warehouses were seventeen Marine communications teams that
were primarily collocated at CARE sites. 189
1.7 Major Stephen Yoshimura fax to author, 8 June 1995. Then Captain Yoshimura was part of the two-man
Civil Affairs team sent to Chittagong. The other member was Major Latham Horn, USA.
,... Milam, 7 June 1995.
,.., Telephone interview with Major Steven Yoshimura, 8 June 1995. Despite this innovative idea, most
remember communications as, at best, consistently poor. In terms of relative expectations, that the military would
be able to proVide a working communications system, this comparatively poor performance was a major
disappointment.
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In general, this structure performed as follows. Dhaka pushed the supplies
down to Chittagong. Anywhere between six and eight C-130s came down daily
with so many tons of the assorted supplies (mainly grain and rice). Once at
Chittagong, these supplies were distributed according to the priorities that
emerged from the MCC. Dhaka had no say in how this process was configured
nor where the relief stuffs went. Dhaka only came into the picture to pass on
pertinent information (i.e., "we heard about village "x" that still needs "y" amount
of "z.'). Dhaka also played the pivotal role of isolating Chittagong from the
politics. If governor "a" of province "b" had a problem with the distribution system,
it was handled at Dhaka. Isolated from the politics of relief, Chittagong was able
to focus solely on the humanitarian intent of coordination and implementation.
3. The Meeting
The operations officer (J-3) of the JTF forward command, ran the all-
important coordination meetings at the Patenga Airport Recruit Training School
facility. Located at the Chittagong airport, this building had two floors. The first
floor was used as a workplace for all the interested parties. The second floor was
where the MCC meeting took place every morning at 0900. Captain Edward
Anglim, USN (J-3), Lieutenant Colonel William Norton (Deputy J-3) , and Major
Don Bloom, USA (Assistant Deputy J-3) , were the men responsible for running this
JTF meeting. (fo be sure, there was a Bangladeshi representative, usually an
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Army major, at these meetings) .190 Anglim, as the J-3 ran the meeting about 50'X)
of the time; Norton about 40% and Bloom about 10%.191 Additionally, Anglim or
Norton would run the meetings/watch during the day while Bloom was primarily
responsible for the night watch.
The meetings were run according to one basic criteria: where was the
dying? The highest mortality rates drove the priorities to be delivered. The reason
behind a high mortality rate -- cholera, disease, or starvation -- therefore decided
how much of what was delivered where and how fast. Each meeting began by
examining that day's priorities, adjusting to what ever issue/problem had arisen
since the last meeting. Next, the group looked to the upcoming two days as it tried
to set up a tentative schedule according to the transportation assets available (the
helicopters, LCACs, and trucks all had mechanical problems at one time or
another). During this process, the MCC was as flexible as possible, always
adjusting to continually meet the top priorities. There was only one inflexible rule:
if you were not on time for the helicopters, you were "bumped." The "birds" were
too precious and expensive an asset to wait on someone.
This common sense approach, which resulted in a general agreement on
priorities worked about 90-95°;;) of the time. The question of course, and the test
of the MCC's effectiveness, was how the remaining 5-10%, "open to debate" issues
100 M. Mokammcl Haque was the government secretary responsible for the disaster effort in Chittagong region.
On May 16th, Haque had sent a memorandum out to the municipal relief committees, establishing how the
Bangladeshis would interact with the US military.
WI Norton, 12 June 1995.
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were resolved. Which brings us to the issue of personality, particularly the J-3's.
"Anybody can look at the numbers, but that doesn't tell the story of what
happened."192 "What happened," was that the two men most responsible for NGO
coordination understood the conceptual and day-to-day approach to coordinating
NGOs.
In dealing with the NGOs, Captain Anglim makes two fundamental
conceptual observations. First, given the political context of a fledgling democracy
(the Bangladeshis had to be making the decisions) and the context of several
NGOs (all nominally deserving equal access to the US infrastructure), the US
military leaders "did not want to appear in charge." Second, as a
coordinator/consensus builder, one had to recognize that "every NGO was his own
personality ... [that] you must prove yourself to them individually ... we saw
them as individual customers."193 Norton complemented this attitude with his
understanding of the "proving" process: "[1] if it made sense, we'd do it ... [2]
what I've done for the past twenty years may not be the right way ... [3] you must
try to persuade [the NGOs], recognizing that you have absolutely no control; that
it's common sense, not because I tell youl94 ... [4] make everyone happy, use
common sense, no hard and fast rules."195
'92 Rowe, 30 May 1995.
'9' Telephone intclView with Captain Edward Anglim, USN, 13 July 1995.
'94 Norton, 28 May 1995.
'95 1#4] from Norton, 12 June 1995.
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It was in this manner that Anglim, Norton, and Broom dealt with those grey
areas where the common sense was not so readily recognized by all. When a
problem arose -- say a mullah wanting to send out pots and pans or a NGO
wanting to distribute its supplies -- the J-3 would reiterate the group's agreed on
common sense. The next step was to consider the unofficial score of "close calls"
(kept intuitively by the J-3). This procedure implicitly recognized the natural and
competing agendas of the various NGOs. If the decision as to which NGO got the
last priority was a "toss-up" the J-3 would remember two facts: 1) which NGO had
"won" the last "close call;" and 2) which NGO needed to "show;" i.e. who had to
show their immediate or international headquarters that they were getting "their"
stuff out. 196
This process was complemented by two key factors. First, there was the
additional awareness of altruistic self-interest. "The NGO will work with
whomever makes its job easiest; that is, you have to satisfy their self interest."197
If the military was not user-friendly, the NGOs would simply go out and do it on
their own. But, it was also in the military's self interest to be user-friendly. The
more NGOs leveraged into coordination by its logistical capability, the less
1!K; For example, if CARE had won the last three close calls for whatever legitimate reason, and it was about
to win a fourth time simply because it was more efficient than the next competing NGO, the call went to the less
efficient NGO. Given these subtle political dynamics of distribution, the overall operation was probably operating
at 90-95% efficiency, on an absolute scale. On the intangible scale of cohesion and a smooth working environment
where everyone felt that their needs were addressed, the coordination was operating at 100%. It was this kind of
awarene!':s that made all the difference.
197 Norton, 12 .June 1995.
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duplication, the more coordinated and comprehensive the effort, the quicker the
military went home.
Second, the atmosphere surrounding the meeting and the interaction
between and among the NGOs and the military was very informal. The NGOs
were essentially in the heart of the military's operations center and found it
comfortable. Importantly, they were not interfacing with a liaison that took
requests somewhere up the faceless "chain-of-command" and then came back with
a "yes" or "no." The person telling the NGO "yes" or "no" was the same person that
they were around all day, drinking coffee or sharing lunch, and had proven that
the military could be user-friendly.19B It is much harder to develop animosity when
the common sense logic of the prioritization process is recognized by all and
coming from someone that people respect. "I know it sounds like a love-in, but no
one was saying I'm more important than yoU."199
It was this type of environment, at the last point of coordination before
implementation that ensured the success of Operation Sea Angel.
'9>< for £lxample, som£l of th£l national NGOs did not initially make their agreed on flight tim£ls and th£l
helicopters took different loads to different places -- som£lthing that irritated the local NGOs. This impression
changed, however, when the military offered to help pre-stage their supplies th£l night before on the tarmac and
also provide a guard.
''"' Norton, 12 '/un£l 1995.
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J. CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS: THE POLITICAL IMPACT
OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT
The primary issue in Operation Sea Angel was sovereignty. While there
were political tensions, most Bangladeshis realized that the U.S. military was just
there to help. Yet, the manner in which the help was presented was absolutely
critical. This appropriate methodology was the essential contribution of Stackpole.
Taking a step back, consider the backdrop of a newly elected Bangladeshi
government which was not fairing well in its attempt to deal with the aftermath of
"Marian." In comes a outside military force that was going to provide something
that the host nation could not provide for its own people. Throughout the
administering of aid, the military commander makes explicitly clear his
subordination to his ambassador and to the leader of the host nation. All in the
face of an obvious fact: it was the American military that enabled the relief effort.
Colonel Anderson makes a very interesting analogy:
The point here is that the management of humanitarian relief
operations is very similar to counterinsurgency operations in that
they require that the host nation be the leading actor if they are
expected to truly assist the national government in achieving the
short term objective of treating the symptom. In both cases, the
ultimate objective is to reinforce the confidence of the host nation
population in the ability of the national leadership to govern
effectively. In so doing, U.S. forces must walk a fine line between
mission accomplishment and the danger of creating unrealistic
expectations among the local population. The reminder of the
Hippocratic Oath "to do no harm" is operable here.20o
2'" 200 OSA, Anderson, p. 39.
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This logic suggests several key ideas. First that the center of gravity were
the people themselves. Second, that the immediate disaster is a symptom and that
reinforcing a functioning government is the first step towards the stabilization of
the larger issues/problems behind the crisis at hand. Third, given the short
duration of the American military deployment, a conscious effort must be made to
recognize the continuum of effort: to help but not to create dependency and false
expectations. And fourth, that given this continuum, the most basic goal, must be
to do no harm. These ideas will resurface in the following case studies.
This type of effort and understanding, however, had to have had an impact
on the Bangladeshi military and government. The world's mightiest army
returning from its greatest triumph in over forty years and it was bending over
backwards to be subordinate in a country that arguably had little to nothing to do
with its national security. As General West summed up, "it was a classic swords
into plowshares operation."zol
But, perhaps, it did have something to do with national security. General
Rowe remarks that the greatest contribution the JTF made was the example it set
for the newly elected government and its people. Every day "we showed them how
you can sit around with different people with different agendas and how it can
work."ZOZ Given the previous tensions, the different agendas -- or the perception
of such -- was obvious to those who lived in Bangladesh. Yet, everything was
lO' Telephone interview with Brigadier General Randy West, USMC, 9 June 1995. Then Colonel West was the
wing command(!r of 5th MEB.
lll2 Rowe, 30 May 1995.
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discussed right there in front of everyone as a decision was reached. In setting an
example that was consciously subordinate while seeking to include all in the
coordination process, the intangible impact of the US example grows. When
combined with the acute effort to have such a small physical impact, the genius of
Stackpole's operationalizing a common understanding of the problem at hand into
an effective response shines bright. It is hard to argue that such an example does
not contribute to the United States' national security.203
The second point is that the US military was not in charge. It supported and
enabled the effort. It never assumed, nor wanted, leadership. Moreover, it only
did reconstruction of infrastructure in support of its limited mission.204 'We never
had any intent to restore the infrastructure; that is not a task for the military. It
is something for the international community to do."20!'i
The support mindset always present, but in such a way that did not have the
military operating outside its expertise, continuum awareness emerges as the next
point. Stackpole kept his force focused, always supporting, but never crossing the
line into long-term infrastructure projects. His means of achieving this conceptual
20:< This obsetvation is not to suggest that it is always in America's interest to do "good things" for other nations.
Irrespective of how or why US troops are committed, however, there will be an impact on national security.
Additionally, the response gave the US military a chance to interact with various other nations as well.
"Nations that might not otherwise consider combined military operations are more likely to cooperate in
humanitarian measures, which, in turn, could lead to confidence-building ventures and possibly act as a building
block toward a standing regional-stability block." [Stackpole, Proceedings, p. 116J. The geo-strategic impact of
these operations is not within the scope of this study. But Stackpole's point is important to keep in mind. Also,
it can be applied at the grass roots level. NGOs are made up from mf!mbf!rs of many nations as wf!ll as sponsored
by many nations. Thf! impressions made in the coordination process ineluctably makf! thf!ir way back, officially
or unofficially, to thf! peoplf! and govf!rnment of many nations. The military will always be an ambassador of sorts,
particularly in its relations with NGOs.
2lH Norton, 28 May 1995.
21l5Stackpolf!, Proceedings, p. 114.
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end-state was rather basic: he repeated it again and again and again. "We didn't
create false expectations, as happens all too often in operations of this nature. We
clearly stated what we intended to do and kept stating it over and over again.
Therefore, they were prepared, as much as possible, to take over upon our
departure. 11206
This point warrants further discussion. It is only by clearly delineating the
parameters of one's effort that, paradoxically, enables that effort to achieve its
goals. (CARE's example in northern Iraq comes to mind). If every interested party
acutely understands the limits of the other participants, a working framework will
present itself. Of course, there are two caveats. First, that each member must
consistently repeat its mission to the other participants. Moreover, there is the
assumption that the limits each party assumes is in response to a common
understanding of the nature of the problem and that their limits are appropriate.
The point remains, however, that it is better to be consistently clear and wrong,
than to be ambiguous, create false expectations, and to still be wrong.
K. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The first strategic observation concerns the absence of traditional
humanitarian emergency players. The UN was not involved in any form apart
from UNICEF's decontamination of water supplies. OFDA was not involved
20G Ibid., p. 115.
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either.207 Similarly, because the scope of the disaster could be addressed from
essentially two places, Dhaka and Chitlagong (Chitlagong supported the Cox's
Bazar effort), the response was more easily controlled and coordinated between
and among the Bangladeshi government, the US forces, and the NGOs. The
simple conclusion is that the fewer players and locations, the more likely effective
coordination is.
The final strategic lesson, is the hidden third member of humanitarian
emergencies: the people being helped. This observation is not so much about the
government as it is about the people themselves. Most interviewed talk of the
"resilience" and "self-discipline" of the Bangladeshi people. Throughout the effort,
there was never "a breakdown of order" or any security threat whatsoever. When
working in an environment of desolation with a people who hold their head high,
the response effort inevitably draws energy from their example. Mutual respect
becomes the modus operandi. This point assumes great importance. If the
provider/enabler does not feel appreciated, nor does he respect the people he is
helping, there cannot help but be an effect on the cohesion of the overall effort.
General West, who spent most of his days flying and thus had the most interaction
with the Bangladeshis and Marines helping them, said simply, "the Marines wanted
to be there; they saw the situation -- you would have to have a tremendously cold
2117 Andrew Natsios, then Director of OFDA, did accompany Mrs. Marilyn Quayle to Bangladesh for a visit, but
that was the cxtent of OFDA involvement on the ground (OFDA did contribute and seek grants for the effort).
OFDA was fully engaged in northern Iraq.
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heart not to want to help;lfzoH While refraining from a "people are people"
argument, the power of the moment can be overwhelming; even more so when
helper and helped appreciate one another.
It is this type of intangible that directly affects the cohesion of an effort. In
many ways, it is the strongest force multiplier there is. If the people being helped,
feel appreciated in a non-patronizing way and actively seek to engage and support
their helpers, the synergy that results is a powerful momentum.Z09 Importantly, if
this mutual appreciation continues, the more likely the population being helped is
to contribute to the effort. Dependency is less likely when the rapport between
helped and helper is one of respect.
L. OPERATIONAL IMPliCATIONS
At the operational level, the issue of comparative advantage again makes its
case. "Each key actor brought a critical element to the table. A summary of these
follows:
• The elected civil government had the legitimacy and had to be seen as
the primary agent in the operation from the Bangladeshi perspective.
• The Bangladesh Army had the ability to provide civil order at the
distribution sites.
OM' West, 9 June 1995. General West also tells the story of 5th MEB's departure. In the simple good-bye
ceremony, the Bangladeshi official was moved to tears as he described how Bangladeshis had served side-by-side
with the Americans in the Gulf War. And then, when Bangladesh was in its hour of need, her ally had
reciprocated. This experience "was very emotional" and made a tremendous impact on all present.
lf~J This momentum had the potential to be negated by a Dhaka control center somewhat detached from the
effort. Captain Anglim notes that there was the feeling sometimes that the Dhaka JTF saw things more from an
efficiency standpoint. With no operational impact, Anglim's suggested cure is "to get them out every once in a
while and keep them in touch." (Anglim, 13 July 95).
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• The civil bureaucracy controlled the surplus grain In government
granaries.
• The NGOs had the majority of relief supplies, to include the ubiquitous
CARE packages, needed to stabilize the immediate situation. They also
had personnel with years of experience in dealing with such disasters."210
It was the US military's job to enable the tools already in place. By focusing
on the logistics of distribution, while being aware of the above comparative
advantages but not becoming intimately involved in them, the American force
satisfied all participants, to include itself. The help was provided in a genuinely
supportive and subordinate attitude as it remained explicitly clear that the JTF
would be leaving as soon as its enabling effort was complete.
Regarding the NGO relationship, ColonelAnderson's point of developing and
nurturing a "synergistic relationship" remains imperative. Certainly, it is the US
logistics that make the response possible. But if it had been in a way that was not
supportive, not user-friendly, it is almost guaranteed that the NGOs would have
walked away and gone about their business as if the military was not even there.
Colonel Blythe puts it best. "The bottom line is we had the transports and they
didn't. But, we leave out the NGOs at our own peril -- they will be there whether
we like it or not, and we must deal with them positively."2!!
One other operational point needs mentioning. Every day, the helicopters
and LCACs (Landing Craft, Air-Cushioned) would come ashore from the ships to
;"" OSA, Anderson, p. 37.
211 Telephone interview with Colonel Roger Blythe, 16 May 1995.
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help. Every day, they would return back to the ships. The ability to daily install
an infrastructure and then to remove it as to reduce its impact on the very fragile
local infrastructure is a unique ability of the Navy-Marine Corps team. This "sea-
based" notion of support, furthermore, did not exacerbate any of the existing
political tensions ashore. Thus the physical capacity to do so, plus the political
utility of such a methodology, ensured that neither the local infrastructure or
fragile democracy was burdened by the "overwhelming force" of the United States
military. There is no doubt that this concept will be used again in support of a
humanitarian operation.
M. TACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
At the tactical level, several basic lessons of coordination are clear. First,
we are again confronted with two cultural organizations stripped of the chance to
be themselves. In the face of a catastrophic disaster, both the military and the
NGO could not have behaved according to their organizational culture, even if they
wanted to. On the one hand, the military was deployed literally overnight. There
was no time to gather the "right" people or build a team; III MEF took the team it
had and worked from there. Once in-country, Stackpole, keeping the physical and
political "footprint" small while ensuring that the mission stay focused. The
military had no chance to build its stovepipes, to include such institutional roles
as the CMOC.
The military's appointed means for civilian interface, Civil Affairs and their
coordination point, the CMOC, did not playa significant role. When they were
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deployed, they were deployed almost haphazardly, in two ten day stints (although
some stayed for the entire five weeks of the operation). In an effort of short
duration, there must be continuity, otherwise such a deployment prevents cohesion
and becomes disconnecting. Thus, conceptually and tactically misapplied, the Civil
Affairs skills "did not have a chance to manifest themselves."212 Although making
significant contributions individually, the Civil Affairs personnel were just staff
officers.
Additionally, the CMOC, as a designated title, did not occur. When one
reviews the facts however, the Military Coordination Center in Chittagong emerges
as a true operations center. In this example, not unlike northern Iraq, the "0" in
CMOC was vitalized. One might conclude, at least in the context of this case
study, that a CMOC acting as a liaison center would have been another stovepipe
layer preventing the accomplishment of the mission. Indeed, the NGOs as an
integral part of the "Ops" center may be necessary in some cases. 21 :1
On the other hand, the NGOs did not behave according to their
organizational stereotype either. Recognizing the common sense of the logistics,
not to mention that they had no transport themselves to the outer-islands, the
NGOs joined the response willingly and cordially. As long as there was a user-
friendly face to the coordination process, the NGOs were game. Besides, why pay
for or develop transport when someone is going to do it for free? (Particularly
212 Intmvip.w with Colonp.l Roger Blythp., Mountain Vip.w, California, 4.funp. 1995.
213 Truly, a phenomenal considp.ration when one considers the military's penchant for secrecy and thp. fact that
thp.re wp.re 122 NGOs, indiginous and international, coordinating through the MCC in Chittagong.
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when there were limited funds coming in from the U.S. and the international
community). The organizational autonomy and insular mindset was mostly
abandoned in order to meet the need.
This discussion of uncharacteristic behavior reflects three more basic
coordination lessons from Bangladesh. The principle of altruistic self-interest rings
loud and clear. In both Dhaka and Chittagong, members of both communities
were receiving something in exchange for their services. The military offered
infrastructure and logistics and asked for expertise and coordination in return.
The NGOs offered their knowledge, expertise, and supplies and asked for transport
in return. Thus, there was an explicit understanding between the two
communities, even if such a recognition were left implicit as Adam Smith's
"invisible hand" guided the exchange of humanitarian goods.
Furthermore, the "invisible hand" derived its diaphanous state from the
transparency of the meetings. Because there were so many sources of information
presented before all the participating parties, it was relatively easy to arrive at a
common sense agenda for the next day or so. Thus, if a representative was
inclined to push hislher agenda, the group would recognize that process for what
it was.
This transparency, of course, was also the direct result of the personalities
involved. Needham, Norton, Anglim, and Anderson, for example, all made sincere
efforts to encourage impartiality while accepting the existence of different agendas
as natural.
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Individual service members must also be prepared to be extremely
flexible in dealing with individual NGO workers. Perhaps by
definition, the individuals who gravitate to that profession are more
likely to be people more prone to the Peace Corps than the Marine
Corps. [This observation based on a long-time A.I.D. official to
Anderson]. They will generally be more prone to seek consensus
than the average military man or woman, and they will not
understand military institutional cultural norms any more easily than
service members will understand theirs. This can lead to friction
unless both sides make a determined attempt to overcome such
prejudices in order to help save lives. The SEA ANGEL operation
worked well in this context because both sides realized the gravity of
the situation and place considerable emphasis on harmonious
relationships.214
What this insightful observation suggests is that it is people who make up
emergency responses, not organizations or cultures. It is people who are living in
a powerful moment as they spend a great deal of time with one another.
Importantly, it is people not necessarily worried about credit.215
The standard for military and NGO alike at the level of implementation is
Ambassador Milam's description of Colonel Anderson's contribution: "he was very
effective -- he made himself invisible. tl216 It would seem that for an operation to be
successful, the invisible hand of altruistic self interest must not only demand
transparency at the group coordination level, but from the individual as well.
214 OSA, Anderson, p. 42.
215 Because there are institutions and organizations involved, of course someone is worried about credit. But
at the implementor level, that does not seem to be the case. It is interestin,; to note that NGOs share the same
animosities for their headquarters as do military operators for their hi,;her staff and Washin,;ton DC components.
2IG Milam, 7 June 1995.
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N. OPERATION SEA ANGEL COORDINATION PRINCIPLES
1. The military cannot be in charge. It would have been very easy for the
JTF commander as the expert on the deployment of his forces to run
roughshod, in a manner of speaking, over the ambassador and host
nation. Mer all, they generally will not know about the capacities of a
JTF. By going out of his way to clearly subordinate himself to civilian
authority, Stackpole accomplished three things.
a. A democratic example was set for the Bangladeshi army and
government. These types of operations are therefore in the
national interest.
b. By keeping the "footprint" to an absolute minimum, pursuant to the
political sensitivities of the young government, the military had no
opportunity to build its stovepipe.
c. By operating within an established infrastructure, the force was
free to leave once its goals had been met.
If the military had been in charge, a democratic example would not have
been set; an appropriate infrastructure would not have been established to
support the effort; and departure would be predicated upon the complete
resolution of the disaster.
2. Repeat your intentions over and over again. Do everything possible to
prevent false expectations. By clearly stating his limited objective again
and again -- based on humanitarian need -- Stackpole paradoxically
increased his maneuver room. Because everyone understood exactly
what the US force was there to accomplish, there were no false
expectations as to the duration or purpose of the JTF. By definition, this
clear statement of the JTF, as the most influential component in the
relief effort, allowed the other components to gauge their own
contributions in a sustained effort that would continue after the
departure of the JTF.
3. Even in such a seemingly "simple" operation, there will be a political
dimension. Remember that it was Stackpole who created and defined
this mission/policy on-the-ground (not anyone higher or Washington).
He was also savvy enough to realize the political dimension and address
it in Dhaka, isolating it from the humanitarian effort in Chittagong.
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4. The humanitarian intent remained primary and drove the operation.
Once isolated from the political dimension, the MCC determined its
priorities according to where the most dying was.
5. The fewer players involved the better (in this case, it was three: the
Bangladeshi government, the US military, and the NGO community). An
obvious statement, the lesson hinted at here is that the more players, the
harder it will be to arrive at a common understanding of the nature of
the problem and then translate it into a common sense approach that
permeates the effort.
6. There must be an awareness of comparative advantage within the
continuum of effort. The military is good for instantaneous
infrastructure and the coordination leverage inherent therein. NGOs
provide knowledge, expertise, and the transition. They were there
before the military, they will resume again after the military leaves.
While the two are in each other's presence, both sides, particularly the
individuals at the coordination and implementation levels, must
encourage and foster a "synergistic relationship." Indeed, it could very
well be that this synergy results from a situation that inherently
prevents both communities from behaving as they would in otherwise
normal circumstances.
7. The invisible intangibles of interaction, or, perhaps, the holy trinity of
humanitarian coordination between the military and the NGOs is also
apparent.
a. Altruistic self-interest. The "invisible hand" of self-interest ensures
that both parties are rewarded in the coordination process. While
various agencies and organizations come together for the same
nominal purpose, each comes with different motivations and
interests. In the name of the common purpose, there are trade-offs
between and among the interests represented. The relationship
between the US military and the NGOs must be mutually
beneficial.
b. Transparency. Coordination meetings must be conducted with as
many surveyors of the same reality as possible. This prevents
"agendas," no matter how benign, from taking priority over the
common sense of the response effort. Participants should work to
encourage it.
c. Invisible personalities. For the most part, the people responsible
for representing their institution/organization must work to keep
themselves "behind-the-scenes." It is only in this manner that true
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coordination can take place. Importantly, this style implies that
those coordinating cannot be looking for credit. The credit must
go to whomever assumes overall responsibility once the military
leaves. In so doing, both the military and NGO are allowed to
return to the purposes for which they were designed.
8. Finally, the primary structural interface was a military operations
center. There was no liaison to a faceless higher headquarters:
problems were solved there between those responsible for the effort.
This collocation decisively increased the cohesion of the effort. Not
only were decisions made in front of everyone, they were agreed to by
people who, after spending so much time together, knew each other as
people -- not as designated positions of an institutional infrastructure.
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IV. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE
A. INTRODUCTION
Somalia. The very word remains a touchstone of emotion for those who
participated in the United Nations sponsored humanitarian intervention that took
place there from December, 1992, to March, 1995. Because the overall
intervention -- to include its various stages -- was so much longer than the
relatively short duration of the other case studies, it is impossible to isolate the
events of the first thirty days from the rest of the experience. Whereas it is
possible to soon envision the end of U.S. military involvement after the first thirty
to sixty days of the previous interventions, that is not the case in Somalia.
Consequently, this account takes a somewhat different and thematic approach,
focusing only on the UNITAF period (December, 1992-May, 1993). First, due to
the sheer complexity of the situation, much more attention is given to the political
context and the emergency situation. Moreover, the discussion will focus purely
on the HOC/CMOC in Mogadishu itself. It is here that there is the most
consternation between the two communities and therefore where there are the
most lessons to be learned. Finally, this chapter will discuss three basic concepts
in its attempt to understand the NGO/military relationship in Mogadishu. These
three areas -- the tangible/intangible distance between the HOC/CMOC and
UNITAF; security and disarmament; and the lack of a humanitarian strategy --
were all evident from the very beginning of the intervention.
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In response to an increasing American and international public opinion that
demanded reaction to the man-made Somali famine, the United States, with United
Nations blessing, took action. On December 9, 1992, the United States Marines--
the initial instrument chosen to conduct the policy of intetvention -- came ashore
in Mogadishu, Somalia. Quickly moving to establish an expeditionary
infrastructure that would facilitate security and the delivery of food to starving
Somalis, the Marines established a Civil Military Operations Center on December
11th. Collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center, the U.N.'s
humanitarian coordination cell, the CMOC would be the national focal point of
NGOIU.S. military coordination.
While the actual impact of the intetvention is very hard to judge
systematically, the following statistics have been suggested for the period 1991-
1993 (March).217 Of a Somali population of 5.1 million during this time,
approximately four million lived in "famine-afflicted regions," mostly in the south.
Of the four million, 330,000 were at imminent risk of death; of these people,
110,000 deaths were averted due to "health, food, and other intetventions" over this
two year period. "Of the 202-238,000 famine related deaths that did occur in 1992,
at least 70 percent (154,000) could have been prevented, had proven primary
health strategies been implemented earlier and more widely."
m Th0S0 numb0rs bas0d on th0 analysis of th0 Refug00 Policy Group report, Lives Lost. Lives Saved: Excess
Mortality and the Impact of Health Intervention in the Somalia Emergency, p. 35. (Hereafter cited as Lives Lost).
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According to this analysis it is therefore hard to ascertain exactly how many
lives the military intervention itself saved.21R Also according to this analysis,
however, it is impossible to say how many more would have died had the
intervention not taken place. Suffice it to say that the military intervention, under
the political leadership of Presidential Envoy Robert B. Oakley, was a humanitarian
success. Indeed, eveJY participant interviewed did not hesitate to state that
Operation Restore Hope was a humanitarian success.
This study characterizes the UNITAF experience as an impressive short-
term success. It is an impressive success in that it achieved its basic aims despite
the dynamics of the political context and the emergency situation in which it was
conducted. It is a short-term success, however, because the political complexity
of Somalia was not acknowledged at the strategic policy level. (fhis absence of
political resolve would reap grim results during the second phase, UNOSOM II).
As a result, the unrealistically limited U.S. mandate of "humanitarianism"
prevented all intervenors from taking the steps necessary to create the condition
for longer term Somali rehabilitation and restoration. The fact that so many
political issues were addressed is a tribute to all the operators in Somalia -- from
Oakley down. In many ways, those in Somalia were not only hamstrung by the
mandate, they were left hanging without the imperative political resolve and
resources to address the issues that demanded attention.
2'. Although the Uves Lost analysis docs sUggP.st that it is "plausible that UNITAF prevented large numbers of
starvation deaths," p. 32.
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It is this failure to acknowledge the political dimensions of the situation at
the highest policy levels that permeates the entire effort, to include the
NGO/military relationship and its more contentious conversations. First and
foremost, this failure manifested itself in the disarmament issue. The disarmament
issue would remain intractable as long as there was an absence of stateside
political will.
Also related to a lack of senior political decisiveness is the ultimate irony
of Somalia: that a humanitarian intervention did not have a humanitarian strategy.
While various ideas and strategies existed, none was accepted by everyone as a
common or shared approach to the situation. There was no concept at the HOC
as to where the humanitarian community wanted Somalia to be in three or six
months. Of course, this is, in part, the direct result of the fact that the Somalis
themselves could not present a united strategy because they were so factionalized.
Also, Somalis were sometimes not allowed to participate because the interests of
the warlords were served by continued anarchy. Ultimately, however, a truly
comprehensive humanitarian strategy would have to be integrated among the other
socio-economic plans that must be a part of stabilizing a society: something
inherently political.
Without a political will that acknowledged the existence of these necessary
strategies and their need to be integrated, ultimately under the broad umbrella of
a political vision, the entire effort was reduced to one of ad hoc, tactical attempts
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to treat symptoms of deeper-rooted problems. AB Ambassador Oakley himself has
stated, "we were reduced to trying locally."219
Finally, the overall UNITAF effort ultimately must be viewed from the
following perspective: nothing had ever been attempted on that scale in a political
and emergency environment so complex. Most were thrown into the endeavor
with little knowledge or personal experience with past humanitarian interventions.
Everyone was dealing with a situation whose sheer size and complexity still
boggles the mind. Although short-term in its impact, the effort nonetheless
remains impressive.
B. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
On January 5, 1991, U.S. Marines evacuated the American embassy in
Somalia. As the helicopters pulled away, leaving behind a recently renovated $35
million dollar embassy, their passengers also included the Soviet ambassador and
his staff.
In telling symbolism that the Cold War was over, Americans and Soviets
together left behind a country that, at one time or another, they had both
supported against the other. No longer in need of this proxy state, both
superpowers left it to its own devices.
Armed to the teeth after nineteen years of military support by the United
States and the Soviet Union, Somalia would not fair well. The state had begun to
219 Oakley, 9 August 1995. This comment was made in reference to the disannament policy and the lack of
support from Washington. It is, however, more than applicable to the the entire UNITAF period.
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disintegrate in 1988 when all American aid had been withdrawn. Previously
empowered by a constant flow of military aid, Siad Barre, who had ruled Somalia
since his coup in 1969, no longer had the means to maintain his support base. In
fact, his policy of keeping the various clans divided against each other finally came
home to roost as insurgents in the north established bases inside Somalia itself in
1988. It was Siad Barre's brutal campaign against these northern bases that
caused the U.S. to renounce its aid as the Cold War waned.
Overthrown by the insurgents in January 1991, Siad Barre fled to the Kenya
border as Somalia descended into anarchy. Most of the fighting between and
among the various clan alliances took place between the Shebelle River and the
Juba River (roughly between Mogadishu and Kismayu to the south) during the first
six months of 1991. (Although sporadic fighting continues to the present day).
This fighting, exacerbated by a continuing drought, created the famine that would
not become familiar to the west until a year later. With continuous warfare for six
months, the entire agricultural system was destroyed: from the fields themselves
to the production, distribution, and market systems. Also, as many as a million
people were displaced during this period, seeking refuge in Kenya, Ethiopia, and
Somalia's major cities. Moreover, the capital itself, Mogadishu, became separated
between the forces of Ali Mahdi Mohamed (a former Somali businessman) in the
north and the forces of General Mohamed Farah Aidid in the southern portion of
the city.
With the growth of the famine, whoever had food had power. With no
economy to speak of and an environment where one had to carry a gun for both
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sUIvival and income, the looting and/or extortion of NGO shipments of food
became routine.220 "Stealing had become a way of life with an entire economic
system built around it."221
In the meantime, NGOs, professional humanitarians, had hired Somali
gunmen to protect them and the delivery of food. It was very much a moral
dilemma: accept 50% food losses and the fact that the food itself, if not the hiring
of gunmen, was exacerbating the situation or continue to feed the needy. As one
senior NGO official stated, NGOs were "damned if they didn't [hire guards] and
damned if they didn't [provide food]. "222
It was in response to this environment, and heavy media-play in the West,
that the U.S. first responded in August, 1992, with an airlift out of Mombasa,
Kenya.22 :> As attention of the press continued and with the acknowledgment that
the airlift was probably providing only 10% of the necessary aid (and that the aid
given could not be fully monitored to the end-user, i.e., to Somali families or
warlords), the calls for some sort of intervention began to get louder. These cries
culminated in the month of November -- just after the Presidential election. By
late November, President Bush, a lame-duck, had decided to intervene.
Importantly, his decision was based, in part, on a letter from Interaction, an
UII While documenting the extent of the looting i~ impo~~iblc, 50% of all food~tuff~ ~eem~ to be a~ good a
number as any.
221 Andrew Natsios, "Humanitarian Relief lntervention~ in Somalia: the Economic~ of Chaos," unpubli~hed
paper, p. 7.
222 Interview with Rudy von Bcmuth, Save the Children, Westport, Connecticut, 7 August 1995.
22:' This announcement, incidentally, was made in conjunction with the Republican Party's National Convention
in Houston.
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umbrella NGO for 160 humanitarian NGOs, with several NGO signatures calling
for assistance in response to the desperate security situation. Never before had
NGOs had this type of impact at the national policy level.
Recognizing the overall situation for what it was, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell sought a civilian leader to complement the
military operation's commander, Lieutenant General Robert Johnson.224 Soon,
former Ambassador to Somalia Robert B. Oakley was appointed as the President's
Special Envoy.225
In sum, Somalia had been stricken with a man-made famine and was racked
by clan rivalry and random banditry. Food had become the source of power and,
as a result, was not getting to the people who needed it most. The NGOs, caught
in a moral quandry, had chosen to accept 50°/rJ food loss, hire armed guards, and,
for the most part, called for some type of intervention. Despite General Powell's
advocacy and implementation of a political leader in a complex humanitarian
situation, Oakley would still be forced to act within the narrow mandate of a
humanitarian operation. In the meantime, the National Command Authority was
about to go into a lengthy transition as a domestically focused Clinton
Administration occupied the White House.
224 Oakley, 9 August 1995.
22-' Beyond this discussion, one hesitates to considm what would have happened if there had been no Oakley,
particularly dUring a change of administrations, to at least present political leadership at the operational level.
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C. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION
If there was any general understanding of the nature of the emergency in
Somalia, it was that the famine required safely delivered food to Mogadishu and
Baidoa. This understanding did not, however, reflect the complexities of the
situation. The result was the misidentification of the problem and therefore the
solution.
The confusion and/or complexity begins with the debate on whether or not
the famine truly existed at the time of the intervention. Although different end-
points are offered, most humanitarians agree that the famine had broken by
September/October of 1992.226 There is also debate regarding the measures
applied to the famine and its related problems. In the Refugee Policy Group's
analysis, the "third wave" of the famine came between July and mid-October, 1992.
This wave witnessed measles, diarrhea, and malaria sweeping through the already
malnourished.227 What this analysis suggests is that it was not so much food that
was needed, but a systematic and basic public health plan.22R If action is to be
taken in the name of humanitarianism, the humanitarian solution itself must be
examined carefully -- it is not always as simple as "food."
226 Craig And~rson,World Concern Director for Africa at the tim~ (telephone interview, 25 July 1995); African
Rights in "Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment," May, 1993, pp. 10-11; RPG report, Lives
Lost, pp. 10-14.
U7 Lives Lost, p. 13.
22K Th~ RPG analysis suggests in another report that, ''the overall Somalia relief effort over-emphasized till too
late the provision of food over public h~alth assistance." RPG. Humanitarian Aid in Somalia: The Role of the U.S.
Foreign Disa<;ter Assistance (OFDA) 1990-1994, [ hereafter cited as The Role orOFDAI p. 12.
153
These issues also reflect the power of the Western media. Pictures do not
lie; there were starving thousands. These pictures, however, inadvertently
contributed to the understanding that the solution was simply a matter of food. It
was this perceived solution that seemingly dominated the highest levels as a
sophisticated and comprehensive response was largely ignored. Indeed, the
humanitarian experts themselves were not included in the senior decision-making
meetings about Somalia.229 The nature of the problem thus became understood as
not enough food and not enough security to deliver the food. Yet there were those
who recognized Somalia's complexity from the beginning and offered a nuanced
response as well.
Andrew Natsios, more than anyone else -- as director of OFDA and then as
the Assistant A.I.D. Administrator for the Food and Humanitarian Assistance
Bureau and as President Bush's Emergency Coordinator for Somalia -- brought the
Somali famine to the attention of Washington D.C. and the American public. At
an August 18th State Department Briefing, in conjunction with announcing the
U.S. military's airlift into southern Somalia, Natsios laid out a pragmatic and
sophisticated approach that was not simply a "do something" crusade.
I should note that no relief strategy will be successful in ending
hunger-related deaths in Somalia unless fundamental security
problems are addressed. Elements of the United States government's
humanitarian strategy can contribute to reducing tensions. However,
Somali leaders themselves are ultimately responsible for the deaths
u" In general. it was felt at OFDA that once Somalia came up on the DOD/NSC scope, OFDA was marginalized
from the planning process, if not excluded, thereby inevitably reducing the significance of humanitarian concerns
as political and security ones dominated. The Role of OFDA, pp. 5-6.
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of tens of thousands of their fellow Somalis ... [he goes on to stress
the three goals of a humanitarian strategy to be pursued by the DART
team that would soon be working in Somalia]
1. A large-scale monetization of food to drive down and stabilize
prices;
2. Decentralization of the relief effort to move people out of insecure
and unstable cities to more secure areas;
3. Development of programs funded with the local currency
generated from the sale of food to accelerate rehabilitation activities,
particularly in livestock and the agricultural sectors, which are
critical to long-term food security.2:iO
Seemingly, here was the framework of a plan. Security was fundamental,
and ultimately the responsibility of the Somali leaders. Moreover, there was no
denying the need for a comprehensive approach. Unfortunately, this plan would
increasingly be ignored as DOD and the NSC reduced the problem to not enough
food and not enough security for food delivery, and as more international players
became involved who would not subject themselves to such a strategy.
D. THE MISSION
In contrast to northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the military's mission statement
was not left to a simple humanitarian intent. Instead, the mission statement slowly
evolved from a humanitarian effort supported by military forces to something that
came fourth after three military concerns. Indeed, what had been initially implied
as a mutually supporting use of comparative advantage became an artificially
delineated separation between military and humanitarian efforts. The unintended
2.,0 August 18, 1992, State Department Briefing.
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result was that a mission statement narrowly defined in the interest of a clear and
achievable end-state ultimately confused everyone, including the military.
On December 3rd, U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 authorized the U.S.
led intervention "to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment for
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible."
On December 6th, Secretary of Defense Cheney said on Meet the Press that
"our mission is to restore conditions so that the humanitarian effort can go
forward, and then to turn over responsibility for securing the country to UN
forces."z31
On December 17th, testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Herman Cohen stated that the
"United States is leading a coalition of forces under UN auspices to establish a
secure environment for the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid in Somalia.
Our mission is clear, it is defined, and it is doable ..."Z3Z
At that same testimony, James Woods, the Deputy Assistant of the Secretary
of Defense for African Affairs defined the American mission as follows:
... to conduct joint and combine military operatons in Somalia under
UN auspices to secure major air and sea ports, ground routes, and
major relief centers; to provide a secure environment; to disarm as
necessary forces which interfere with humanitarian relief operations,
and to protect and assist UN and non-governmental humanitarian
relief operations . . . US forces will remain until they fulfill their
mission: the establishment of a secure environment so that [the]
2:lJ NBC's Mp.et The Press, December 6, 1992.
232 Hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committp.p. on thp. Situation in Somalia, December 17, 1992.
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peacekeeping operation can sustain the humanitarian effort.
Meanwhile, private voluntary organizations will continue distributing
humanitarian aid. The purpose of our coalition efforts is to permit
them to operate in a more secure and safe environment.233
On January 1, 1993, in Baidoa, Somalia, President Bush articulated the
American mission to those present at the orphanage he was visiting.
So I think in the new administration you'll find people who are
understanding of and appreciative of the mission here. And beyond
that, I cannot really go, because you know our mission is limited. It's
not to stay forever, and it is not to totally disarm this country. So
we've spelled it out, in accordance with the U.N. -- in accordance with
the U.N. resolutions, and we will do exactly what I said -- told the
American people we'd do. We'd come in, we'd make -- we'd make the
peace, we'd get the humanitarian aid flowing, and then our people go
home. 234
As one progresses through the various enunciations of the American
mission, from prepared statements to conversational responses, the connection
between security and its humanitarian purpose begins to fade. President Bush's
statement is very ambiguous. It suggests that the presence of U.S. troops would
make the peace. After that, the humanitarian flow would result. There does not
seem to be a conceptual bridge between the two ideas.
2:1:< It should also be noted that A.I.D. once again presented its comprehensive plan for Somalia. Both Andrew
Natsios and Lois Richards, Deputy Assistant Administrator. Food & Humanitarian Assistance, were present. Ms.
Richards suggested the following six phases:
I) Provide a regular supply of cereals and supplemental foods along with medi(.-mes.
2) l'urchase and distribute seeds and tools by March. 1993. in time to be planted by April rains.
3) FulIy implement food modemization programs (in order to expand food ba~e ofmarkel~)
4) LalUlch live~1()ck rehabilitation programs.
5) Return refugees to their homes (once area is secure).
6) Rcc\m~1itute a Somali peace force. which ean OpL'fate ulld(.'f UN authority and management.
2-14 The Reuters TranSCript Report•.January 1, 1993. Friday, Be cycle.
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Indeed, the military's mission seems remote from the U.N. mandate and
Secretary Cheney's description of the U.S. purpose. According to the Department
of Defense, the military's mission/objectives were to:
1. secure major air and sea ports;
2. to provide open and free passage of relief supplies;
3. to provide security for relief convoys and relief organizaion operations;
and
4. to assist the United Nations/non-governmental organizations in
providing humanitarian relief under U.N. auspices.235
Moreover, the fourth element was added as a permissive objective for the
JTF commander so that he could assist as he thought appropriate.236
As Jonathan Dworken has argued, this mission statement reflected the JTF's
perspective on an "ideal division of labor:"
The [military] would create a secure environment in which to deliver
supplies by protecting the HRO [Humanitarian Relief Organization]
distribution system, from the ports and airfields where the supplies
entered the country, to the road networks over which the supplies
moved to distribution points. The [NGOs] would get the supplies in
country, transport them overland, and distribute them.237
2:'5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Somalia OPlAN," p. 5., as quoted in "Restore Hope Coordinating
Relief Operations," by Jonathan T. Dworken in Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 199.5, p. 15.
2:'6 Jonathan T. Dworken, Military Relations with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From
Re.qtore Hope, p. 36 (Hereafter cited as Observations From Restore Hope). Sec Dworken's footnote #37.
2:l7 Dworken, .TTF Quarterly, p. 15.
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This well-articulated thoughtbegins to point to an almost imperceptible fault
line in the NGO/military relationship: 1) that security is necessarily the only
condition for humanitarian work; 2) that, in this particular situation, the labor of
security can, or should, be divided away from the labor of relief. In short, that
there was a military job to do and that the humanitarian stuff would take care of
itself.
Of course, the first three points of the military's mission statement are
implicitly in support of the entire humanitarian relief effort. There is nothing in
the statement, however, that indicates a guiding humanitarian intent or strategy
that is supported by the military. By comparison, the mission statements of the
first two case studies may have been much more simple but they left no doubt as
to what the overarching humanitarian goal was.
Finally, one could argue, perhaps cynically, that this mission statement as
such conveyed the true political mission of the military: take as few casualties as
possible and do something humanitarian in the meantime. Indeed, Dr. Ken
Menkhaus has argued that despite the rhetoric of good intentions the "main
consideration was minimizing casualties," as evidenced by Ambassador Oakley's
political interaction, primarily with Aideed. Menkhaus suggests that while Oakley
may never have been given the orders, it was this concern that drove u.s.
actions.238 A different interpretation, never to be documented, it demands reflection.
238 Telephone intelView with Dr. Ken Menkhaus, 24 August 1995. Menkhaus suggests that by centralizing the
U.S. effort in southern Mogadishu, the U.S. had to deal with the one threat that could visit casualties upon U.S.
forces: General Aideed. Consequently, Oakley met with Aideed more than any other warlord.
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Thus, the mission statement and its wording is important, capable of several
interpretations. What does appear evident, however, is that even before the
intervention started, there was already a gap between humanitarian end and
military means.
E. PROVIDE RELIEF, NGOS, AND CIVIL AFFAIRS
Before considering the response structure that finally developed after
December 9th, we must briefly examine some additional considerations that could
have made the intervention a much smoother process. To begin with, there were
the le$sons of Operation Provide Relief. This effort was an airlift of relief supplies
into southern Somalia that began in mid-August and continued until mid-
December. Run out of Mombasa, Kenya, it witnessed the close collaboration of the
DART and the American military.
Commanded by Brigadier General Frank Ubutti, USMC, the American
contingent worked in direct support of the humanitarian intent: getting the food
to the airstrips. Cognizant of his supportive role, Libutti pointed out at the time
that issues of food distribution were "outside my foxhole."2~9 Indeed, the military
"did not try to overstep the bounds of its mandate," essentially acting as a "flying
firm" in a logistics operation.240 What resulted was a mutual understanding of
comparative advantage.
~;'" As quoted by Keith B. Richbu~ in "U.S. Bettins Airlift For Starving Somalis' Negotionations With Kenya
Clear Way for Aid," The Washington Post, 22 August 1992, p. AIR
24(\ Interview with Kate Farnsworth, Washington D.C., :n July 95. Farnsworth was a DART member.
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Every morning at 0800, the DART met to discuss the technicalities of what
needed to be lifted, review NGO information received since the last meeting, and
consider any other issues. Later that afternoon, a DART representative would
attend Libutti's staff meeting. Although not called a CMOC (or anything besides
a staff meeting), this meeting, for all intents and purposes, was the CMOC.
Recognizing that they did not have the "skills to evaluate and validate and
prioritize distribution,"241 the military determined their mission according to the
input of the DART. This relationship proved to be very healthy. It is worth noting
some indicators of success.
First, there was a clearly delineated intent: get food to the Somali airstrips.
As a result, each community -- represented solely by the DART on one side and the
military staff on the other -- operated according to their comparative advantage.
The military stuck to logistics in support of the humanitarian intent, the DART
provided the necessary expertise to prioritize the air missions. NGOs operating
in Somalia were represented by radio-sent information to the DART in Mombasa.
This information provided humanitarian "intel" on the situation as well as airfield
conditions and capacity reports.242
Second, humanitarian decisions were made cooperatively, at the same table.
As in northern Iraq and Bangladesh, the coordination of the two communities took
place at one focal point. General Libutti's staff meeting was very much an
'4' IntClview with Thomas Dolan, Washington D.C., 31 July 95. Dolan was the Deputy Team Leader of the
DART.
z.lZ Farnsworth, 31 .July 95.
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operations center whereby the DART, as a clearinghouse for NGO information,
provided the ends as the military provided the means. Working hand-in-hand
meant a true understanding of comparative advantage.
F. NGOS
Prior to all the media attention in the summer of 1992, it was just a few
NGOs that had had a continued presence in Somalia through the very worst of the
anarchy. The International Committee for the Red Cross (lCRC) , Doctors Without
BorderslFrance (MSF), the International Medical Corps (lMC), World Concern,
Save the Children (UK), and SOS (an Austrian NGO) were among the very brave
few (the U.N. had left). As a result, these stout-hearted humanitarians were not
just the only western source of information on Somalia, they also represented the
most up-to-date information on the overall humanitarian emergency. They were
not in any way utilized prior to the intervention.243
"During the planning phase for the deployment, there was no contact at the
operational level [the First Marine Expeditionary Force, the unit around which the
JTF was established] with representatives of the humanitarian organizations
working in Somalia."244 The actual Marines who came ashore on December 9th,
l·l:. Richard Vcnnigone, World Vision International, 28 October 1994; Patrick Vial, MSF/Fmnce, 17 January 1995;
William Berquist (formerly of Catholic Relief Services) 21 August 1995; Carl Harris (formerly of World Concern)
24 August 1995; Refugee Policy Group, The Somalia Saga: A Personal Account 1990-1993, by .Jan Westcott, p.
37. (Hereafter cited as Westcott Report].
2.... Kevin Kennedy, 'The Relationship Between the Military and Humanitarian Or~nizations in Operation
Restore Hope," unpublished paper, p. 2. [Hereafter cited as Kennedy Paper].
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were merely given a list of NGOs in the area.245 Their first priority, in any case,
would be establishing a secure area. For an operation defined as humanitarian,
and in support of those who knew the situation best, the NGOs were conspicuously
left out of the equation. The common rebuttal to such an assertation is that
collecting such information is virtually impossible. Where would one start?
By the end of January, 1991, the Inter-NGO Coordinating Committee for
Somalia (lNCS) had been formed in Nairobi, Kenya. On February 5, 1991, it
agreed upon the following statement of purpose:
1. To establish open, clear and effective communication between
Somali authorities and NGOs;
2. To coordinate resources and programs of agencies working in the
same areas of relief, to assure maximum effectiveness thereby
eliminating conflicts of efforts and duplication of capital assets;
3. To establish a forum through which all NGOs interested in
involvement in Somalia can gain and share knowledge of existing and
planned programs; and
4. To promote donor confidence in a coordinated NGO effort toward
Somalia through effective communication to attract maximum donor
funding.246
There was thus a well established forum through which to contact NGOs
operating in Somalia, not to mention the contact made during the Provide Relief
operation. Moreover, OFDA's Special Relief Coordinator for Somalia, Jan
Westcott, had been operating, and continued to operate, in Somalia since
245 IntClview with Major David Castellvi, 3 August 1995, Quantico, Virginia. Major Castellvi was a company
commander for 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines. .
246 Westcott Report, p. 6.
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November of 1990. As it turned out, Ms. Westcott was eventually contacted by the
military in a ship-to-shore phone call in early December.247
G. CIVll.. AFFAIRS
Another seemingly inexplicable missing component from the intervention
preparation was the lack of Army Civil Affairs units involved or eventually sent.
Given their stellar performance in Operation Provide Comfort, it appears unusual
that they would not be fully utilized. While Charlie Company of the 96th Civil
Affairs Battalion (the Army's only active duty Civil Affairs unit) was sent to
Somalia, the reserves, despite receiving call-up orders, were never activated.248 One
suggested reason for this conspicuous absence is that the Marines thought they did
not need them. Moreover, the call-up of such units generally indicates a longer-
term commitment. The Civil Affairs units also implied nation-building, something
that was clearly not part of the mission statement. The Marines, as a short-term
expeditionary unit, fit the political climate of Washington D.C.
H. RESPONSE STRUCTURE
It was against this backdrop of lessons mis-learned and opportunities lost
that the Marines came ashore to an established U.N. structure amidst the anarchy
of multi-clan warfare. Designated as the Humanitarian Coordinator for the U.N.,
247 Westcott Report, p. 31. "The voice on the other end announced that he was calling from the SS Tripoli and
wanted more information on the landing since a "Mr. Westcott's" name was included on his list of people involved
in the advance party for the landing of the Marines." (p. 31).
2·'. The 452nd Civil Affairs Battalion, for example, was told that some of its elp.mcnts would be going.
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Dr. Philip Johnson, an American and President and CEO of CARE, had been the
Director of the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) since October, 1992. A
supporter of military intervention, Johnson was ready to work with the JTF.249
Southern Somalia was soon divided into eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS),
with a sectoral HOC established in each one (to include a CMOC that represented
the local military forces). This sectoral HOC worked directly with the forces in
that HRS. Importantly, the Mogadishu HRS HOC also served as the national HOC.
As a result, this HOC would work directly with the UNITAF staff, according to its
national charter, but it would not work directly with the military forces directly
assigned to Mogadishu (First Marine Division).
The HOC was to provide for the following conceptual needs:
1. serve as a focal point for the humanitarian relief organizations;
2. increase the efficiency of humanitarian operations through planningand
coordination;
3. gather and disseminate information among all humanitarian relief
organizations;
4. provide the link for the humanitarian community to UNITAF and
UNISOM military forces.25o
2." On December 11th, the Marine .JTF, according to its international make-up, became known as the Unified
Task Force (UNITAl') in support of UNOSOM, the U.N. Operation in Somalia.
2S11 Kennedy Paper, pp. 7-8.
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In short, the HOC was responsible for developing and implementing
humanitarian strategy and for coordinating logistical and security support for the
relief organizations.
Once ashore, the Marines established their command center at the former
U.S. embassy compound. This decision, a natural one given the compound's
security attributes as well as its central location in southern Mogadishu, meant a
ten minute separation (by vehicle) from the location of the already established
Hac. Hence, a means was needed to establish a permanent liaison with the HOC
and the U.N. itself.
On December lith, the UNITAF CMOC was collocated with the HOC.
Colonel Kevin Kennedy, of I MEF's G-3 shop (operations) was its Director. He
would focus largely on NGO/UN relations. Colonel Bob MacPherson, a chance fill,
would focus on the CMOC's relationship with UNITAF. The CMOC operated
according to four "principal missions:"
1. serve as the UNITAF liaison to the humanitarian community and
UNOSOM headquarters;
2. validate and coordinate requests for military support;
3. function as the UNITAF Civil Affairs Office;
4. Monitor military support in the Regional HOCs.251
2f>' Kennedy Paper, p. 9.
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The collocation of the CMOC with the HOC ameliorated a number of critical
concerns. First, the physical presence of the CMOC at the HOC was viewed as the
military's "reaching out" to the humanitarian community252 -- an important first
perception because the NGOs did not know quite what to expect from the military
(not having met or talked with the military until December 9th). Second, the
resulting coordination proved to be "tremendously effective" as there was "no other
means of getting security information" to the NGOS.253 (Security was the issue
around which all coordination was centered). Third, the collocation provided a
fulcrum through which the DART could input its expertise. As in northern Iraq,
the DART members -- due to their many trips to the field, their own previous
experience, and their checkbook -- were able to keep their finger on the pulse of
the effort and help effect coordination.
Finally, the HOC needed to be separate from the UNITAF operations center.
The UNITAF compound was the center of the American command element (with
all the security accouterments of barbed-wire, bunkers, and machine-guns). By
definition, information and meetings there were not meant for anyone but
Americans, and access was accordingly restricted to those who had a need for
entry. The HOC, on the other hand, had to be completely accessible to everyone.
2S2 Interview with .James Kunder, Vice President of the Save the Children (US), 7 August 1995, Westport,
Connecticut. Mr. Kunder was the Director of OFDA at the time and present in Somalia for the first month.
2S:l Interview with Lauren Landis-Guzman, Save the Children (US), 1 August 1995, Washington D.C. Landis-
Guzman was a member of the DART and worked in the HOC.
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Anybody with any humanitarian concern was welcome to attend the meetings and
share information.
The actual structure of the HOC reflected the different players involved. As
the U.N.'s Humanitarian Coordinator, Phil Johnson was the HOC Director. He had
two Deputy Directors, one civilian, one military. The civilian Deputy Director was
the DART leader (first Bill Garvelink, then Kate Farnsworth) while the military
Deputy Director was Colonel Kennedy. Theoretical subordinates, the Deputy
Directors' first responsibility was back to their respective organizations. It was
these people who ran the daily HOC meetings.
I. THE MEETING
It should first be noted that there was a pre-existing forum for NGO
coordination called the NGO consortium. The Consortium had originated as the
natural gathering point of the NGOs which had remained behind in Somalia when
everyone else had left, induding the U.N. With the advent of the CMOC, this
informal meeting assumed a more official role as the major NGOs pitched in to
hire a person who was responsible for their collective issues.
It was here that NGOs, big and small, had a chance to centralize their voice
about other related issues. Like the military's staff meeting in the UNITAF
compound, it was also a place where they determined the agenda and could talk
among themselves. Occasionally, Kennedy and MacPherson would be invited to
attend as observers. According to Joelle Tanguy of Doctors Without Borders, this
meetingproved to be a "fundamental coordination mechanism" because it took the
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burden off of the HOC/CMOC staff to address every single NGO.254 In this
manner, the HOC could refer smaller NGOs to the Consortium and, when various
issues arose, could themselves ask to speak to the Consortium.
The actual HOC coordination meetings were held at the U.N. headquarters
(on the 2nd floor of a rented house in southern Mogadishu). Given its big, open
space, the 2nd floor was a natural place to host meetings that generally included
between eighty and one-hundred participants. Typically opened by Kennedy or
Kate Farnsworth of the DART,255 the meeting would start out with some basic
military reports (weather, security) from G-3 representatives. In exchange, the
NGOs would offer their information. General discussion followed. According to
topic, sector, or relevant organization, the conversation worked itself around the
room, giving everyone the opportunity to speak.
As a general consensus emerged on what had to be done and in what order,
the meeting broke down into smaller meetings whereby further coordination was
done relevant to specific tasks. It was during this process that the DART earned
its money. For example, as one NGO representative noted of Lauren Landis-
Guzman, she was a "floating broker" who set up quick meetings and made
appropriate coordination changes with a sense to the overall planning process.256
From these meetings came the actual NGO Requests For Action (RFAs) that were
25-1 Telephone interview with Joelle Tanguy, MSF, 6 September 1995.
2.0. Phil Johnson was sometimes unable to contribute as much as he liked. Diagnosed with amebic dysentery,
malaria and an ulcerated intestinal tract in December, 1992, he was very sick at times in Somalia. (Somalia Diary,
by Philip Johnson, Ph.D, p. 76).
2.0(; Telephone interview with Carl Harris, 24 August 1995.
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taken back to UNITAF for approval or disapproval. (Most of these requests were
for convoy security).
All participants agree that both forums were "congenial" and very "healthy."
Of course, in reference to the CMOC, "some NGOs just didn't want the military
there at all and went out of their way to make it difficult as possible."257 But these
folks proved to be the exception rather than the rule. Indeed, there was probably
even a hidden blessing among those NGOs perceived as outspoken. Carl Harris
of World Concern described one of his peers as "irreverent, profane, yet searching
and honest." He found these particular NGO representatives to be a "catalytic
influence that brought out the best in people." Importantly, Harris points out that
at "no time was there a loss of respect" for the CMOC staff because there remained
the feeling that "we were all in this together."25R
Which brings us to the atmosphere in which these meetings were conducted.
While everyone was equal, the military obviously assumed a primus inter pares
place at the table by virtue of its ability to provide security. Yet, the people most
responsible for the military's representation, Kevin Kennedy and Bob MacPherson,
did not act in a condescending or arrogant manner.
Instead of giving orders, they asked questions. Instead of taking
over, they took inventory of all the people and supplies they could
use to help create solutions ... We also shared a concern that the
humanitarian community, while it numbered in the hundreds, might
feel overwhelmed by a force of 30,000 soldiers, sailors and Marines.
257 Intcrvicw with Elizabcth Lukasavich, 1 August 1995, Washington D.C. Lukasavich was a DART mcmber.
25. Harris, 24 August 1995.
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The first time the issuewas raised, Kevin didn't hesitated to speak up.
"The military should be in the background. We want the
humanitarian community to know that we're responsive to their
needs, that we're here to cooperate. If we can be open and candid
with each other about our needs and expectations, I think we make
this a team effort."25!J
By all accounts, the CMOC did everything possible to collaborate and
contribute to a coordination atmosphere. Besides an obvious respect for the NGOs
and personalities conducive to consensus building, Kennedy and his team brought
one further element to the table: a forthright and transparent honesty. One-and-
all appreciated the CMOC staff for their blunt honesty: "we can do that, I'll get
back to you on that, we will never do that ... " If Kennedy said it could happen,
it would.260
Bob MacPherson further emphasizes that sometimes what one has to offer
in exchange for NGO collaboration and coordination is simply sincerity of effort.
It is not always a "matter of ability, but a willingness" to listen and cooperate.26]
The NGOs responded in kind to this effort.
This overall interface worked well. Carl Harris, a retired State Department
officer who had worked refugee problems and NGO coordination for twenty years
in Vietnam, Biafra (Nigeria), and Cambodia, stated that Somalia was the best
25"Somalia Diary, pp. 77-78.
26" As further testimony to this respected integrity, several observers recall meeting various Somalis in random
places throughout the country who would cite "Colonel Kennedy's" approval for something they were doing
(usually while having no idea who the man was or what he looked like).
261 Telephone interview with Colonel Bob MacPherson, USMC, 9 September 1995.
171
NGO/military interface he had ever seen.262 Kate Farnsworth, who has extensive
experience throughout Africa on this matter, reflected that "more was done there
[Somalia] to build the NGO/military relationship than any other place."26~
J. PROBLEMS
Despite these efforts, however, the NGO/military relationship was plagued
by persistent parochial pt.;fceptions. There was the feeling among the NGOs that
the information sharing was a one-way street, with the military's penchant for
secretiveness preventing a reciprocal flow. There was also the perception that the
military simply did not want to be bothered with the NGOs. As William Berquist
recalled, there was eventually the sense that "either the CMOC was lying, or that
Johnson [the UNITAF commander] was lying to the CMOC, or that the chain-of-
command" did not work.264
On the military's side, there was the feeling that the NGOs simply had no
concept of how the military operated. There was also the sense that the NGOs
generally kept their distance but called upon the military only when they needed
them. Moreover, there was a general difference of opinion among the UNITAF
officers as to what their exact relationship with the NGOs was: direct or indirect
support? Or both?
26"l Harris, 24 August 1995.
2'" Farnsworth, 31 July 1995.
264 Berquist, 21 August 1995.
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Thus, two views on the nature of the mission emerged. One view
held that the mission was only to provide security; this would allow
the HROs [Humanitarian Relief Organizations] to provide relief ...
Those holding this view pointed to the focus on security in the
mission statement as a whole. They also noted that there was no
other discussion of helping HROs anywhere in the OPLAN
[operations plan]. Another view held that the military was there to
help the HROs -- both directly and indirectly ... They also said that
helping the HROs was so obviously underlying the reason for being
in Somalia that of course the military should assist the HROs in any
possible manner. Most of the officers on the CMOC staff held the
second view. Other officers -- especially on the MARFOR staff
[Marine force] -- held the first view.265
These competing interpretations were the direct result of a mission
statement that did not provide any specific guidance as the humanitarian intent
was conspicuously absent.
Finally, if one accepts the simple logic that even the best people will have
trouble dealing with a completely unprecedented situation, then the coordination
process is necessarily exacerbated by what the Mogadishu CMOC had conceptually
become. For the first time, the CMOC was no longer a CMOC. It was not an
operations center where people solved problems at the same table. Instead, it had
become a CM--L--C: Civil-Military Liaison Center. Despite the best of intentions
and personnel, the Mogadishu HOC/CMOC was twice removed from reality. Not
only did the CMOC have to coordinate with the local Marine forces in Mogadishu
ltc' Dworkcn, Observations From Restore Hope, p. 37.
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through the UNITAF staff; decisions made about NGO security were removed
away from the NGOs to a faceless chain-of-command.266
The cohesion that results from decisions made in conjunction with one
another at the same table -- as in northern Iraq, Bangladesh, and the Somalia
Airlift -- necessarily fades once the liaison process becomes the primary means of
communication. With no significant face-to-face interaction as fellow problem-
solvers in a difficult situation, negative stereotypes soon emerged as organizational
behavior permeated to the operational level for the first time in our study.
We now examine three general areas, already evident in the first thirty days,
in an attempt to flesh out the NGO/military relationship: 1) the tangible/intangible
isolation of the HOC/CMOC from UNITAF; 2) security/disarmament; 3) the lack of
a humanitarian strategy.
K. CULTURAL CHASM: THE 1YRANNY OF A TEN-MINUTE DRIVE
The ten-minute drive from the HOC/CMOC to UNITAF was symbolic of the
increasing cultural chasm between the NGOs and the military in Mogadishu after
the first month. This tangible and intangible separation came to taint every
militarylNGO discussion. The essence of this separation was that there was no
permanent humanitarian representative at the operations shop in UNITAF.
Consequently, Kevin Kennedy and, primarily, Bob MacPherson became the single
2("' For pxample, when an NGO callpd into thp CMOC about a real security emergency, thp "chain-of-command"
(UNlTA> t1id not respond. Thp CMOC, howpvpr, respondpd when it could with its own personnpl (sixtppn timps).
This itprM1il!l made for stronger tics bptween thp NGOs and the CMOC while simultaneously hurting thp overall
NGOIUNITAF relationship.
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point of contact between the military and the NGOs. Once narrowed to this extent,
the overwhelming lesson of past CMOCs is negated: that there must be multiple
surveyors of reality, making decisions, at the same table, in order to ensure that
everyone stays on the same wavelength.
As Jim Kunder put it, the general impression was made that "discussions
with Kevin Kennedy were discussions with the military. "267 Kennedy and
MacPherson may have thus done their job too well. Because of their honesty, their
fair brokerage, and their work ethic, it may have become quite easy for the NGOs
to simply accept them "as the military."26il With such a mindset, it would be easy
to assume that the UNITAF folks all thought and acted like Kennedy and
MacPherson.
A second, related, observation is that the HOC/CMOC became the only
point of planning and input for the NGOs. It did not generally occur to the NGOs -
- until they felt that Kennedy and MacPherson themselves were having problems
communicating to UNITAF -- that there might be another separate and distinct
military operations center. Additionally, this separation is accentuated by the fact
that the HOC was the highest institutional access the NGOs had to UNITAF. The
U.N. for example could apply pressure on UNITAF vis-a-vis its New York office
and its official relations with a member state. Besides going to the press, the
NGOs had no other recourse.
lG7 Kunder, 7 August 1995.
l';X This logic is born out by the previous quote from Bill Berquist who su~sted that the CMOC was being lied
to.
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The rebuttal to this line of argument is that while the official liaison was
limited to one or two people, there was plenty of unofficial communications to
ensure that the humanitarian/NGO perspective was represented. Indeed,OFDA
personnel, particularly Kate Farnsworth and Lauren Landis-Guzman, had the ear
of Ambassador Oakley whenever they wanted.269 Certainly the DART knew the
humanitarian pulse and the military listened to Oakley. Moreover, as Ambassador
Oakley points out, besides the regular staff meetings that he held nightly (at which
there was 0 FDA representation), he also invariably had Farnsworth or Garvelink,
along with UNITAF officers, over for breakfast to discuss issues: "there was plenty
of dialogue."27o
The final counterpoint, however, is: how well did anybody, apart from
Kennedy and MacPherson, know the Marines? This thought is certainly not
disparaging of Oakley, the DART, or the Marine Corps. But the point remains,
what was the influence of the Marine warfighting mentality on the overall
understanding of the situation and the communication between the military and
the NGOs?
Mark Biser, an infantry officer himself, sheds light on this subject, setting
up a typical Marine perspective of the CMOC.271
2m Farnsworth, :31 July 1995; Landis-Guzman, 1 August 1995.
27" Oakley, 9 August 1995.
271 Telephone interview with Mark Biser, Lieutentant Colonel, USMC (ret), 22 August 1995. Biser had served
in the greater Horn region from .January, 1990, to .July, 1992, as a member of the Marine Embassies staff. (A
process through which he got to know a number of the NGOs operating in Somalia). He returned with the .JTF
as a member of the Forward Support Service Group (FSSG). When asked to, Biser portrayed a typical Marine
vJew of the CMOC and its relationship to the Marine's warfighting culture.
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CMOC? What's that? Who knows? Who cares? Those
guys are over there living under UN rules with air-
conditioning. They're skating [getting off easy]. Who wants
to be in a CMOC? Nobody wants to be in a CMOC. That's
like asking ten brand-new Second Lieutenant infantry
officers just out of The Basic School [where all Marines
officers learn to become infantry officers first] if they want
to be the adjutant [an administrative position with little
command opportunity]. Ten out of ten would say no. They
are warfighters and they want to practice their craft.
Biser is quick to point out the irony of this perspective (which is
not just common to the Marines) in a humanitarian situation. "What is
least important at D+ 10 [ten days after the landing, with security still
very much an issue] emerges as the most important later on ... it [the
CMOC] must eventually become the FOME [focus of main effort]."
MacPherson, a combat veteran with twenty-four years experience
as an infantry officer at the time, suggests similar observations about the
warfighting nature of the Marines. "Nobody really wanted to embrace the
CMOC ... at best it is still a couple of dirtbag Colonels, at worst it is just
another box in the schematic set-up."
MacPherson points out, however, that, despite this general
mindset, he essentially had unlimited access to the JTF commander and
the Director of Operations, Brigadier General Anthony Zinni. He also
notes that he was clearly empowered to support the NGOs as best he
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could. But, MacPherson still described his job of UNITAF/CMOC liaison
as trying "to keep peace in the family."z72
Although malicious UNITAFintent can generally be discounted, the
point remains that it was not the institutional nature of the Marine Corps
-- or any military personnel trained as warfighters from day one -- to
elevate the CMOC to the priority of Focus of Main Effort. As one Marine
officer reflected, "does the Marine culture prevent the right questions
from being asked?"Z7:i
The communication argument is therefore again narrowed back to
the two person liaison theory because only a Marine would truly
comprehend this mindset. Again, credit goes to the two Colonels for
being so effective as translators to both communities. They understood
and spoke for the NGOs. Eventually, however, all they could do was
present UNITAF policy. Inevitably, according to their professionalism,
theirs must have been a deep and silent frustration.
The third lens through which to view the figurative and literal
space between UNITAF and the HOC is NGO expectations. For
example, with the announcement of the intervention and Boutros-Boutros
Ghali calling for disarmament, many of the NGOs assumed "security"
m MacPh0rs:m, 9 September \, <>C'.
27:. Intetview with Lieutenant Coiond George A. Biszak, USMC, 15 March 1995, Twentynine Palms, California.
Biszak worked for the G-3.
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would be both corporate and personal. How could 30,000 troops not be
enough to accomplish that mission?
There was also the initial feeling that Restore Hope would be like
Provide Comfort.274 While very few NGO personnel had actually been in
northern Iraq, word had spread as to what an unexpected and great
experience it had been working with the military. Not the least of this
experience was the fact that the U.S. military provided everything from
tents and cots to food and water for the NGOs. Although it was not quite
a "free ride" mentality that pervaded the NGOs, there certainly was the
expectation that they would be more appreciated.
Charles Petrie, a senior DHA275 official in Somalia at the time,
provides a telling perspective on these optimistic expectations. Provide
Comfort, in his opinion, was a situation where the military basically sub-
contracted the NGOs to do the humanitarian work,276 Indeed, with no
NGOs present prior to the emergency, the military was the first on the
scene. Everyone recognized and accepted the military's role as a
necessary leader and facilitator. The Somali situation was almost the
exact opposite. This time, the military was coming into a situation where
27·1 Landis-Guzman, 1 August 1995.
275 Dcpartmcnt of Humanitarian Affairs, located within the Secretariat of the United Nations. DHA had been
created after the emergency in northern Iraq in recognition that one agency had to be responsible for coordination.
Besidcs the natural growing pains of a ncwly created organization, DHA has still not been empowered to carry
out its mandatc.
276 Telcphone intcrview with Charles Petrie, DHA, 23 August 1995.
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the humanitarian operation was well-established. For better or for worse,
because the situation was completely different than northern Iraq, the
working relationship would not be replicated.
A final approach to understanding and/or preventing the cultural
gap was to collocate the HOC/CMOC with the UNITAF compound,
thereby allowing for a constant humanitarian presence in the military's
planning cell. As indicated earlier, there are problems with this proposal.
First, the HOC was already established and the only suitable building for
the UNITAF headquarters was the embassy. Second, there were
legitimate security concerns about who came and went out of the
military's command post. Third, the UNITAF staff meeting was no place
for a consensus type meeting. Staff meetings are action-oriented towards
military means, not necessarily about information sharing, and end
according to the senior officer present. Simply, because of its inherent
nature and purpose as UNITAF's own coordination cell, the staff meeting
was the wrong place for an additional 80-100 people. The entire First
Marine Division, for example, had only two representatives at that
morning meeting. Fourth, the NGO community as a whole would have
objected to being that closely associated with the military.
Thus, the coordination framework between the two communities
was not the most conducive one for daily planning and the consideration
of overall strategy. With essentially two different operations centers, no
matter how good the liaison, there inevitably had to be a divergence
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between the two planning processes. The victim would be the primacy
of the humanitarian intent. Unfortunately, while the next two issues --
security and humanitarian strategy -- were somewhat beyond the control
of the NGOs and the military, the coordination process had been theirs
alone to understand and control.
L. SECURTIY (AND DISARMAMENT)
The issue of security and its immediate offspring, disarmament,
was the major point of contention between the NGO community and the
military in Mogadishu. Like the literal and figurative space betwe~n the
HOC/CMOC and the UNITAF compound, this issue involves many angles.
The establishment of security for the forces coming in and their
follow-on logistics is, and will always be, primary. Like adults who are
instructed to first put their oxygen masks on before helping their
children, so it is with an armed force in pursuit of a mission. The mission
can only take place once the force is prepared to take it on. Having said
that, the question becomes: how long does this process take and how
should it be accomplished? These concerns are the first points of
contention, largely resulting from different perceptions of "security" and
the expectations that these perceptions create.
The military was stepping into an uncertain situation -- the military
threat was relatively unknown. Accordingly, the Marines took a worst-
case approach, displaying overwhelming force in everything they did,
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from the amphibious landing to convoy protection. The NGOs had a
different perspective because they knew the ground and the people. In
general, the Somalis were looking forward to the intervention. Although
not military experts, the NGOs did appreciate that in a situation where
most Somalis supported the intervention, the armed clans and bandits
would probably take a wait-and-see approach. More importantly,
however, they felt that the very presence of military forces would prevent
violence and allow them to address the imperative humanitarian needs of
the moment.
The Baidoa example is illustrative. Baidoa is 142 miles west of
Mogadishu. Hundreds of children were dying there daily. But there were
also eleven technicals in town.277 NGOs who had recently returned from
Kenya, thought that, given the need and the threat, Baidoa would be
occupied in the same fell swoop as Mogadishu. Unfortunately, what was
Phase I to the military, lasting for a week or so, meant the simultaneous
occupation of Baidoa to the NGOs.
u.s. forces landed in Mogadishu on the 9th, but it was not until the
15th that they arrived in Baidoa. These six days became an eternity
according to NGO expectations. With the Marines ashore, the
"technicals" took a final opportunity to loot the rest of the supplies in
town, knowing that once U.S. troops arrived, they would not have another
m Technicals were old pick-up trucks with heavy guns mounted on them. They were the most visible symbol
of power for the competing clans.
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chance. According to the humanitarian perspective, the Marines were
moving at a glacial pace. According to the military perspective, however,
the Marines were "smokin'." For a landing force to be that far inland
within six days, under uncertain threat conditions, was a considerable
feat. 278 And thus the most fundamental question: how do you define
military security in a humanitarian intervention?
Joelle Tanguy suggests the following frame of reference for the
military and NGO.z79 The military's security is about "protection by arms,
a practical security which must be put into place." The NGO, on the
other hand, defines its security "in terms of the larger context: what is
the situation developing around us and what is driving the relationships
around us?" In this sense, security emerges from an acute situational
awareness and the legitimacy that results from acting in a humanitarian
manner in accordance with the overall situation.
The significance of these divergent points of view can be seen in
the eventual withdrawal of MSF. By May of 1993, everything that MSF
did was contingent upon the military. The physical threat was so bad
that they consistently needed military protection, even with basic training
programs for Somalis. Protection was driven by military logistics and
logistics were decided by operations. In short, MSF was completely
27" BisN, 22 August 1995.
27'l Tanguy, 6 September 1995.
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associated with, and dependent upon, the military. For a group that
originally viewed attending the HOC/CMOC meetings as a compromise
to their independence, this position was unacceptable. MSFlFrance
pulled out of Somalia in May of 1993.
This overall NGO conceptual approach to security suggests that
the military needs to understandjust how divergent the security definition
can be and how important it is to create a dialogue with the NGOs from
the very beginning to eliminate false expectations and, hopefully, create
common understandings. Similarly, however, the NGOs must understand
the vulnerability of a force not yet built-up. Jim Kunder, director of OFDA
at the time and a former Marine himself, suggests that while the
psychological impact of overwhelming force is obviously at its zenith
during the first hours, days, and weeks, it is also the time at which a
military force is at its most vulnerable. Thus while there is great
opportunity for decisive action -- political, humanitarian, or military -- it
is also a time of weakness because there may not yet be sufficient
security for the armed forces. Consequently, there must be a certain
amount of caution.2Ro
For example, if a platoon had been parachuted into Baidoa and,
for whatever reason, they had been wiped out, then what? How do you
immediately redress the military and political implications of such a turn
2>1<' Kunder, 7 August 1995.
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of events? Or, what if a few well-placed snipers had kept the landing
process at bay for a few hours/days? Simply, the military must have
sufficient security to protect itself. It is these concerns that will always
be in the forefront of every commander's mind.
Craig Anderson ofWorld Concern sums up this seeming dichotomy
of perceptions: the military "established themselves in military format;
but, they couldn't have done it any way else." Yet, the NGOs still felt that
"they [the military] took their understanding of security and applied their
own solution . . . there was no brainstorming about 'what kind of
security. "'281 It would seem that to answer the most difficult question of
all during a humanitarian intervention -- how do you define security in a
way that enables the humanitarian effort but also protects the force? --
begins with this mutual brainstorming. It would further seem that such
a dialogue must begin prior to the intervention itself.
M. DISARMAMENT
No one issue exemplifies this different perception of security more
than the policy/non-policy of disarmament. Above all else, this problem
was a political issue, something which the NGOs occasionally lost sight
of when they blamed the military itself for inaction. Disarmament was
NOT a part of the U.S. mandate. Viewed as related to nation-building,
2><1 Anderson, 25 .July 1995.
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there was soon a public dispute between the Secretary-General and the
President. Boutros Boutros-Ghali called for disarmament while President
Bush declared that disarmament was not implicit within the Security
Council resolution to use "all available means" to create a secure
environment. Eventually, even the policy-makers in Washington could
not avoid the reality that there had to be some sort of disarmament.
While all agreed and welcomed the attempt, the dreaded "D" word
was soon much more than a thorn in the side of NGO/military relations.
This "constant, festering, unending sore of the weapons business"282
manifested itself most voraciously in identifying those who needed to be
disarmed, particularly those Somali guards hired by the NGOs. As
Colonel Gregson states, "who is the bad guy when everyone has guns?"283
Prior to the intervention, the NGOs had hired Somali guards from
local warlords in order to get their relief shipments through (not to
mention a measure of personal security). Pure and simple, everywhere
was "Indian country." The problem, however, was that these same
"guards" were sometimes using extortion to get their job if not
moonlighting as bandits at night. As Carl Harris recalls of World
Concern's guards, "they were pretty basic, crude thugs ... it was nuts to
fire them with their weapons [i.e. they would be used against World
;>12 MacPherson, 9 September 1995.
21<:' Interview with Colonel Wallace Gregson, The Pentagon, 2 August 1995. Gregson was the UNITAl.' assistant
.1-3.
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Concern], and we needed them."21l4 Besides, even with the guards'
nebulous background, were the NGOs "going to turn on those guards with
whom they would have to live afterwards [after the military's
departure] ?"21l5
Even prior to the debate over the weapons of NGO guards, there
was consternation regarding the general security issue. American forces
focused on securing certain areas -- such as general NGO areas and food
distribution sites. The military thought that the NGOs should consolidate
to make their protection easier. Initially logical, this fire-base approach
did not account for the military's eventual departure, presented a possibly
bigger target, and stood to separate the NGOs from the very population
they were seeking to serve (an imperative component of a successful
helperlhelped relationship).
The larger issue, however, was that no matter how the security
situation was approached, there would be "more secure" areas and "less
secure" areas by default (Mogadishu was too big and there were not
enough troops) with a decided need for protection between these zones.
Even if relations were 100% perfect between the military and the NGOs,
the NGOs would need personal guards.
l"' Harris, 24 August 1995.
ll.., Gregson, 2 August 1995.
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Given the overall political backdrop and an inexplicably slow
approach by UNITAF, the disarmament policy painfully evolved from
January to May. The first attempt to identify the "good guys with guns,"
those Somalis working/driving for the NGOs, involved the issue of pink
identification cards by the CMOC. These cards, without a photo-ID, were
easily counterfeited.
The s~cond attempt, in February, involved a blue photo-ID card.
This poHcy allowed Marines and soldiers to confiscate any "visible"
weapon. This concept soon became disputed as "visible" was not clearly
explained and open to interpretation by the military personnel manning
the checkpoints. For example, did "visible" mean from outside the vehicle
or once one looked in the cab, seeing a weapon on a guard's lap? A third
policy resulted in April whereby a weapons policy card, simple and with
pictures, was used in conjunction with the blue photo-ID card. At this
point, things were more clear, but UNITAF was on its way out.
Several factors added insult to injury. First, the NGOs and their
guards were inevitably caught in the disarmament net. During one week
in March, for instance, 84 weapons were seized of which 54 belonged to
NGOS.286 This process soon turned the CMOC into the tragic-comedy of
'Guns "R" Us' as humanitarians left the meeting with AK-47s strapped over
286 Dworken, Observations From Restore Hope, p. 31.
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their backs.287 At the same time, Marines on the streets of Mogadishu --
who had spent a hard day's work fulfilling their assigned mission, and
protecting themselves, by disarming those whom they had been told to
disarm -- saw the CMOCs return of the weapons as directly contrary to
their efforts.
Furthermore, even with a clear policy for Mogadishu, the rules
would change from HRS to HRS (Humanitarian Relief Sector) according
to the security threat and the international force present. Thus what
finally worked in Mogadishu might not have been applicable in Baidoa or
Bardera. Finally, as Colonel Kennedy points out, the administrative
support for an ID card system requiring thousands of cards -- so crucial
to an effective, or at least consistent -- policy was supported by just two
UNITAF clerks.
The inability to reach a successful resolution despite
numerous efforts at the most senior levels and the generally
compliant nature of the humanitarian organizations, leads
to the conclusion that the sustained confrontation
represented more than just a vigorous application of
weapons policies but a fundamental antagonism towards
humanitarian organizations from some elements of
UNITAF.288
2M7 Moreover, it usually took three to four days for NGOs to get their guns back (with no bullets). In the
meantime, the immediate dilemma of a NGO guard/expatriate, who had just had their weapon confiscated, was
how to get back through "Indian country."
2&< Kennedy paper, pp. 23-24.
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As Ambassador Oakley later reflected about this process,
"demobilization and disarmament were screwed up, no doubt about it."2R9
N. HUMANITARIAN STRATEGY?
Because there was no higher political resolve behind the
intervention, no humanitarian strategy ever emerged. Certainly,
strategies existed. Since the very beginning, AID/OFDA, in the form of
Andrew Natsios, had a plan for Somalia that comprehensively addressed
issues beyond immediate relief, such as livestock, agriculture, and
monetization. This American plan, however, was not clearly understood
or adopted by the Americans themselves. This is not to say that the plan
was articulated poorly. Natsios, in fact, had been a broken record from
the summer of 1992 through the intervention promulgating the need for
a nuanced and comprehensive response.
Rather, it suggests that policy-makers thought that just getting food
over to Somalia would take it off the 'skyline;' and that was good enough.
Moreover, it suggests again that once the Department of Defense became
a part of the planning, the humanitarian intent was given lip-service while
the military concerns dominated. Thus, there was not too much of an
appreciation for the actual situation and the crying need for a
comprehensive, integrated, and synergistic approach. Although it was
2".0 Oakley, 9 August 1995.
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obvious from the beginning that Somalia demanded much m ore than just
a food solution, that is exactly what it got.
This misunderstanding of the nature of the problem was
exacerbated early on by NGO and military alike at the operational level.
Charles Petrie observes that relief agencies themselves did not appreciate
the relief-to-development continuum as they "operated in Somalia as if
there was no tomorrow."290 Likewise, the military, unfamiliar with
humanitarian issues and forced to deal with political ones because they
had been ignored at higher levels, contributed to "relief issues [becoming]
operationally subordinate to diplomatic and military issues . . . military
and diplomatic strategy in complex emergencies needs to follow, not
direct or be separated from, relief strategies."291
The American plan was not adopted by the international
community either. Natsios admits that he made a mistake in not
attempting to better sell the plan to the European Community.292 Even
had he done so, however, it still remained for the implementors
themselves to 1) accept the broad guidance of such a strategy; and 2) to
simultaneously mold an operational manifestation of it. Even if all the
2<)0 Charles Petrie, ''The Price Of Failure," unpublished paper, p. 9.
2'" Andrew Natsios, "Food Through Force: Humanitarian Intervention and U.S. Policy," The Washington
Quarterly, Winter 1994, p. 133.
2"2 The EC is important because, combined with America, they represent 90% of all donor funds in emergency
responses. Thus, if the money behind an operation supports one plan, then hopefully it will be that plan that the
various field agencies, which implement donor projects, follow. (Otherwise, they do not get the money). In this
manner, through the power of the purse, it may be possible to permeate a response effort with one overall plan.
Natsios, 23 August 1995.
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donor countries were to agree, it still comes down to the expert in the
field.
The other strategy that existed was the U.N.'s "100 day" plan for
Somalia. This piece of paper received absolutely no legitimization from
the international community. Charles Petrie states unequivocally that the
plan was "written by a group of nice people with a do-good mentality" but
was not hard-nosed enough about the reality of the Somali problems; as
a result, the plan "didn't really address anything."293 With no international
consensus, no accepted plan, no political resolve, a short-sighted NGO
vision, and a sometimes contentious NGO relationship with those whose
mission it was to provide security, an overarching humanitarian strategy
never stood a chance.
Furthermore, no one who worked in the HOC recalled ever having
the feeling of a uniting strategy. Not only was there no sense of what the
humanitarian community wanted to generally accomplish in the first
month(s), there was not even a general sense of cohesion or purpose.
Kate Farnsworth states that it was "not very clear what we were supposed
to be doing."294 Carl Harris "didn't sense anything was coordinated
towards a long-term goal."295 Lauren Landis-Guzman recalls the
19" Telephone interview with Charles Petrie, 21 and 23 August 1995.
""., Farnsworth, 31 July 1995.
lOf> Harris, 24 August 1995.
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HOC/CMOC atmosphere as "reactive."Z!)fi Kevin Kennedy states that there
was "no strategy in the beginning [during UNITAF]."z97 Jim Kunder states
that there was "no sense on anyone's part that this was anything more
than dumping food."z9'"
Given this strategic vacuum, how does the military incorporate the
humanitarian priority into their daily taskings, assuming they were
receptive to begin with? The CMOC staff did keep estimates of what was
done. For example, "on average, UNITAF conducted 70 escorts, used 700
vehicles, and moved 9,000 metric tons of supplies each month."Z!)!)
Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kirtpatrick confirms that UNITAF was tracking
this information as well.30o
But what was done is no indicator of where each action leads.
While the military needs to keep track of this information, that is not
their primary job nor should they be the only one doing it. Moreover,
these numbers, in and of themselves, mean nothing, if the goal is to
understand whether the original intent is being accomplished.
Two conclusions follow. First, even the best humanitarians are less
effective without a comprehensive plan that has no political resolve
2<l6 Telephone interview with Lauren Landis-Guzman, 2:3 August 1995.
2!Y1 Telephone interview with Kevin Kennedy, 17 October 1995.
2% Kundp.r, 7 August 1995.
2''' Observations From Restore Hope, p. 21.
"'HI Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Roger Kirpatrick, USMC, 1 September 1995. Kirtpatrick
worked in the G-:3.
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behind it. This lack of political resolve strongly indicates that the
humanitarianlNGO community and the military have a common enemy:
an inattentive and basically ill-informed civilian leadership, irrespective
of country, and, as a result, a wishy-washy public mandate. Andrew
Natsios was the Special Coordinator for the President of the United
States of America, and he could not get his plan through.
If there is a common enemy, then there is also a need for all
implementors to seek one another out. Bill Berquist suggests that the
NGOs must have the opportunity for serious input prior to an
intervention. "We didn't know what to expect ... it would have been
great to bring the [NGO] leaders out and sit down with [General] Johnson
and spend some time strategizing.":lOI (These words are akin to Craig
Anderson's suggestion that there needed to be "security brainstorming"
between the NGOs and the military).
This idea bears some consideration, particularly in light of the
political context in which these events occur. In order for both sides to
know "what to expect," there should be a meeting prior to intervention,
if possible, between the commanding general and the NGO leaders (along
with the DAR1). Even if to mutually recognize that they are speaking
different languages, such a meeting represents a significant start. It also
needs to be an on-going process.
:<111 BClrquist, 21 August 1995. GivCln just how quickly thCl Somalia msponsCl unfoldCld, this logic cannot be!
applied realistically in retmspClct. Th<' iogic is mom than applicabh~ to future contingencies.
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Moreover, extending this logic, there needs to be a humanitarian
presence with the commanding general (this idea finds fruition in
Rwanda when a DART member serves as the JTF commander's advisor).
It is only through concerted and situation-appropriate efforts like these
that the military and the NGOs have a chance at understanding each
other.
O. CONCLUSION AND IMMEDIATE LESSONS
This chapter has focused on the Mogadishu CMOC because that is
where there was the most consternation between NGOs and the military.
It should not be forgotten, however, that a significant humanitarian
difference was made -- the food did get through -- and that there was
much mutual respect between the NGO community and the military. This
respect was particularly true among the regional HOC/CMOCs, where
coordinators lived and worked together, and during the implementation
process itself.
It should further be remembered that "there was such a big
learning curve . . . at the time, nobody knew how to do any of this
stuff. "302 Mark Biser states, "they [the military] didn't have any idea of
what to do and they [the NGOs] didn't know what to ask them to do."303
.111l Lukasavich, 1 August 1995.
3113 Biser, 22 August 1995.
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While there are some obvious parallels with Bangladesh and northern
Iraq, the size and complexity of the Somalia intervention remains
unequaled. Given this enormous novelty and the extent to which success
was achieved, it is fair to conclude that NGO/military relations were
"good enough."304
Having said that, this conclusion does not accept "good enough" for
the next time. Consequently, let us consider the following areas: 1)
briefly, the issue of created expectations and the political will to address
them; 2) the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of analysis; and 3)
as with the other chapters, the boiled down NGO/military principles of
coordination for this particular case.
P. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE
CONTINUUM OF EFFORT
There has never been a greater need to interweave the
expectations created by a foreign presence and the need for a continuum
of effort.305 Because the U.S. military mission was somewhat nebulous--
the ironic result of an attempt to narrowly define the military's role in
support of a seemingly simple humanitarian mandate -- there were many
and different expectations among the participants, particularly the
:«>1 Dworken, Observations From Restore Hope, p. 5.
:<.." The Rwandan intervention is not considered because, rightly or wrongly, the U.S.'s clear intention to be
nothing more than a very short-term logistician was extremely clear to one-and-all.
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Somalis. Dr. Ken Menkhaus writes that "evidence suggests that in the
first phase of the intervention there was widespread popular Somali
support for, and the expectation of, a move to marginalize the militias,
provided it was done even-handedly so as not to expose one clan to
attack by another."30r, On December 9,1992, Dr. Said Samatar stated that
"there seems to be high expectations among the people that with the
coming of the Americans, good days are here again. I fear that if the
economic situation does not improve , there might be a feeling of
letdown."307
Like it or not, the arrival of the world's mightiest army was going
to create economic and political expectations. To think that it was
possible to isolate the humanitarian effort from these concerns was a
mistake, especially in a failed state like Somalia, where everything was
political. Every Somali and their every expectation was a separate
political entity because they had no means by which to voice their
concerns. As a result, the political significance of an organized action
takes on greater meaning because it is the only thing that works.
Thus, there must be a plan; a continuum of effort that accounts for
these expectations.
""" Ken Menkhaus, ''The Reconciliation Process in Somalia: A Requiem," PRELIMINARY DRAIT, unpublished
paper, p. 23. IHereafter cited as Menkhaus Paper).
:<07 NIGHTLINE, "Nightline in Somalia, Day Two." Also see Wescott Report, p. 33.
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· .. everyone, both inside and out of the U.S. government,
understood that military protection of humanitarian relief
supplies to famine zones represented little more than a
temporary palliative. All were aware that a long-term
solution to the Somali crisis would entail a commitment to
fostering national reconciliation and supporting the
resuscitation of the collapsed Somali state. These tasks,
though later derided by critics as "nation-building," were
essential if the anarchy and armed banditry which triggered
the famine were to be eliminated.:lOll
Jeffrey Clark presented the answer in 1993: ''What is required is
a phased and linked national process that addresses humanitarian,
military, political, and economic components, and that has the support of
an international coalition of donors prepared to facilitate reconstruction
programs.":109 (Of course, such an endeavor would seek the full
participation and eventual leadership of the Somalis themselves).
What Clark recognized, Lieutenant Colonel Tom O'Leary, the
commander of the first Marine Battalion to land in Somalia, knew back
in December of 1992. The intervention represented an "immediate
change for their lives; they will have the highest expectations; if they are
not met, the relationship [between helper and helped] will become
disenchanted and then it will go sour ... you can provide security and
food, but how long will they be satisfied?":lJO It is with these words that
:lll" Menkhau!'> Paper, p. 1.
:l'" Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia: Failure of the Collective Re!'>pon!'>e," in Enforcing Restraint, p. 232.
:l'O Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thoma!'> O'leary, USMC, Quantico, Vir¢nia, 3 Augu!'>t 1995.
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we discuss the strategic NGO/military lessons learned from this case
study.
Q. STRATEGIC IMPUCATIONS
Humanitarian intervention is a political process. This process
shapes every dimension of the effort, to include the NGO/military
relationship. Despite a mandate not to be political, the military, and the
NGOs, were very much political in their actions, albeit in an ad hoc
manner. A permeating plan was needed and that plan should have been
of U.N. origin with international donor support. The HOC should have
been recognized by the international donor community and participants
on the ground as the U.N. sanctioned center of humanitarian activity.
Recognized as such, the humanitarian imperative remains primary as all
other tasks -- political and military -- are developed in support of the
HOC. Moreover, the HOC should have been the focus of the overall U.S.
effort. By extension, the CMOC should have been the focus of UNITAF.
The HOC, however, was not capable of supporting such a U.S.
focus because it did not have a plan that was realistic or supported by the
international community. Yet to blame the U.N. is, to some extent, to
blame ourselves. There is considerable merit to the argument that the
U.S. was the U. N. throughout the entire Somalia intervention, particularly
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during UNITAF. Indeed, as Liz Lukasavich described the HOC, "the only
thing U.N. about it was that we called it U.N.":>11
This perspective reveals the underlying tension arising from the
fact that the U.S. will almost never allow its military personnel to work
directly for the U.N. Yet, the aegis of U.N. legitimacy was imperative to
the whole operation. Hence, U.S. action required a U.N. cloak (thus the
UNITAF concept). But when things go wrong, no matter who is to blame,
politics dictate that the U.S. blame the U.N. This relationship must be
better understood and we must "quit using the U.N. as a whippingboy.":>12
Only if this relationship is appreciated and worked at by both
communities can the HOC, or its conceptual equivalent, be supported as
the true center of a humanitarian intervention. If understood as such,
there will be no misunderstanding as to roles and relationships between
the NGO community and the military. On the other hand, if there is no
acknowledged center of effort, then all of the other relationships will be
confused.
In the absence of higher political resolve, the military and NGO
communities must understand and accept the need for such an
operational center. The first step to creating this center, however, is not
a wire-diagram but the mutual understanding that there must be a unity
.," Lukasavich, 1 August 1995.
:m Farnsworth, :n July 95.
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of effort. The mechanism for realizing this unity of effort must be the
HOC. If together they can create a central role for the HOC, or its
conceptual equivalent, then perhaps they will have a greater chance of
success.
The second strategic implication recognizes that, in such crises, the
implementor will engage in nation-building activities in order to properly
address the humanitarian need. Better understood as the enabling of
"marginal self-sufficiency" by the military and moving from relief to
rehabilitation and restoration by the NGOs, these political-socio-
economic-civic dimensions will take place. They are the ingredients of
problem-solving in a extremely complex humanitarian emergency like
Somalia. The suggestion that Somalia did not have such "broader
objectives" and thus did not "require an assessment of progress in the
areas of politics, economics, health, agriculture, and welfare,,:m is dead
wrong. "Did we get into nation-building? Absolutely."314 The Marines
were involved in everything from Councils of Elders to engineer support
:m Center for Naval Analyses report: Operation Re.~tore Hope: Summary Report, p. :n.
:"., Gregson, 2 August 1995. For an outstanding overview of just what kinds of activities the Marines were
involved in, see Liuetenant Colonel John M. Taylor's article, "Somalia: More Than Meets the Eye," in the
November, 1993, issue of the Marine Corps Gazette.
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to food distribution.:H5 The problem, or the "big mistake," was that
"nation-building was never acknowledged."~l()
While politics dictate that nation-building will never be directly
acknowledged, the nature of humanitarian intervention demands a clear
humanitarian intent. It is very clear that the Somalia mission statement
delivered to the U.S. military men and women in the field left things
ambiguous and created differences of opinion as to how to relate to the
NGOs. The mission statement must remain broad, allowing for
operational latitude and guidance, while leaving no doubt as to what the
humanitarian purpose is that it serves.
Finally, even if there had been a crystal-clear mission statement
that allowed for a total understanding between the two communities
based on the HOC and its humanitarian intent as the center of the effort,
one has to wonder about the effect of UNITAF's implicit mission: few
casualties. Again, this does not imply that the Marines acted in an overly-
cautious manner; their aggressive patrolling and community interaction
stand out. But, it is relatively safe to infer that this method was OK as
long as there were no casualties. As the Somalis increasingly tested the
:H5 One debate not addressed in this chapter is the issue of how much humanitarian effort should the military
be involved in. While humanitarian purists recoil at the thought of such endeavors, there is a place for the military
taking humanitarian action, particularly in the earliest stages of an intervention. Such action is ultimately of a
tactical military nature because it gives potential belligerents a reason NOT to shoot at U.S. personnel. Of perhaps
greater importance, it also gives the American armed service member a chance to participate and interact with
the values which he/she joined to defend.
316 Berquist, 21 August 1995.
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Americans, however, there was the general understanding that the
Americans were reluctant to use force. A fine line to draw, the point
remains that casualties were a high-degree concern of the stateside
decision-makers.
A common retort suggests that it is public opinion that drives the
no-casualties concern. That notion is too simple. The no-casualties
agenda results from the American public inability to tie casualties to any
larger goal. There is no goal because the mission has not been politically
articulated by the White House, and a self-fulfilling prophecy is the result:
we cannot have casualties because the public will not stand for it; and
they will not stand for it because we will not articulate our objective
except in purely humanitarian terms. Implicit herein is the reminder that
the military is an instrument of policy, an extension of politics by other
means. If it has no political purpose, how can it function properly?
Sending troops as a humanitarian curative -- doing something -- will
never work. There must be a political purpose for the troops, the NGOs
with whom they will work, and the public.
This [absence of a political understanding] sums up the
complete ambiguity of this type of operation: action for
action's sake ... designed to soothe public opinion by 'doing
something.' But the decision to move into the humanitarian
field is the result of a cruel lack of a political perspective.
Protecting humanitarian aid-workers becomes an aim in
itself, replacing the age-old need for soldiers to have a
political purpose when going to war. This new paradox of
protection can be summed up as follows: humanitarian aid
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permits intexvention by armed forces yet gives them no
precise political program.:m
The consequences of this disconnect between political purpose and
a soldier's use are enormous. First, a cautious mind-set is potential and
dangerous result from a setting where casualties are not allowed. This
mindset could figuratively and literally bleed over into a real warfighting
scenario. Moreover, a policy nominally in protection of the volunteer
soldier actually endangers him. Any potential belligerent recognizes that
the U.S. is leery of casualties, which in tum makes the soldier or Marine
a high-value target. Because his death can change the course of a
government, his humanitarian purpose is dwarfed by the perceived
political ramifications of his death.
Ironically, it would seem, a political purpose from the international
community and the governments of those sending troops allows the NGO
and the military to assume their traditional garb: purely humanitarian
and purely a tool of a higher policy. Without that resolve, they are as
political as anyone else, with as great a chance of dying as someone in
the warring factions.
317 Life, Death, and Aid: The Medicins Sans Frontieres Report on World Crisis Intervention, p. 119.
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R. OPERATIONALIMPUCATIONS
The most important operational conclusion is that the NGO/military
dialogue must begin as soon as possible, ideally stateside. It should be
actively and aggressively sought by both communities. This process is
imperative for three reasons. First, if the emergency situation is to
stabilize, there must be some sort of coordination. Second, such a
dialogue ensures that the humanitarian intent remains primary. If by
hearing the other community's interpretation of the humanitarian intent
is the only accomplishment, it is a significant one. Third, a candid and
continuous dialogue keeps the military and NGO united against a
common enemy: the absence of political resolve. While one can inform
higher headquarters and hope that senior policy-makers truly understand
a phenomenon that has recently come to the forefront of foreign policy,
the implementors will certainly drive, if not create, the eventual policy of
the international community. As Ambassador Oakley has stated, "Somalia
equaled ad hOC."318 If so, then the operators must be in unison. They
know the turf better than anyone and they must be in accord if they are
to achieve any degree of success.
Such a dialogue demands one further operational conclusion. In
a humanitarian intervention, the CMOC must become the focus of main
effort from the very beginning for the military. Whether it becomes the
3'8 Interview with Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University, 19 January 1995.
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conceptual equivalent of the HOC or is a subordinate component of the
HOC itself, the CMOC represents the military's only institutional chance
for accurate feedback on whether or not the humanitarian intent is being
met.
The CMOC must therefore be elevated in status and legitimacy
within the military culture. The very best people must be assigned to it
and it must be fully empowered by the JTF commander. To think of the
CMOC as another place for "pogues" and non-warfighters is a
fundamental mistake. If for no other reason than self-interest, the CMOC
must become the priority because it represents -- through close
coordination with the NGOs and the rest of the humanitarian community
-- the military's best chance to design and control its own exit strategy.
S. TACTICAL IMPUCATIONS
The direct result of a need for a continuing and mutually
reinforcing dialogue is the greatest lesson learned of all: the HOC and
the military operations center must be co-accessible. This phrase is
defined as "within secure walking distance of the other." Some have
suggested that the two be collocated. While this possibility satisfies the
operational need, it does not satisfy basic living and security
requirements. The military needs a secure space where it can talk and
analyze as the military force that it is. Very few need access to this
space. Additionally, there is the obvious need to create the most secure
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area possible. Thus, the military operations center will always be "in the
wire."
The HOC/CMOC must be completely accessible to anyone willing
to participate. It must also be frequented daily by the military leaders,
particularly from operations. While it will be situation and terrain-
dependent, the HOC/CMOC should be made secure by whatever means
are appropriate. This recommendation does not suggest sandbagging,
bunkers, or armed guards. Rather, in whatever surreptitious and
subdued manner is available -- from a second, exterior "wire" to hidden
snipers or a rapid reaction unit of some sort -- the HOC must be secure
enough to allow for the unimpeded and ready access of both NGOs and
military to meet there, or for NGOlhumanitarian leaders to go over to the
military operations center.
Additionally, co-accessability demands that the NGOs develop
accepted mechanisms by which they speak with a collective voice. They
cannot expect to send eighty people to a military staff meeting. The NGO
Consortium, for example, can only become effective if one or two people
can speak for it in an emergency. These mechanisms must be understood
by the military prior to an intervention. Against their most cherished
values of organizational autonomy, it is a change that NGOs must endure,
at least during crises of this magnitude.
Finally, there remains the question of the HOC structure itself. A
military perspective would suggest that coordination and unity of effort
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are inherently impossible. With a Director responsible to the U.N., and
two Deputy Directors responsible to OFDA and UNITAF each, it is a
system built for inefficiency, if not failure. However, like the American
government, it is the best system possible. These various players within
the HOC impose a system of checks and balances to the humanitarian
process. While it may not always be the most efficient structure,
everyone is at the same table and truth is generally the result. That is as
good as it gets.
T. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COORDINATION PRINCIPLES
1. A liaison/collaboration must be established as soon as possible,
preferably before the intervention itself. Such a process is
continuing and dynamic as it reflects the changing nature of
the emergency problem.
2. This liaison/collaboration process should be attended by the
most senior leaders from both communities. Not only does
better communication result, but the humanitarian element of
the mission is elevated to a higher status by the joint task force
commander's presence. This elevation is imperative, not only
for the sake of the humanitarian community, but for the JTF
commander's subordinate commands as well. His presence
indicates what is important and what he expects from his
junior leaders and men and women.
3. The military needs to incorporate Civil Affairs personnel into
its planning process from the very beginning. Civil Affairs
personnel are responsible for the military's doctrinal interface
with civilian agencies.
4. NGOs have to establish their own form of doctrinal interface.
They must be able to speak with some sort of corporate voice.
If they cannot, they will not only exacerbate the situation, they
will be left behind by those who can coordinate.
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5. The HOC/CMOCmust be co-accessible with the military's
command element (or vice-versa depending upon the
situation). The mandate must be continually re-visited by
humanitarian (to include NGO) and military leaders alike.
6. The CMOC must be elevated within military culture. Not a
"leader of men" environment, the CMOC, in a humanitarian
emergency, will be the focus of main effort. The entire force
must know the importance of the CMOC -- if only for the
reason that it represents the ticket home -- and support its
efforts anyway it can.
7. The CMOC Director must have unlimited access to the JTF
commander. The Director represents the JTF commander's
official military feedback on whether or not the humanitarian
mandate is being met.
8. The military's mission must be explicit. Clarity, however, does
not mean defining a mission so narrowly that its components
are reduced to simple "go/no go" criteria (e.g. seize airfield).
There must be an overarching and simple humanitarian intent
that provides guidance as to what goal the military mission is
working in support of. This humanitarian goal, if kept
paramount, will provide the implicit and specific military tasks
at hand.
9. If there is no political resolve from the leading country, in this
case, the United States, and there is no humanitarian strategy
universally supported by the international donor community,
the military and NGOs must seek each other out for they have
been reduced to trying locally. Left as such, they are the only
ones who stand any chance of making the overall effort work.
If there is enmity between them, then their potential
contribution is significantly reduced.
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V. OPERATION SUPPORT HOPE
A. INTRODUCTION
On July 4, 1994, Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, fell to the Tutsi-
dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF). With the sudden fall of the
northwestern town of Ruhengeri on July 13th, thousands of Hutus
thought themselves trapped. Hutus, fearful of a genocide equal to or
worse than the one-half million deaths that they had recently visited upon
the Tutsis, began to flee. 319 Their only means of survival was to flee west
to Zaire or to the French safe-zone in the south-western part of Rwanda
or to Burundi itself. Thus began the single-largest exodus in modern
history.
Most fled toward G9ma, Zaire, along the northwestern border of
Rwanda. "It's a river of people bleeding out of Rwanda!" stated Panos
Moumtzis, spokesman for the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.32o* Kate Crawford, there with the DART, called it a "human
tidal wave" that was "unprecedented in the history of refugee relief."321 By
nightfall of the 15th, just forty-eight hours after the exodus had begun,
31!1 This flight was actually quite systematic and organized. Wanting to maintain as much power as possible
while simultaneously delegitimizing the RPF, the former Hutu-dominated government of Rwanda manipulated,
and continues to, the fear of a reciprocal genocide as a means to ensuring a sustained refugee presence just
outside the Rwandan borders.
OW, As quoted in Time Magazine. Transmitted: 94-07-22 13:32:56 EDT.
* Note: All Time Magazine articles taken from the America Online directory. Accordingly, footnotes will reflect
the date and time that Time transmitted the article onto the Internet.
:W Telephone interview with Kate Crawford, 17 March 1995.
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the refugee camps in Goma numbered nearly a million people.
Statistically staggering to imagine, somewhere between 15,000 and 30,000
Hutus had crossed the border per hour into Zaire. In Burundi, to the
south, the refugee population had increased from 83,000 to 200,000 in the
same amount of time. In the southwest, 6000 people an hour had crossed
into the French safe-zone on July 14th.322
The worst situation was in Goma, Zaire. With a non-existent relief
infrastructure and a volcanic soil, Goma was ready to explode. "It is
impossible to find enough camps for one million people," Moumtzis said
at the time, and "the land is volcanic; we can't drill for water. What are
we going to do about latrines? It is an absolute nightmare. I don't know
how we are going to deal with it."323 With so many refugees and a
shortage of water, it was only a matter of time before cholera broke out.
By July 17th, it was estimated that one refugee was dying per minute due
to cholera, dehydration, and exposure.324 Clean water was needed fast.
By July 24th, American military personnel had been deployed to
Goma, Zaire, Kigali, Rwanda, and Entebbe, Uganda, setting up the
necessary infrastructure to complement and support the humanitarian
response community. By the end of July, a CMOC had been established
.122 OFDA "Rwanda Chronology," workinf{ draft, pp. 9-10. (Hereafter cited as Rwanda Chronology).
:U:l Raymond Bonner, "30 Trampled to Death as More Rwandans Flee Rebels' Advance," Special to The Dallas
Morning News, 18 July 1994, p. AI.
.24 "Rwanda Chronology," p. 1I.
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in Goma and Entebbe. By the end of the first week in August, a CMOC
had been established in Kigali. Working hand-in-hand with oFDA,
UNHCR, DHA, and the NGOs already present, the American military
helped to create an atmosphere of collaboration and coordination as the
major problems of the humanitarian emergency were quickly addressed.
Given its limited mandate, the American military did a splendid
job. It maintained a small "footprint," was subdued in achieving its goals,
did everything possible to support UN leadership and credibility, and was
"out" in sixty days. The JTF recognized that it was not in charge and that
it was there to support according to its comparative advantage of logistics
and infrastructure.
Indeed, the NGO/military relationship is officially a non-story.
Because the U.N. was in charge, with the American military as just
another supporting element, NGOs had to go through the U.N.
infrastructure in order to obtain American logistical support. The U.N.
prioritized the needs, utilizing the military's logistics through a single
point-of-contact: the CMOC. There was no official interface between
NGOs and the American military.
In purely operational terms, the cooperation and coordination
among the various participants will stand out for a long time to come.
And that collaboration will be the focus of this chapter. Yet, while the
immediate humanitarian abrasion of refugees had to be treated, no small
213
task in itself, the much deeper political gash of genocide would remain
unattended. The wrong solution, albeit almost perfect, had been applied.
It is this consciously ignored backdrop that shapes the context of
the U.S. response and, consequently, the military's relationship with the
NGOs. Given Rwanda's strategic insignificance and haunted by the
lingering doubts of Somalia, the rationale behind U.S. policy and actions
was to get out as quickly as possible, with no casualties. There would be
no more Somalias. Accordingly, the U.S. did what it took -- to include
submitting itself to the U.N. -- to achieve this overriding interest. To have
recognized the situation for what it was would have raised complex
political issues with which no one wanted to be bothered.
The U.S. government was not alone in its hidebound approach.
The NGO community, with the preemptive and notable exception of
Doctors Without Borders, thought that their humanitarian actions could
occur without political effect.325 What resulted was not just the end of the
refugee crisis, but the sustainment and de facto legitimizing of those who
had commited genocide, the former government of Rwanda (to include
their army and their militia, the Interahamwe, "united attackers").
No other event so embodies the moral quandary of intervention
and the fading distinction between humanitarian and political. Rwanda
was a political problem par excellence. But we, the West, treated it as a
:<2S Doctors Without Borders, for the first time in its history, actually called for military intervention during the
massacre of the Tutsis by the Hutus.
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humanitarian one. In the end, there is every reason to believe that this
particular treatment of symptoms and not causes will bring us all back.
B. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT
Rwanda and its cousin Burundi to the south share a history of
enflamed ethnic conflict. In this region, the Tutsi minority has
traditionally subjugated the Hutu majority. This ethnic division was
reinforced by the German and Belgian colonial influences. With
Rwandan independence from Belgian rule in 1962, the Hutus officially
threw off the Tutsi yoke, killing thousands of Tutsis and sending
thousands more into Zaire and Uganda.326 In 1973, the Tutsi-dominated
Burundi army killed thousands of Burundi Hutus which instigated the
further killing of Rwandan Tutsis by the Rwandan Hutus. In 1993, a
Tutsi-dominated army coup in Burundi, set off more killings of Burundi
Hutus by Burundi Tutsis. This sustained ethnic hatred set the stage for
the Rwandan genocide in April of 1994.
On April 6th, a plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda
(a moderate Hutu) and President Ntaryamira of neighboring Burundi (a
moderate Hutu) was shot down as it approached the Kigali airport. While
no one has ever been implicated, the results of this dual assassination are
more than clear. Almost as if on signal, the killing of the Tutsis within
:Wi Many of the Tutsis in the Rwandan Patriotic Front were the offspring of the Ugandan exodus.
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Rwanda began -- to include moderate Hutu political leaders. Radio des
Mille Collines (Radio of 1,000 hills, originally operated out of Des Mille
Hotel) was soon announcing "The grave is still only half full, who will
help us to fill it?"~27 Monique Mujawamariya, a Rwandan human rights
activist who escaped, reported the following.
In my neighborhood there were six militiamen who in three
hours killed 200 people. They had automatic weapons, they
had a map, and they knew exactly where they were going.
They had total impunity. They were paid, and they would
get bonuses for the scope of the massacre.328
There is no doubt that the killing of the Tutsis was premeditated
and systematic.~29 Genocide had been committed.
As multiple reports indicate, this crime was known at the time,
particularly in America. Upon returning from the region, Representative
Tony Hall (Ohio-D) wrote an open letter to Ambassador Madeline
Albright on June 9th, which combined realpolitik and idealism. "The
fundamental concern must be to take swift action before other members
of the global community begin to duplicate acts of Genocide . . . It is
:<27 Robert M. Press, "SUlviving Tutsis Tell the Story of Massacres by Hutu Militias," The Christian Science
Monitor, 1 August 1994, p. 9.
:l211 As quoted in The Wa<;hington Post, "So That the World Does Not Forget Rwanda," 24 April 1994, p. Cl.
:l2!' See also: 1) June 28, 1994 report by the UN's Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights; 2)
Human Rights Watch report, May, 1994; 3) African Rights report, May, 1994.
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imperative for the United Nations to strengthen itself by holding its
member states accountable.":Bo
But the knowledge of the event was ignored. To begin with, the
Organization of African Unity (OAD) did not take any action. Generally
speaking, a Cold War collection of dictators, acting against their own
citizens under the guise of sovereignty, the OAU is used to looking away
in the name of stability.:m ''When they look at a Rwanda, it makes them
all nervous. Because it's either happening or could happen to them.,,:m
The OAU was not going to take any action -- it was not in their heritage
or their interest.
That left the West, whose reaction was naturally shaped by its
collective strategic indifference to central Africa. Yet, genocide is still
genocide. Moreover, human rights in Africa had been recently rewoven
into the fabric of American diplomacy. In an address before the 23rd
African-American Institute Conference in Reston, Virginia, Secretary of
State Warren Christopher laid out the parameters of America's policy
toward the African continent:
The Clinton Administration will make Africa a high priority
and give it the attention it deserves . .. And we will help
330 According to the December 9, 1948, Convention on Genocide, contracting parties must prevent and punish
genocide. Virtually the entire world has signed the document.
:m Idi Amin, for example, was made president of the OAU despite his well-known crimes.
:m Robert B. Oakley, as quoted by Bill Keller in "Blind Eye; Africa Allows Its Tragedies to Take Their Own
Course," The New York Times, 7 August 1995.
217
Africa build its capacity for preventive diplomacy and
conflict resolution so that the people of that continent can
live free of the terror of war. At the heart of our new
relationship will be an enduring commitment to democracy
and human rights ... I want to make clear that the United
States will take human rights into account as we determine
how to allocate our scarce resources for foreign
assistance.333
Despite this policy, there would be no action, in part because the
Department of Defense saw another Somalia in Rwanda. Concerned with
-sasualties and open-ended entanglements, there was no seeming rationale
for U.S. military involvement. Though it was a political situation from the
beginning, there was no political will to address the essence of the
problem.
c. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION
With a full-fledged cholera/dysentery epidemic -- one person dying
a minute -- the world mobilized according to a situation with which it was
more comfortable. As one observer noted:
The miraculous and unheralded arrival of dysentery gave
the world a born-again virgin purity. Genocide took a back
seat to a humanitarian disaster. The drama of the rescue
could now begin, and the curtain of good intentions allowed
to fall on the mass graves. The moral and political question
mark created by the world's passive acquiescence to the
""" Secmtary of State Warmn ChriRtopher, 'The United StateR and Africa: A New Relationship," in Dispatch,
Vnl. 4, No. 21.
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annihilation of the Tutsis was erased by the monumental
logistical problems of dealing with the epidemic.334
On July 22nd, President Clinton called the situation the "world's
worst humanitarian crisis in a generation ... From the beginning of this
tragedy, the United States has been in the forefront of the international
community's response."335 Defined as such, the American response was
a matter of addressing immediate humanitarian needs.
While there were significant refugee populations almost
everywhere, the focus of the international media, and the U.S. response,
would be Goma, where almost one million refugees were spread
throughout three major camps. If the epidemic were to last, hundreds of
thousands could easily die. While enormous, this situation was now a
matter of organization. With DHA designated as the lead agency in
Rwanda and UNHCR designated as the lead agency in Goma, Tanzania,
and Entebbe, the infrastructure was soon in place to handle the situation.
D. COMMON UNDERSTANDING
The common understanding of the humanitarian problem was
apparent. The first priority was clean water and then it was a matter of
organizing the camps and establishing distribution systems for food stuffs
334 Rony Brauman, "Genocide in Rwanda: We Can't Say We Didn't Know," in Populations in Danger. 199.5, A
Medicins Sans Frontieres Report, p. 89.
:J3fi As quoted by Kathy Lewis in "U.S. to Increase Relief to Refugees; President Orders Round-The-Clock Airlift
Operation," The Dalla~ Morning News, 23 July 1994, p. 1A.
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and other necessities. Although unprecedented in its size, a refugee
problem is something with which the humanitarian community is quite
familiar. Moreover, given the right tools, stopping cholera is somewhat
academic. With a clear humanitarian mandate, this common
understanding almost automatically equated to a permeating common
sense in the field. The introduction of U.S. logistical support expedited
a process that would have happened anyway. The stabilization of the
emergency took place by mid-August.
Before focusing entirely on the humanitarian solution, however, it
should be noted that there was a wide-spread feeling from the beginning
that feeding the leaders of genocide, their army, and their militia, would
have unpleasant consequences. Alain Destexhe, Secretary-General of
Doctors Without Borders, wrote a letter to The Economist, published in
the last week of July. He warned that just as the Khmer refugee camps
on the Thai border had kept alive the Khmer Rouge, so would Rwandan
refugee camps keep the former Hutu government alive. Using the same
logic as Congressman Hall's June 9th letter to Ambassador Albright,
Destexhe predicted that if the perpetrators were not punished, this fact
would be "borne in mind by other potential tyrants."336
Of much greater stature, at least in America, was Ambassador
Robert Oakley's prescient article in The Washington Post on July 27,
"36 Alain Destexhe, letter to thE) Editor, The Economist, July 23rd-29th 1994, p. 8.
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1994. Oakley warned from the beginning that this emergency needed a
multi-faceted response. First and foremost, Oakley emphasized that the
solution would be protracted and political. At the politically strategic
level, the OAU had to become the primary player in solving the problem
(in conjunction with the UN and NGOs). Tactically,
the OAU and regional African governments must accept the
responsibility for dealing with the numerous armed and
ruthless Hutus from the former regime who have moved to
Zaire. In the short term they must be prevented from
terrorizing the refugees and disrupting relief and return
activities. In the longer term they must be prevented from
organizing to return and seize power by force. Also the
threat they pose to international civilian and military
humanitarian workers cannot be ignored. Nor can the
possibility of casualties. If casualties among humanitarian
workers should occur, the American people need to
recognize that the cause is worth the price. But to minimize
the threat, an early start must be made on disarmament.:>:>7
What had been warned about is now true.338 What was prescribed
was never attempted because the situation had been categorized as a
humanitarian one. Reflecting on his article, Oakley notes that it was "not
too terribly prescient -- just common sense at the time."339 Indeed, he
337 Robert B. Oakley, "A Slow Response in Rwanda," The Washington Post, 27 July 1994, p. A27.
338 Oakley's words manifested themselves as early as late October. From October 20th to November 17th, Jeff
Drumtra of the u.s. Committee for Refugees (USCR) visited the refugee camps.
"In addition to physical intimidation, the regime (of the former Rwandan government)
conducts "psychological warfare" in the refugee camps with an effective, systematic
misinformation and propaganda campaign that exaggerates the dangers facing Hutus
inside Rwanda, accentuates ehtnic hatred, and has convinced many refuggees that the
war must continue."
Jeff Drumtra, "Site Visit to Rwanda, Zaire, and Burundi," p. 15.
"!>Telephone interview, 13 March 1995.
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later emphasized that "everyone knew [about the political impact of
feeding the perpetrators] from the beginning.":'l40
It was against this backdrop that U.S. forces deployed to Uganda,
Zaire, and Rwanda at the end of July. They would have only one concern
-- the humanitarian need.
E. THE MISSION
On July 22nd, White House and Pentagon officials defined the
military's mission according to the following tasks:
• Provide air traffic and communications control for the necessary
airfields.
• Provide military security at the airfields.
• Provide sUIveillance aircraft to track refugees.
• Deploy loading/unloading equipment.
• Establish purified water system.341
Despite these specifics, there was a primary humanitarian intent.
Designated JTF "Support Hope" by European Command, Support Hope's
mission was "to provide assistance to humanitarian agencies and third
nation forces conducting relief operations in theater to alleviate the
immediate suffering of Rwandan refugees (summarized verbally by
I'" Tclephonc intcrvicw, 19 March 1995.
:<-1\ Th2 Daila.o; Morning News, p. AI.
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USCINCEUR [the commai1der~in-chiefof Europeand Command] as "stop
the dying"). "~42
This mission statement left no doubt as to what humanitarian end-
state the military should work towards. The mission statement was
further enhanced, however, by the JTF commander, Ueutenant General
Daniel R. Schroeder. Schroeder took the somewhat unusual and
additional step of examining every single speech and statement by senior
policy-makers on Operation Support Hope. From these, he developed an
intent of facilitating, not doing. This approach would keep the mission
sharply defined, allow other participants to find their comparative niche,
and prevent dependency upon U.S. resources. Importantly, such an
intent was only possible because the political dimension was completely
ignored by the NCA.
F. THE RESPONSE STRUCTURE
The international community was already reacting to the crisis.
With a nominal airhead in Entebbe and a presence in Kigali and Goma,
the U.N. had determined the lead agencies which would head the
responses. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs was designated as
the lead agency in Rwanda itself. UNHCR was designated the lead in
Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. There would be some problems with this
:H' Operation Support Hope, After Action Review, p. 10. (Hereafter cited as OSH/AAR).
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set-up as HCR-Zaire and HCR-Uganda were not in the habit of talking to
each other directly; instead choosing to go upstairs to their international
headquarters in Geneva. Although these types of problems caused
consternation with the U.S. effort, the U.N. infrastructure was sufficient
to deal with the crisis at hand. Indeed, the U.N. effort, in general, was
commendable.
G. THE U.S. INTERFACE
With the U.N. already in place and long-time NGOs continuing
their work there, the U.S., according to its mission and its desire to have
a very subdued role, was just one among many participants. Whereas in
the previous case studies, the U.S. had a central, if not leading, role to
play, the U.S. would not be involved in any direct humanitarian action or
decision-making. At every tum, it was facilitation and support. Crucial
to the success of this type of mission was the person chosen to be
responsible for civil-military operations.
In 1993, Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan had
established the Peace-Keeping Institute (PKI) in recognition that
peacekeeping and its related endeavors would be a significant part of the
future. Chosen to become the first Director was Colonel Karl Farris, an
Army armor officerwho had recently returned from working in Cambodia
with the U.N. With a year under his belt working within the discipline
and among the other players in the humanitarian community (to include
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OFDA and several NGOs) , Farris was a natural person to head the civil-
military operations in Rwanda.
On July 23rd, General Sullivan gave Farris a Saturday morning call
and told him to get in touch with the NGOs: what was the situation over
there and what were their needs? Farris soon called Lauren Landis-
Guzman (formerly of the Somalia DART and now working with
Interaction) and Joelle Tanguy (formerly of MSF/France in Somalia and
now the Executive Director of MSFIUSA). Although Farris left for Europe
the next day, both women got back to him in time and provided the
appropriate information.:i4:i For the first time, if ever so briefly, the
military had sought out NGO expertise stateside before deploying. By
July 28th, Farris was in Entebbe. His plan called for a CMOC in Entebbe,
Goma, and Kigali.
H. CMOC ENTEBBE
Entebbe had been chosen by the JTF commander in full
recognition that such a site was a stop-gap until Kigali International
Airport opened up. (Although military planes could, and did, land there,
commercial planes did not because the airport was not certified for
safety, driving insurance rates sky-high). In the meantime, Entebbe
would serve as the airhead through which supplies to both Rwanda and
:...:l Intcrvicw with Colonel Karl Farris, 4 August 1995, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
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Zaire moved. The JTF headquarters were located on the fourth floor of
the Entebbe airport terminal.
The CMOC in Entebbe was stood up on July 28th and was initially
under the direction of Farris and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Quentin
Schillare, USA. When Farris went to Kigali to stand-up the Kigali CMOC
in early August, Colonel Steven Riley, USA, took over as Director of the
CMOC (Schillare continued as the Deputy Director).
The CMOC was collocated with the JTF headquarters at the
Entebbe Airport air terminal. Located on the fourth floor of the terminal
as well, the CMOC was directly across from the J-3 shop (operations).
While there would still be some slight conceptual problems between the
J-3 and the CMOC, this set-up would prove ideal. The goal of the CMOC
was to be in the wholesale business of expediting transport to the retailer,
the NGO, who dealt directly with the customer, the refugee. The best
manner in which to accomplish this task was to "create an atmosphere to
support, not to lead."344
Although successful in this goal, both Schillare and Riley were a
bit ambivalent about their non-traditional assignment. Riley, a logistician,
had never heard of a CMOC -- "I couldn't spell it"345 -- and Schillare, an
armor officer, greeted the news as though he had just "tested positive for
"..., Telephone interview with Colonel Steven Riley, 23 February 1995.
3·1f> Telephone interview with Colonel Steven Riley, 5 September 1995.
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HIV.":W; Yet, both quickly grasped the central role of the CMOC and
found themselves working directly with UNHCR and the varied and
transient NGOs who were on their way to and from Rwanda and Zaire.
The CMOC met every morning at 0800 on the fourth floor.
Schillare or Riley initially ran the meetings as UNHCR did not have the
office space or furniture to conduct meetings. (Later, after HCR took an
office space on the first floor of the terminal, the meetings were held
there). Again, in a familiar format, specific coordination events for that
day and the next forty-eight hours were analyzed as a common sense and
prioritization emerged from the discussion. Essentially, the humanitarian
needs of Goma drove the process. If there were any disputes, Eva
Demant, the senior UNHCR representative would have the final say.
The representatives at the meeting would vary, especially among
the NGOs. NGOs showed up according to the need to move their "stuff"
or themselves into or out-of theater. Hence, the NGOs were not so much
a permanent, same person representative as they were a permanent,
collective presence. Given their transient nature and the fact that
Entebbe was a stop-gap measure waiting on Kigali International, there
was no real need for NGOs to even attend the CMOC meetings.
The information they had, however, either about shipments coming
in or about events/needs as they left Rwanda, was very important to the
346 Telephone interview with Lieutenant Colonel Quentin Schillare, 29 AUWJst 1995.
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CMOC and its ability to monitor the entire situation. Per the principle of
altruistic self-interest, the CMOC came up with two "hooks," or valuable
goods, to exchange for the NGO information. Because commercial air
was not flying into an uninsured Kigali airport, military air was the fastest
theater entrance (the other possibility was a long truck drive). This asset
was self-evident and the CMOC developed a process by which the NGO
presented a flying "chit" to the Combined Logistics Cell (to be discussed
shortly) and were accommodated accordingly.
The second "hook" was as novel as it was brilliant. The CMOC
posted a bulletin board outside their office on which NGO personnel
could tack their business cards. NGOs would want to find out who else
was "in town." One look at the board, a discussion with CMOC operators,
and an NGO worker, in search of expertise and/or assessments, could
track a trusted colleague to within a day or two. In the meantime, once
at the CMOC, the NGO representative would be asked the pertinent
questions of the day.
Although not dealing with the same NGOs on a daily basis, this
was the most official direct contact the military would experience with
the NGO community. This NGO interface proved successful for five main
reasons.
First, Riley and Schillare clearly understood, according to
Schroeder's intent, that their job was to facilitate and support.
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Next, along with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen A. Lindsey, USA,
Schillare had developed the idea of the Combined Logistics Center (CLC).
The CLC acted as the mechanism by which the CMOC coordination
process was enacted. With Lindsey and two U.N. workers from Croatia,
the CLC did the actual tarmac movement of relief supplies and
implemented all of the coordination decisions agreed upon at the CMOC
meeting.347 For instance, once a flying "chit" was approved at the CMOC
meeting, the NGO person would take the "chit" to the CLC where it was
recorded and prioritized according to the CMOCs intent. The CLC, as
the first stage of implementing CMOC coordination, was an instrumental
tool for making things happen.
The CLC also represented the first step taken by the CMOC in an
effort to transition to the U.N. Developed in conjunction with U.N.
workers, the CLC was the first mechanism of coordination to be fully
assumed by the U.N., as Lieutenant Colonel Undsey eased himself out of
the picture. Moreover, the CMOC itself, while it physically remained on
the fourth floor, its coordination meetings were soon transferred to the
U.N.'s office space on the first floor. This transition not only meant less
of a walk, it also symbolized that the U.N. was taking control of the
effort.
""7 For example, all the relief supplies brought in by commercial air had to be re-palletized to military pallets
in order to load them.
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The eMOC's constant awareness and encouragement of the
necessity for U. N. control was critical in establishing U. N. leadership, and
thus responsibility, for the overall logistics effort out of Entebbe. With
the U.N. as the primary player, the U.S. could begin to assume a less-
pronounced role while simultaneously creating an environment in which
NGO personnel were more comfortable: the U.N. facilitating the entire
response. Also, the sooner the U.N. was in charge, the faster the
Americans went home.
Fourth, the NGO interface was a success because of the attention
given to the CMOC by General Schroeder. Not only did the CMOC
Director or Deputy-Director attend the JTF staff meetings but Schroeder
also took the time to go and spend time in the CMOC itself. Schroeder
went so far as to use a secondary entrance to the air terminal that had
him pass first through the CMOC before entering the rest of his staff's
office space. As a result, Riley and Schillare had unlimited access to the
JTF commander. Both Riley and Schillare confirm that Schroeder was
very concerned with the CMOC and its impact on civilian relations.:wl
Finally, Tom Frye of the DART had been seconded to General
Schroeder as a humanitarian advisor. Frye traveled everywhere with the
General and provided "humanitarian" input for all the decisions made by
Schroeder. Thus, not only was the CMOC collocated with the JTF (it was
:14" Riley, 5 September 1995; Schillarc, 29 August 1995.
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really an extension of it), Wlienlhe JTF commander was away, he always
had humanitarian expertise on-call. (An important point as Kigali and
Goma had different humanitarian needs. Moreover, Frye could tap into
the DART presence in both towns).
While all worked out very well, there were some initial problems
that are worth noting. When Dr. Brent Burkholder of the Center for
Disease Control (CDC) flew to Rwanda on July 24th, he waited in
Entebbe for three days. Granted, the military was just setting up and
figuring themselves out, but it was apparent that the military's first
concern was providing for itself.349 This perception was probably not due
to any malicious intent, but rather a manifestation of a traditional military
mindset (something evidenced by Riley and Schillare's initial reaction to
being assigned to the CMOC).
Schillare reflects, however, that "his biggest frustration in Entebbe"
was a mindset more concerned with a wire-diagram schematic and its
infrastructure than the humanitarian purpose it was facilitating.350 For
example, such a mindset created a backlog of humanitarian supplies in
Entebbe during the first few days.3;;! The root cause of such problems,
though, was the following question: on which mechanism should the JTF
:WI Telephone interview with Dr. Brent Burkholder, 6 September 1995.
"'0 Schillare, 29 August 1995.·
:lS' This problem was, in part, solved by Tom Frye who pointed out to Riley that there were too many idle
military planes on the tarmac. Riley and the CMOC accepted this observation and "turned it up a bit." (Riley, 5
September 1995).
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staff focus to accomplish its mission? It soon became a matter of
convincing the J-3 and the rest of the joint staff that "in a humanitarian
JTF, the CMOC is the focus." Schillare went to great lengths to make this
point. At the staff meetings, he would bring over a big can of maize or
a box of high-energy biscuits and state: "this is why we're here." As
Colonel Riley points out, "who are you there to support: yourself, or the
humanitarian effort?"352
This insight is noteworthy because it suggests that even with a
clearly humanitarian intent, a supportive JTF commander, and the
collocation of the CMOC and the J-3, a traditional mindset will present
itself. Not because it is malicious or purposeful, but because it is human
nature to fall back into something known and comfortable -- i.e., the way
one is trained -- when confronted with the unknown.
With the influx of trucks with a forty metric-ton payload (compared
to a C-130 thirteen metric-ton payload) and, later, the opening of Kigali
airport in mid-September, the Entebbe airhead died a natural death and
CMOC Entebbe became secondary in importance to the CMOC in Kigali.
Before considering this effort, however, it is necessary to examine the
nature of CMOC Goma and its importance during the first weeks of
August.
'52 Schillare, 29 August 1995; Riley, 5 September 1995.
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I. CMOCGOMA
Goma, Zaire, was the focus of the crisis. At the end of July there
were over 800,000 refugees in three camps and they were dying at a rate
of 6500 a day. The area was blanketed from above by the haze of
thousands of fires and from below by human feces. It was absolutely
unprecedented.
UNHCR was reeling. Philipe Q'Grendi of UNHCR had to find a
way to address the myriad of problems. Among the most pressing needs
were the distribution and storage of clean water and the burial of the
dead. Other concerns included the rapid influx of NGOs with varying
degrees of skills and previous experience, the utter chaos of the situation,
and the potential for violence.
The organization of a response to such an overwhelming problem
necessitated a central location in which all agencies could meet.
Q'Grendi established his coordination center (there was no real title) at
a bank in downtown Goma. Accordingly, Q'Grendi would have large
NGQ meetings once or twice a week (where over 100 would participate).
The real money-maker, however, were the sectoral meetings which
addressed specific areas (i.e. sanitation, water, seeds and tools, etc.) and
how to best coordinate the available assets. This central yet diffused
effort, based on consensus-building, proved very effective.
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By July 30th, CMOC Goma had been established at the airfield on
the northern edge of town. (fhe U.S. focused its support efforts on water
purification, delivery, and storage as well as some basic engineering
help). The term "CMOC" is actually a misnomer. It was more like a
MaC, a military operations center that facilitated U.N. requests vis-a-vis
its liaison with O'Grendi's coordination center at the bank. The "CMOC"
had no interface with NGOs, or any other civilian agencies. The actual
military headquarters - endaved for security reasons out at the airfield -
served to facilitate U.N. requests and take care of its own infrastructure.
There was no civil dimension to it as an operations center. One DART
member described it as a "separate support activity."~5~ This assessment
is a fair one as the "CMOC" at the eye of the hurricane ironically had no
coordination contact with the NGOs (although there was obviously
contact at the point of implementation between troops and NGOs).
The liaison was primarily one person: Major Richard D. Hooker,
Jr., USA. Hooker's job was to liaison in support of UNHCR in accordance
with his commander's intent (facilitate, don't do). It was a relatively
simple process. Hooker would attend the general and sectoral meetings,
which were conducted in French and English, as one more player within
the humanitarian response. He would collect and track requests that had
been validated by UNHCR only. (Sometimes these requests would be left
353 Interview with Greg Garbinsky, Washington D.C., 31 July 1995. Garbinski was a member of the DART in
Goma.
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in a drop-box in the bl1s~metit of the bank where the DART was
collocated). Once done, and working in conjunction with OFDA's
expertise, Hooker would report back to Brigadier General Nix, USA, the
"CMOC" commander for final approval. By all accounts, this methodology
worked reasonably well.
Crucial to this success was the NGOs' understanding of the
American military's role and Hooker himself. It was self-evident that the
Americans were not there to implement, coordinate, or otherwise take
charge. One-and-all recognized that the U.S. force would abide by Philipe
O'Grendi and UNHCR's decisions on prioritization. Hooker was
essentially understood as a messenger. Given the context of the U.S.
mission and the role of Hooker, there would be no attempt at an end-run
by the NGOs to speak directly with the Americans. Besides, there was
just too much to do.
This common understanding of the U.S. purpose and role forced
the NGOs, vis-a.-vis UNHCR, to use the military for exactly what it said
it would do. Also, it forced the UNHCR and the NGOs to come up with
alternative methods and means of their own to solve situations that the
U.S. could conceivably address, but would not.
The issue of transition was the only noteworthy problem of this
nominal interaction. According to Greg Garbinsky, the American force
had promised to leave certain gear and equipment behind and then
vacillated. While the DART could have pushed harder for a transition
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plan, it was probably anticipating more than the four-day notice the
American forces had provided. Also, the gear issue was important
because its absence/presence determined just how self-sufficient the
UNHCR effort would become. Both issues were resolved as the gear and
equipment stayed and the departure was postponed for a week.
By mid-August, the death rate was down to 'Just" 500 a day as the
situation began to resemble something with which UNHCR and the rest
of the humanitarian community could again cope. On August 28th,
"CMOC" Goma shut down.
J. CMOC KIGALI
CMOC Kigali was formed on August 5th by Karl Farris as a sub-
component of UNREO (U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office). Farris directed
the CMOC and reported to General Schroeder in Entebbe. During the
third week in August, Farris and his Deputy Director, Lieutenant Colonel
John Crary, USA, returned home. They were replaced by Colonel Paul
Monacelli, USAR, and Colonel Fred Jones, USAR, both Civil Affairs
officers. CMOC Kigali shut down on September 28th.
In order to coordinate the relief efforts in Rwanda, the U.N. had
established DHA as the lead agency. DHA, according to its coordination
mandate, set up the On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in
the UNDP building (U.N. Developmental Program) in downtown Kigali.
The OSOCC was run by the U.N.'s Humanitarian Coordinator, Arturo
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Hein. In reality, however, it Was run by his Deputy, Charles Petrie (the
same official who had worked in the Somalia HOC). The OSOCC had
three objectives:
1. To provide a framework for the coordination of operational
activities undertaken by humanitarian organizations
responding to the Rwanda emergency;
2. to act as a focal point for the collection analysis and
dissemination of information relating to developments in the
emergency and the international relief activities; and
3. to facilitate the access to and sharing of resources for the
timely and efficient delivery of humanitarian relief.354
The four essential components of this operation were represented
within the OSOCC. There was UNREO (U.N. Rwanda Emergency Office)
itself which handled the actual coordination; UNAMIR (U.N. Assistance
Mission In Rwanda) the peacekeeping mission; ICVA (International
Council of Voluntary Organizations) which funded a tent outside of the
UNDP building to work in concert with UNREO, handling NGO liaison;
and the CMOC, which handled airlift and relief support.355
Not unlike UNHCR's coordination center in Goma, the OSOCC had
large weekly meetings (as many as 100 people) every Tuesday and Friday
night in which everyone had the opportunity to speak. Petrie, speaking
:J54 Internal UNREO Paper titled, "Operational Coordination of Humanitarian Relief," pages unnumbered.
:J5f> This o!1¥lnization was known as "UNREO" or the osocc. Importantly, clements within the OSOCC, to
include the CMOC, were not commonly thought of as independent entities. If you needed something, you went
to UNREO, not, for example, to the U.S. Army's CMOC.
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from a table at the front, would open the meeting up with words of praise
for various organizations and then ask for a general concurrence to that
meeting's agenda. Then, according to emergency priority, sector, or
region, the relevant representatives would speak their piece as a picture
emerged from the different reports. Later sector-specific meetings would
discuss the details of their responsibilities (i.e., sanitation). This
consensus-building and diffused approach won high-marks from all
involved.
It is extremely important to note the role of Petrie. While Petrie
obviously was an outstanding leader in this potentially leaderless
environment, it is more important to reflect on what the following
comments indicate: that the U.N., like in Goma, can be very capable.
Karl Farris remarked that Petrie was "the right person to pull a loose
community together."356 Quentin Schillare from the CMOC in Entebbe
noted that "Petrie is one of the heroes ... if they didn't have him there,
the plan [the military's] would have fallen apart."357 Paul Monacelli states
that Petrie "was the key to success . . . he had the ability through his
personality to get people to work together . . . If there had been no
Charles Petrie, we may have had to have played a more active role."35R
356 Farris, 4 August 1995.
:<57 Schillarc, 29 August 1995.
'''" Telephone interview with Colonel Paul Monacelli, USAR, 1 September, 1995.
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These comments, all from·. military officers with over twenty years
experience, reveal the true scope of an operation well-done. For the first
time in our study, the U.N. had been up to the task and had managed to
satisfy its hardest customer, the American military.
Thus, it was with a very comfortable subordinancy that the CMOC
operated in Kigali. Some might rush to point out that the wire-diagram
called for Farris/Monacelli to report to the JTF in Entebbe. Of course,
this point is true. Yet, let there be no doubt, "we were working in support
of the U.N. effort."359 As uncomfortable as that may seem to some, it is
also the reason for the operation's success. Not only did this attitude
make for more cohesive coordination, it also allowed the U.S. to write its
own exit strategy.
Like Goma, the official coordination between NGOs and American
military is a non-story. With DHA having the last word on prioritization,
the CMOC was removed from that decision-making process and its
inherent responsibilities. Unlike Goma, however, and because the CMOC
was collocated with the OSOCC, there were unique opportunities to
encourage the coordination process and thus accelerate the exit strategy.
Truly regarded as just another component of the overall effort, the
CMOC's position was first strengthened by its widely-acknowledged
mandate -- to facilitate, not do. As in Goma, this position prevented an
'59 Farris, 4 August 1995.
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end-run by NGOs to take the path of least resistance; i.e., to use the
military simply because it was there. Consequently, the NGOs respected
the OSOCC structure and operated according to its parameters:
submitting requests and awaiting adjudication and assignment by DHA.
In this sense, the CMOC remained distinctly in the background.
In accordance with the military's mandate, this type of presence
was more than appropriate. Yet, upon further inspection, it was
nominally negative to the overall purpose. Accepted as part of the
OSOCC structure and as not responsible for how resources were
allocated, the CMOC inherently risked th~ chance of becoming a passive
player, with absolutely no control over events. It could easily have
assumed the mantle of somebody else's tool.
This potential was not realized for four main reasons. First, as
discussed briefly, the CMOC accepted and encouraged its subordination
to UNREO. Colonel Farris recognized from the beginning that "it's OK
not to be in charge ... it's best that you not be in charge."36o Out of sync
with traditional military training -- "when in charge, take charge" -- this
awareness indicates the open-mindedness with which one must approach
these situations. Farris further notes that there can be no "presumed
formula based on a warfighting [doctrinal] mindset." This unencumbered
:<6" Farris, 4 August 1995.
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and atypical military intentpermeated the entire CMOC Kigali effort as
the humanitarians were more receptive to the CMOC staff.
Second, there was an aggressive liaison effort. Farris was
constantly out and about the city and countryside. As he checked on the
implementation of coordinated efforts, Farris did not hesitate to let NGOs
know of the CMOCs capabilities. It was through unofficial contact like
this that NGOs became aware of the CMOC and what it could do for
them. This theme was continued by Monacelli. Adding to the "C" themes
of Collaboration, Consensus, and Coordination, Monacelli stressed that
there must be a "Courting" process as well. This unofficial contact was
essential in a wire-diagram that did not reflect such interaction.
Monacelli suggests that "the more structured you become, the less
effective you are in coordinating with the humanitarian community."361
Thus, the informal, yet aggressive, courting process becomes the primary
conduit of mission accomplishment.
Next, the CMOC did not become a passive instrument of the U.N.
infrastructure because they were able to demonstrate their value-added
nature. According to the principle of altruistic self-interest, the sooner
the NGOs and the humanitarian community accessed the military's
logistics, the sooner stabilization would result, the sooner the military
could return home. The obvious "hook" was the logistic capability. For
361 Monacelli, 1 September 1995.
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example, the CMOC brought down a Movement/Control team down from
European Command to coordinate the burgeoning fleet of U.N. trucks in
Rwanda (eventually over 400 trucks).
But there were also more subtle enticements that made the NGOs
want to check in with the CMOC when they stopped by UNREO. For
instance, the new government of Rwanda had posted a map of known
land-mines in the Kigali area. Fred Jones managed to get a copy of it,
posting it outside the CMOC office. Initially ignored, it received a great
deal of attention when a mine was set off just a few days later. Another
examples involves the use of the military's aerial photography. At one
point, the rumor-mill had produced a near catastrophe of almost 100,000
refugees congregating near one particular bridge. The military was able
to produce some photo-imagery that suggested that the actual numbers
were significantly less. It was these types of innovative approaches that
made NGOs seek out CMOC personnel when they stopped by UNREO.
Finally, it was the manner in which military interaction was
presented that made the official and unofficial interface with NGOs "user-
friendly." Monacelli points out that they "made a conscious decision not
to sit at the front table; we instead sat in the first row of chairs." In this
manner, a proper example of "coordination and facilitation with no
unrealistic expectations" was set.~62 As the emergency stabilized, and
:l'>l MonacCllli, 1 SeptcmbClr 1995.
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with obvious symbolism, the CMOC offiCers slowly moved towards the
back of the room. By the time the CMOC shut down at the end of
September, the CMOC was represented by an Air Force Second
Lieutenant intelligence officer who stood in the back.
Thus, it was always very clear that the military would transition out
sooner, rather than later. While they were there, however, it was also
clearly understood that they would do everything within their mandate to
facilitate the humanitarian effort. It was this well-balanced approach,
coupled with the inter-personal skills of the CMOC officers, that made the
CMOC most effective.
These four points were only possible because the CMOC was
collocated with the OSOCC. Importantly, these points, due to the manner
in whiCh they were implemented, did not encourage the CMOC to be
viewed as a passive appendage ofthe U.N. infrastructure. Moreover, they
also directly contributed to an information sharing atmosphere that was
so important to Petrie's leadership style. If sharing was the accepted
name of the game, the above elements to the CMOC strategy eventually
contributed to the snowball of cohesion that Petrie was pushing downhill.
K. THE NGOS AND THE NGO UAISON
This atmosphere of information sharingwas reinforced by one final
intriguing element of the OSOCC, located in a tent outside the UNDP
building: The NGO Liaison Unit (NLU). Just as the CMOC did not
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officially interface with NGOs, the NGO Liaison did not coordinate the
NGO effort. Yet, Anita Menghetli, the NGO Liaison, had very good
relations with all the CMOC officers and was equally appreciated by
them. This only official NGO relationship of the CMOC made for
smoother coordination and cohesion within UNREO. Her contribution to
the NGOs -- "to be nothing to everybody and everything to everybody"363 -
- reflects just how far the NGOs have come in acknowledging the need
for integration; while also demonstrating just how very far they have to
go.
Anita Menghetli's employment process, in and of itself, reveals the
complex nature of the NGOs and their cherished tradition of
organizational autonomy. Menghetti had been working for ICVA in
Geneva. ICVA, like Interaction in the United States, is an umbrella NGO
for over a 100 European and American NGOs. Also like Interaction, the
NGO membership uses ICVA for very general purposes that serves
everyone's interest. ICVA, too, serves no coordination or operational role
in emergencies.
Thus, the NGO community in the greater Rwandan area did not
ask for a NGO Liaison Unit. But Rudy von Bemuth, the Vice President
of ICVA's Executive Committee (and also Vice President of Save the
ChildrenlU.S.) thought that they should have one anyway. Consequently,
--~--------
3m Mcn~hetti,7 August 1995.
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he had Save the Childtetrfund ICVA's position and placed it under
UNREO. Menghetti was thus seconded to the U.N. by Save to work in
the ICVA funded unit. NGO liaison, let alone coordination, does not
come easy.
In so many words, Menghetti was the "welcome-wagon" in Kigali
to all the arriving NGOs. She registered NGOs (eventually building a
computer database of who was doing what, where); she gave them all the
necessary information (cost of renting, maps, how much to pay
interpreters, drivers, etc.); and she served as a reference point for any
NGO which had questions regarding UNREO. (She even developed a
library, by sector, for the NGOs). All of this was done single-handedly
until November, when two interns arrived to help her out.
Although the NLU was an absolutely invaluable service, the NGO
community did not want to: 1) take it over; 2) expand it into a working
group that could express its collective voice at the UNREO meetings. As
Rudy Von Bernuth relates, the NGOs "accepted it [the NLU], but didn't
invest in it."364
And why invest in it? The NGOs had an accomplished fellow NGO
of whom they could ask questions when they wanted. Importantly, they
did not have to listen to anything she said. In the meantime, they could
:l64 Interview with Rudy von Bernuth, Save the Children, Westport, Connecticut, 7 August 1995.
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attend UNREO meetings, contribute as they saw fit, and continue on with
their humanitarian charter.
In many ways, at least initially, the Rwandan emergency was like
a long-lost friend to the NGO community. The military was kept in its
place, was accessible as needed vis-a.-vis the U.N., and, in the meantime,
they were able to act as they wanted, as they have always done. They
were free to go about being purely humanitarian.
L. THE OTHER MILITARY
In many ways, the Rwandan intervention was also greeted as a
long-lost friend by the rest of the American forces deployed to the region.
While the CMOCs displayed a nuanced understanding of the situation,
the rest of the American contingent behaved according to its cherished
charter. With the CMOC handling the humanitarian coordination, the
much valued and coveted single point-of-contact had reasserted itself.
The enclaved deployment of military personnel ensured that the
interaction between American forces and NGOs, let alone the refugees
themselves, would be very limited.~65 A dynamic, multi-dimensional
chessboard had been reduced to a two-dimensional wire-diagram,
something with which the military was infinitely more comfortable.
:m[, Even Richard Hooker had to get special permission to stay out past 1800. American personnel attending
specific NGO water/sanitation liaison meetings had to leave before it got dark out. (Interview with Dr. Les Roberts
of the Center for Disease Control, Honolulu, Hawaii, 19 September 1995).
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Worrisome, however, is the overriding imperative of the
deployment: no casualties. Indeed, Dr. Burkholder distinctly remembers
being in the Goma "CMOC" and seeing the Army's posted number one
goal: no casualties.:>66 With Somalia as a cognitive map, this feeling
saturated the forces and was evident in everything they did. For
example, the Americans built up the airstrips in Goma and Kigali into
veritable fire-bases. When they moved, they had HUMVEE's with
mounted .50 caliber machine-guns at the front and rear of the convoy.
No matter the context, they always wore their flak jacket and helmet.
A first response might be, "well, that's what militaries do; besides,
you can't argue with results (no casualties)." This point is well-taken.
There is a very strong argument that such a presentation of no-nonsense
and overwhelming force set the proper tone for the deployment and, as
a result, there were no problems.:>67 Such an employment, if necessary,
further makes for an easier transition to a real warfighting scenario.
These points are very true and seemingly persuasive.
But when women were driving throughout the countryside, alone,
as were the rest of the NGO personnel, one begins to wonder whether or
not this particular application of "security" is appropriate. Many recall the
curious juxtaposition between unarmed NGOs going anywhere they
,,'"; Burkholder, 6 September 1995.
367 Warfighting skills, it should be noted, were not attrited as they were actually employed in such activities as
establishing bunkers and providing security for convoys.
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wanted and the armed-to-the-teeth military having to be in before dark
while not being allowed in the refugee camps at all. Greg Garbinsky
notes that once the Americans left, convoys around Goma increased by
one or two runs a day because there was no security to slow it down.3fia
M. ARTIFICIAL SEPARATIONS: THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF
FOREIGN PRESENCE AND THE CONTINUUM OF EFFORT
In both communities, then, the Rwandan intervention was almost
welcomed home like a long-lost brother. The NGOs, eventually over a
hundred in the region, were able to access military support while
simultaneously keeping it at arm's length. The military was able to do
something humanitarian, in a military manner, while keeping the
humanitarians at arm's length.
This acceptance of traditional roles was possible for one reason:
the political reality was ignored. Fortunately for the military, this
ignorance was part of their mandate. The ghost of Somalia dictated no
casualties, a small footprint, a short duration, and an overwhelming
conventional power. From the beginning, as political instruments, they
were intentionally isolated from the political situation by the senior
policy-makers. There would be no political impact from their presence
and no expectations created because it was understood from the
3'" Garbinsky, 31 July 1995.
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beginning what the military's role would be. Which, a clear military role,
is the way it should be.
In this sense, lessons had been learned from past humanitarian
interventions. There was no way the military means would be confused
with the humanitarian end. As a result, the military was much more
effective. That the political situation was ignored, that "we had postponed
death in that part of the world until another bloodbath" and that "we
really didn't solve a problem"369 was beside the point. In fact, the case can
be made that Rwanda was the ultimate continuum of effort: the military
knew and kept its place, according to its mandate, as it enabled the
humanitarian effort.
The NGOs, on the other hand, used their own charters to isolate
themselves from the political reality. Despite having a significant and
immediate humanitarian impact, very few NGOs were willing to
acknowledge, let alone consider, the long-term ramifications of their
actions. That, in fact, they were feeding the perpetrators of genocide and
specifically enabling the former Rwandan government, whose sole intent
was to begin the war again (something the U.S. government was
obviously party to with its financial support of the NGOs). As Rudy Von
Bernuth states so clearly, "we'd better 'fess up to the fact that we can't do
"till Riley, 5 September 1995.
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anything that's apolitical."370 Anita Menghetti takes it one step further;
"There never was such a thing as an apolitical NGO.,,;m
What was nominally the purest of humanitarian missions, and was
conducted as such by the NGOs and the military, ultimately was
operating in the purest of political environments.
N. PHll..OSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
Above all else, this "emergency" was rooted in genocide. No matter
how one presents the case, this one irrefutable fact glares through the
humanitarian mist. The entire world had stood by and watched.
Only when the "humanitarian" label had been attached did the
world take action. This last slap-in-the-face to the one-half million dead
will forever remain one of the most tragic ironies of our lifetime. And
thus the international community of nations must ask itself: what is the
purpose of armies and what is the purpose of humanitarian organizations
if not to prevent this great evil? Ultimately, this question may be the only
one worth asking. For now, however, it is important to examine some
other philosophical ramifications of this ignored political reality.
Rwanda, as an extension of the Somalia experience, raises some
very fundamental questions: about national interest and the use of force
:<11' von Bemuth, 7 August 1995.
371 Menghetti, 7 August 1995.
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in a humanitarian intetventionand itsevertttial effect on the CMOC. The
singlemost manifestation of these concerns is the enclave deployment of
u.s. personnel. Irrespective of force protection, mission statement, and
the end-result, the following obsetvations, at the least, have to be
considered before the next such intetvention.
"Many attempts to have NGOs and the military become more
familiar with each other have been made in the U.S., but those meetings
and exercises mainly involve the higher level managers of NGOs and the
upper ranks of the military. The real familiarization has to be made
among field people. Since Somalia and the loss of U.S. lives there, the
understandable emphasis on security has distanced U.S. military
personnel even more from their NGO counterparts. This was obvious in
Goma, Zaire, where there was almost no social mixing of the two groups.
Without the personal relationships, such as were possible in northern
Iraq, the organizational relationships will never work. In a field of
human endeavor so stressful and emotional, the personal linkages are
even more important. [emphasis added] In Goma, while sometimes
sitting in the back of a pickup truck on the way to the camps, we would
pass a military convoy escorting several U.S. military water technicians:
as I said, an understandable concern for the well being of soldiers, but
not available to civilians who were taking far more risks. This situation
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sends very mixed messages to NGOs and makes it difficult for them to
identify with the mission of the military.,,:m
This statement by a world-respected doctor who has served
extensively in northern Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda is
disconcerting. Anita Menghetti synopsizes these ideas about the
military's separation from the relief effort more directly: lid uty only goes
so far ... you have to see the effect of what you're doing."37:1 And Dr. Les
Roberts suggests that like Mao's guerrillas, all helpers must swim in the
sea of the helped.374 The above thoughts have three potential
consequences.
Essentially, the paramount question that begs asking is: does such
a deployment separate the American soldier from the very values that he
espouses andjoined to defend? What are the ramifications (psychological
or otherwise) upon an American force that, regardless of its mandate,
ignores the reality around it?375.
Second, as the Bangladesh and northern Iraq case studies indicate
(and to some extent Somalia), success comes from the power of an
intangible cohesion that results from the mixing between the
m Dr. Michael Toole, fax to author, 8 June 1995.
:m Mcmghetti, 7 August 1995.
374 Roberts, 19 September 1995.
:m. American forces, for example, did not take part in the burial of the refugee dead, ostensibly to protect them
from the trauma of such an event.
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humanitarian community and the military, and then, more importantly,
between the helpers and the helped. That type of cohesion was an
impossibility from the beginning in Rwanda. Granted, the CMOC worked
extremely well. But there was nothing like the cohesion witnessed in
northern Iraq and Bangladesh where everyone was intermingled in a
common, uniting effort. If the political aspects had been acknowledged
in Rwanda, the CMOC effort would have failed. As a liaison within such
a politically-charged environment, the necessary cohesion between the
two communities would never have resulted. The Mogadishu CMOC,
despite the best efforts of those involved, would have been replicated.
Third, as discussed in the Somalia chapter, does such a cautious
and enclaved deployment -- primarily focused on no casualties -- not
eventually effect the mindset of the warfighter? If, at every level, the
troop commander's basic worry is no casualties, is not risk-taking and
boldness ineluctably eroded? Will this cautious mindset not figuratively
and literally bleed over into a warfighting scenario? As Dick Vennigone
of World Vision observed about Rwanda: "Howcan you be a world leader
and expect to use your military power without anybody getting hurt?,,376
These questions are left at the rhetorical level. Humanitarian
operations must be conducted as military operations pursuant to a
376 Vennigone, 12 September 1995
253
political purpose. Only then will military personnel be unfettered to act,
and interact, as the situation demands.
O. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
The first concern, based on the above philosophical implications,
is that the CMOC, as a liaison between the communities, is an unwitting
abettor to the problem. Granted, the CMOC in this case did everything
unofficially possible to interact with the NGOs and understand the larger
issues. But as an institutional interface, it remained a liaison tool. Both
communities -- because of their desire to ignore, or have ignored for
them, the political context -- did not mind this artificial separation. As
a result, the CMOC as a liaison worked relatively well. If the political
context had been remotely addressed by either community, the CMOCs
would have failed. Such an environment demands that decisions be made
at the same table in conjunction with the other political and military
concerns. Therefore, we must be careful to suggest that the interface of
the two communities has been finally figured out. It worked for one, and
only one, reason: it was a humanitarian effort that did not seek to
address the larger political issues.
P. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (pURELY HUMANITARIAN)
Once this last notion is accepted, it is possible to focus on the
positive coordination lessons learned. First and foremost, although it was
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just another player, the U.S. obviously could have taken on a larger role,
even after it deployed. By defining its mission and assiduously pursuing
and maintaining it, the American force made very clear what it would do
to its fullest extent, and what it would not even consider. In so doing, the
other parties were able to more easily define their own role within the
continuum of effort.
Such a clearly defined mission also prevents other parties from
accessing the military for resources simply because it is the path of least
resistance. Fully aware of what they would not get from the military,
even though the military could theoretically provide it, the NGOs were
forced to come up with their own alternatives. This avoidance of military
dependence ultimately rested on the accepted role of the U.N. as lead
agency. All parties recognized that the U.N. would have the final word
on prioritization. There must be a center of effort. The U.N. proved
capable.
This logic additionally implies that vis-a-vis the U.N., the
comparative advantage of both communities were successfully employed.
While there was not an extensive intermingling, so as to provide further
cohesion to the overall effort, there is no doubt that both communities did
extremely well within their respective sectors. Moreover, the military was
willing to accept its subordinate role. Colonel Farris' words come back
to mind: "it's OK not to be in charge." Clearly reminiscent of the
Bangladesh and northern Iraq coordination processes, this atypical
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military mindset is a critical element upon which the military/NGO
relationship must be founded.
There is also the operational issue of transition, best illustrated in
the Goma example. Without a clear idea of what the military was going
to do, the humanitarian community could not project what resources
were needed and when. Not a significant event in light of the overall
impact, this glitch does point to an idea that will make the next
humanitarian intervention better: 'Joint" assessment/transition teams.
To a large degree, the arrival of the military imposes a false time
line on the continuum of a humanitarian emergency. The NGOs and
those being helped have been there long before and will remain long after
an American intervention. In this sense, the highly sought after end-state
of the military is a false ending. In order to be sensitive to this fact and
its operational implications, the CMOC must "plug into" or have as its
own, an element fully dedicated to assessment/transition.377
Hopefully, such an element could tap into a parent element within
the conceptual HOC/OSOCC. If not, the continuum nature of a complex
emergency demands that the military think about its short-term actions,
to include withdrawal, and their long-term implications. Thus, this
element of at least the CMOC, should include people with operational
m The warfighting analogy would be the elevation of the S-3 Alpha (the assistant operations officer in a Marine
Combat Operations Center) whose job it is to think about the battle three to four days away while tying it into the
reality of the present battlc.
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experience who can also conceptually relate to the humanitarian
response. It will be their only job to work jointly with the humanitarian
experts as they simultaneously assess the immediate situation while
relating it to the mandate's end-state. The CMOC Director, and the JTF
commander, should use them as an impartial reality check on the effect
of the overall military effort. If done properly, in conjunction with the
humanitarians, there will be no surprises, such as the Goma withdrawal,
as everyone stays attuned to each other. Ultimately, such a process
enhances the possibility that the military's artificial end-state will
encourage the overall continuum of effort.
Finally, there is the role of Army Civil Affairs. Although there
should be further discussion as to when and how to bring the Reserves
into the emergency situation, it goes without saying that they are critical
to a successful effort. In this particular case, the effort worked perfectly
as the Civil Affairs officers maintained and increased the excellent
momentum that the regular officers had created. The question remains,
however, what if the conventional folks applied had not been Farris,
Riley, Schillare, or Crary? (Which is to say, what if General Sullivan
himself had not taken a direct interest in the matter?) What if those
responsible for the sandbagging of the airports had been instead given
the mission of working with the NGOs? The forces chosen, to include
their specialties and their individual personalities, are absolutely critical
to the success of a mission.
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Q. TACTICAL IMPliCATIONS
There are two noteworthy tactical implications. First, in this case,
collocation worked. Importantly, it worked because the OSOCC was
recognized by the U.S. military and the NGOs as the center of the entire
effort. Once collocated, the CMOC came to be truly viewed as the
support mechanism that it was. This perception was largely due to an
energetic and aggressive CMOC staff that not only clearly defined its
mandate, but pursued it with the same vigor.
It was also due to the unifying lesson of all the case-studies: the
principle of altruistic self-interest. On the military's side, it recognized
that it had to "court" and provide the "hook" to engender NGO
participation and the exchange of information. The exchange of services
was again mutually beneficial.
R. OPERATION RESTORE HOPE COORDINATION PRINCIPLES
This chapter concludes with some basic principles of NGO/military
coordination form this particular study.
1. For the best type of cohesion to develop among the response
participants, there must be an intermingling between military
and humanitarians, and between the entire international
response and those being helped. This cohesion, rightly or
wrongly, did not develop in Rwanda due to the enclaved
deployment of American forces.
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2. Once isolated from the political dimension of the emergency,
both the military and the NGO perform admirably according
to their traditional mandates and comparative advantages.
3. Once the U.N. is isolated from the complex political issues of
an emergency, it works relatively well. If isolated -- kept to
traditional refugee or Chapter Six scenarios -- the U.N. can
prioritize needs and effectively employ the comparative
advantages of the military and the NGOs.
4. It is OK for the military not to be in charge.
5. A broad humanitarian mandate allows for the military to stick
to its comparative advantage in support of the humanitarian
goal. Once defined, other components, particularly the NGOs,
can define their own effort and not seek out the military as the
path of least resistance to solve problems outside of the
military's mandate.
6. The CMOC must be the focus of effort in a humanitarian
intervention. Any other military focus runs the risk of the
military means becoming confused with the humanitarian end.
7. The CMOC Director must have direct and unlimited access to
the JTF commander.
8. A predetermined joint assessment/transition team whose sole
job is to relate the immediate situation to the mandate while
working in conjunction with the humanitarians, would do
much to smooth the eventual military withdrawal.
9. Collocation works when there is a recognized center of effort.




Locusts have no king, yet they advance together in ranks ...
Proverbs 30:27
A INTRODUCTION
As we have seen, there are many dimensions to the relationship
between the NGO community and the American military during times of
humanitarian intervention. Given the unfolding nature of this
relationship, tidy conclusions are out of the question. If there was to be
one lesson from these experiences, however, it would be that there are
no comprehensive models. None of these cases will ever be repeated;
none should be cast in bronze nor held up as holy writ. There remains,
however, some conceptual linkages among these studies, as well as some
known facts and indicators, that can be drawn out. Similar to the chapter
conclusions, the conclusion examines the NGO/military relationship and
the effectiveness of the CMOC from the strategic, operational, and tactical
perspectives. Moreover, it presents other conceptual lessons learned
about the relationship at each respective level.
B. STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS
The most important implication of this study is the importance of
recognizing that humanitarian operations are implicitly political.
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Specifically, it is the handling of the political dimension by the highest
levels, to include the President, that determines the NGO/military
relationship. Other strategic lessons involve the national security
implications for a successful NGO/military relationship; the role of the
U.N.; and the importance of initiating the NGO/military relationship as
soon as possible.
1. The Political
The effectiveness of the CMOC and its incumbent NGO/military
relationship was determined by how the political dimension of the
intervention was handled. In northern Iraq, the political problem of
400,000 refugees from an ethnic group without a state was addressed as
an extension of the Gulf War. There was a residual responsibility and
resolve to see the matter through. There were also in-theater forces with
which to do it. Although articulated as "purely humanitarian," the United
Nations turned the traditional notion of sovereignty on its head as it
eventually occupied the northern section of Iraq. Without Resolution 688
of the Security Council, the situation could not have been addressed.
Moreover, a rapidly unfolding situation in the field prevented
higher echelons of government from getting involved, let alone identifying
a policy. As Major General James Jones notes, the only reason Operation
Provide Comfort worked so well was because it was "all done without a
piece of paper being signed; the situation grew up so quickly that it
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outstripped the governments' ability to bebureaucratic."37R Consequently,
the policy-makers had to rely on those in the field. Fortunately, the
political situation, as a means of enabling the humanitarian intent, was
consistently and correctly assessed by Fred Cuny and OFDA (among
others). From convincing the Kurds to come out of the mountains, to the
camp site selection, to the identification of the Iraqi police in Zakho, to
the inclusion of Dohuk, the political dimension could not be ignored.
Once committed, Washington eventually served the purpose of rubber-
stamping the necessary and correct political decisions -- based on a
humanitarian intent -- of the operators in the field. As a result, however,
the right course of action was pursued and supported by Washington.
With a primary humanitarian intent that provided de facto political
guidance for higher echelons trying to keep up with the situation, and a
secure zone in which to operate, the NGO/military relationship was truly
isolated to just traditional humanitarian concerns. Because the military
understood the overall humanitarian intent, it consciously worked to
support and enable the NGOs. Indeed, because the military was the there
first, with no prior NGO presence, it was very clear that the NGOs and
the U. N. had to take over the effort. In this sense, the Zakho CMOC's one
mission was to support and facilitate that transition (something
"" .Jones, 2 August 1995.
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accomplished in the form of Michael Hess, who took the CMOC to the
NGOs).
In Bangladesh, a more traditional humanitarian intervention took
place whereby one state aided another. Yet there were political
complexities to this situation as well. There was a thirty-nine day old
democracy still trying to figure out how its institutions related to one
another. There were tensions between the Bangladeshi government and
its army. There were tensions between the government and the NGOs.
There were the claims of the Bangladeshi political left that the Americans
were there to establish a permanent base. Not acknowledged by
Washington, these political realities were addressed at the operational
level by the JTF commander.
With the creation of a split command, the Dhaka command
element worked directly with the government about all issues related to
the relief effort. Additionally, the strong but subordinate role played by
the JTF commander in relation to his Ambassador and the Prime Minister
had an undeniable calming effect on the underlying tensions. These two
factors kept the politics in the capital.
Because of these factors, the JTF forward command element in
Chittagong, the center of the disaster area, was allowed to focus on the
coordination and implementation of the relief effort. Although not called
a CMOC, the NGO coordination function performed by the Military
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Coordination Center at Chittagong airport ~ .. where NGOs worked hand-
in-hand with the military -- was essentially the same as in northern Iraq.
In Somalia, the political dimension was never acknowledged by
Washington D.C. (In fact, it was only the recommendation of General
Powell that allowed for there to be a political overseer at the operational
level). Consequently, the military's mission, although seemingly clearand
limited, became confused. Without addressing the multiple and
overlapping problems that were present in Somalia, such as disarmament,
the military stood no chance of creating a secure zone. Yes, the food got
through and the immediate starvation was averted; but what next?
Stabilization meant political expectations among the humanitarian
community and the afflicted population -- and those expectations could
not be met by the local force without a higher political resolve. There
was none.
As a result, the CMOC became many things to many people,
resulting in problems of separation and communication (among other
reasons, these problems resulted from the CMOC operating as a liaison,
instead of an operations, center). And there were problems within the
military as to exactly what their mission was in relation to the NGOs. In
the end, the CMOC was not only attempting coordination in a very
confused environment, it was also addressing policy concerns such as
disarmament and weapons retrieval. Comparatively, the strategic
ignorance of the political dimension had the biggest impact on the
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Mogadishu CMOC, as it ultimately had to address both relief and specific
political problems.
In Rwanda, we see the return of a "traditional" solution, like a long-
lost friend, because the political dimension is ignored at every level. This
traditional solution focused on the unprecedented humanitarian scope of
the refugee crisis, while ignoring the genocide that preceded it. Thus,
despite an official American policy of human rights and the unquestioned
veracity of the genocide reports at the time, the United States and the
world did nothing. For the American government in particular, which
only saw a repetition of Somalia, there was no desire to think about the
political complexities of a central African country with no strategic value.
The ignoring of the genocide allowed the humanitarian dimension
to be isolated. Consequently, the relief effort worked quite well. The
CMOCs established in Entebbe, Goma, and Kigali were able to liaison
directly with the U.N. agency responsible for overall coordination (the
liaison did not officially take place with the NGOs). With a clear mandate
and another agency in charge, the military's relationship to the
humanitarian effort, to include the transition, went relatively smoothly.
What are the lessons? "Anybody who tells you that politics has
nothing to do with humanitarian aid is way off the wall."379 Humanitarian
intervention is a political process. Even if the political dimension is
37" A "senior Western relief official," in Newsweek, "Diaster Fatigue," p. 38, 13 May 1991.
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addressed at the highest levels, the actual relief effort must still be aware
of the local political impact of its decisions and the strategic accumulation
of its actions. If these impacts are not consciously addressed, then those
actions will contribute, perhaps inadvertently, to the formation of a de
facto policy. Moreover, it would seem that even with an awareness of the
political impact of their decisions and actions, the attempt must be made
to operationally isolate those involved in coordinating the NGO/military
relationship from the specific political issues of the moment. This was in
fact the case in Bangladesh and northern Iraq, benignly, and in Rwanda,
malignantly. If the NGO/military relationship is not isolated from specific
political issues -- like the disarmament policy in Somalia -- then the
chance for confusion is markedly greater.
2. Presidential Leadership
Ultimately, the political discussion points to the need for
Presidential leadership. Congressman McHugh's words after his return
from the Kurd refugee camps ring loud: 'We think this requires strong
political leadership . . . the President should consider the possibility of
appointing a high level official within his administration to facilitate the
movement of these requests and help the interagency processes move
rapidly." By law, this person exists: he or she is the Administrator ofthe
Agency for International Development. Irrespective of legal
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appointments, however, it is only a sustained presidential gaze that will
provide political resolve, dissipating interagency differences.
Moreover, it is only the President that can continually articulate the
link between the humanitarian need and the deployment of military
forces. Only he can explain what political purpose the military forces
serve. Only he can tell the American public that the humanitarian goal
is in the national interest and that casualties may result. If he does not,
then military means and humanitarian ends stand a much greater chance
for being confused as the possibility of failure increases exponentially.
Obviously, given the other domestic and international issues of the
day, the President cannot always focus on a particular humanitarian
intervention. He needs a ready pool of advisors who understand the
multifarious dimensions of humanitarian intervention. In short, the long-
standing call of Andrew Natsios for a permanent humanitarian
emergency sub-committee to the National Security Council should be
implemented. Such a committee would be solely responsible for tracking
these events and planning contingencies. Importantly, it would ensure
that the humanitarian intent was kept primary at the highest level. The
head of this sub-committee, during times of crisis, would have direct
access to the President.
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3. The National Interest and Happenstance
A third strategic observation is that from realpolitik to diplomatic
windows of opportunity to goodwill, the consequences of successful
humanitarian intervention make a considerable and compelling case for
the national interest. But, one has to ask, would the two most successful
interventions have taken place if the American forces had not already
been in the area? If the "Proven Force" infrastructure had not already
been in Turkey and the Civil Affairs personnel had not been in theater;
or, if the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade had not been already en route
returning from the Persian Gulf, would the interventions have taken
place? That the results of these two successful interventions are in the
interest of the nation is beyond doubt. (Whether they would have
happened if there had not been a war is an important question).
For example, in northern Iraq, a potentially explosive regional
issue that has been a matter of great significance to Turkey, our NATO
ally, was settled within a matter of months. In Bangladesh, a country
which provided troops to Desert Storm, the U.S. proved itself a reliable
ally while simultaneously setting an example of democracy during the
implementation process.
Moreover, humanitarian interventions provide the opportunity to
interact with other nations in a unique way that would not otherwise take
place. In northern Iraq, French NGOs and the French military worked
hand-in-hand with their U.S. counterparts. In Bangladesh, there were
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Japanese, Pakistani, and Chinese helicopter contingents. All of these
interactions, no matter how small, are conducive to building good
relations with other states. All represent social/economic/diplomatic
windows of opportunity.
Finally, these endeavors, because of their purpose, created
tremendous goodwill. The area around Zakho is still remembered as
"happy valley." The Kurdish deaf sign for President George Bush is the
crOS3 In Bangladesh, people still speak highly of the American military
and the manner in which it handled itself. This kind of goodwill is the
kind that endures.
It should further be noted that this goodwill is not the monopoly of
those helped. Time and again, the press reports on these interventions
reflect American servicemen and women truly thankful for the
opportunity to help and to give. Given their primary mission -- to be
prepared to kill and die for the national interest -- these experiences
unmistakably remind them of the values they joined to defend.
4. The Role of the United Nations
The V.N. is capable of handling the role of helping refugees or
classic peacekeeping. Although late in northern Iraq, the V.N. eventually
took over the effort and still runs it today. In Rwanda, the U.N. did a
very good job in coordinating the various "subordinate" agencies, to
include NGOs and the American military. Once it is involved in
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military/political affairs thateritail a significant security threat (i.e., a
Chapter Seven case), however, the U.N. structure simply does not work,
significantly affecting all of the relationships under its mandate. In the
most ambiguous of humanitarian interventions, a secure environment
must be created by a great-power lead coalition under the general aegis
of the U.N. Only after real stability has been achieved should the U.N.
take over.
5. Stateside NGO/Military Coordination
This coordination, or at least collaboration, should take place prior
to the intervention. If not, it should take place during the intervention.
The NGOs need to develop a stateside mechanism through which they
"plug into" the interagency planning process. Against their nature, this
change must be endured in the name of a comprehensive response. Such
a process allows for a continuing dialogue. The existence of the dialogue
is ultimately more important than what is actually said. While true
coordination of effort cannot always be the expected result, the
expression of how each community understands the others expectations
and needs is imperative. Also, how each community interprets the term
"security" is of paramount importance. An agreed on dialogue -- perhaps
sponsored by a humanitarian sub-committee of the NSC -- would
significantly reduce misunderstanding and duplication of effort.
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c. OPERATIONAL OBSERVATIONS
The operational obseIVations are, perhaps, the most important.
Given the general lack of political resolve, those at the operator level
must be aware of what their aggregate actions encompass and determine.
More often than not, the actions of the operators create or significantly
influence a policy. As one senior military official said "those guys were
creating policy down there." (fhe official then retracted that statement
and said that "they were creating the relationship to achieve broader
policy goals.")380
Moreover, it is in the best interest of the operators -- the military
because it seeks a quick exit, and the NGOs because they seek the
primacy of the humanitarian need -- to work together against a common
enemy: a potentially inattentive stateside political apparatus. Pursuant
to this common need is to correctly understand that there is a continuum
of effort in which all parties have a proper role to play.
1. The Continuum
As Colonel Gary Anderson noted about the NGO/military
relationship in Bangladesh, there must be a "synergistic relationship."
The essence of realizing this synergy is the strategic acknowledgment
that the humanitarian intent is primary. Once recognized, the NGO and
'''''' This official preferred non·atttibU:",'.
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the military work, according totheir comparative advantage, to support
the intent as they complement the other. Importantly, how "success" is
defined must always reside with the NGO, and other humanitarian and
indigenous authorities, who are there for the long haul. The military
must recognize that its success results from placing itself properly within
the overall continuum of effort. Its end-state is an artificial one whose
sole purpose must be to effectively transition the overall effort to the next
phase of recovery. The military's mission is to enable marginal self-
sufficiency.
Three basic precepts follow. First, the military cannot be in
charge. If it is in charge, there is the strong potential for it to provide its
own solutions with its own means. Colonel Steve Riley's admonition must
be the basic question of every military activity: "who are you there to
support, yourself or the humanitarian effort?"
If the answer is yourself, two problems result. First, the "structure
to support the structure" becomes more important.:m How much to how
many for how long will dominate the discussion as the military worries
more about proving mission accomplishment -- via briefing exercises to
senior Pentagon officials -- rather than considering the affect of its efforts
according to the original humanitarian intent. The second consequence
is the implicit encouragement of mission creep. Cultural and
"~1 Hess, 5 June 1995.
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technological concerns aside, the provision of military solutions inevitably
creates a dependency upon the military infrastructure. If that particular
stage of the effort is dependent upon the military, no matter the political
pressure to withdraw, the political fallout from leaving the situation will
be much worse. At all costs, the military must not provide solutions that
inherently rely on military hardware and infrastructure.
The second precept is to help the helper, specifically the NGOs.
They are usually culturally aware and sensitive to the situational needs
of that particular emergency. This awareness generally provides the right
information to the military and prevents military infrastructure-based
solutions. In the end, it is their war to win or lose. The military can only
help with one of the more severe battles of the humanitarian
continuum.382
The third precept is that the CMOC must be the military's
operational focus of effort within a humanitarian intervention. It must
maintain its title as an operations center. Humanitarian intervention is
about joint civil-military efforts. If it becomes a liaison center, then it
becomes divorced from reality. Military operators must be empowered
to solve coordination problems at the same table, person to person, with
:l"" This discussion is not inconsistent with the imperative of cohesion between military and humanitarian and
helper and helped. There will be times, particularly during implementation, that the military will be involved
directly with the afflicted population. There will also be times when, according to tactical (security) necessity, the
military will engage directly in humanitarian efforts (i.e., doing something humanitarian to show the various
belligpr.ants the purpose for which they are there). The general point being, however, that the military's role will
usual1y t.e to support the humanitarians.
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the NGOs and other humanitarian personnel. It is absolutely critical that
this process take place. If it does not, then different solutions and plans
will arise from the inevitably competing centers of operations to whom
the liaisons report.
The military's Tactical/Combat Operations Center should work in
support of the CMOC. (The TOC/COC would be concerned only with
coordination internal to the military). This proposed relationship further
implies that the military headquarters be co-accessible to the center of the
humanitarian effort. The overwhelming and compelling need for them
to be thinking alike demands that they be mutually accessible (defined as
within secure walking distance of the other).
Finally, the CMOC must be elevated within the military culture.
Once recognized as the operational center of effort, the military should
work to support it just as they would support the operations center of any
regular military operation. Moreover, it should be duly established that
service in a CMOC during a humanitarian intervention is noteworthy.383
By virtue of its humanitarian feedback function. the CMOC is the first
indicator of changing phases within the continuum of effort. Working
hand-in-hand with the NGOs and the other humanitarian professionals.
CMOC personnel must trace and plan the transition process to complete
military withdrawal. The transition process should be planned for from
"". Additionally, the militaty as an institution must incorporate and encourage such specialties as those involved
in a humanitarian intervention/peacekeepingination-assistance scenario.
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the day the CMOC is established. As Colonel Paul Monacelli states about
the Rwandan effort, "whenever we set up something, we knew when it
was coming down."31l4 It is with this prudent mindset that the
humanitarian intent must be pursued.
2. Continuum Roles
Within the military, the role of the Civil Affairs community takes
on an increased importance. The Civil Affairs contingent has two tracks
to pursue in support of the JTF commander. The first track is the
traditional function of liaison with established authorities within the host
nation/region, if there are any. The second, non-traditional, track is to
coordinate with all international organizations and, particularly, with non-
governmental organizations. These tracks are their institutional
responsibility. In an age where humanitarian/peacekeeping type
operations are rising in importance, everyone seems to be redefining
themselves according to these two buzz words. The Civil Affairs
community, to include the Marine Corps', needs to claim its institutional
mantle better. If it does not, it may find itself unneeded.
The role of the NGO community is of paramount importance. They
must participate, they must advise, and they must do it in a manner
conducive to a comprehensive effort. The best NGO example of
collective connectivity remains the NGO Coordination Committee of
3... Monacelli, 1 September 1995.
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Northern Iraq whereby the NGOs had a. coordinated voice (which also,
incidentally, was listened to by the military). Unfortunately, given the
independent nature of NGOs, this role has been hard to codify. Against
their most cherished and liberating traditions, the NGO community must
find a way to endure and succeed in the coordination of their advice and
efforts in complex humanitarian emergencies.
On September 17-18, 1995, Interaction sponsored a "in-house"
discussion for American NGOs to begin addressing this need for common
mechanisms within the community to properly "plug into" the overall
humanitarian response. While the jury is still out on just how receptive
the various NGOs were to such possibilities, the new era's verdict is in:
coordinate or be left behind. In an age of declining foreign aid and
increasing complex humanitarian emergencies, those NGOs that can
coordinate appropriately with the U.S. government will not only receive
the most money, they will also receive the logistical support so critical to
rapid response and credibility. The NGOs must reconcile their traditional
identity with these incorrigible facts of a new era. It has been a slow
process.
The other important role to be played out within the continuum is
that of oFDA. Far and away the consistent shining star of these
emergencies, it has been their responsibility to be the floating glue of
these ad hoc responses. They have performed admirably. The most
conversant in the various organizational cultures present during a
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humanitarian intervention, OFDA personnel are essential to ensuring
smooth coordination. They must continue to be institutionally supported
in their "glue" role. No matter the official mission of OFDA, all parties
will look to them for leadership and liaison; particularly in a transitory
age whereby most parties are still unfamiliar with the other actors.
OFDA must exert its leadership, not just in the specifics of humanitarian
response, but also in the political leadership of the operation itself.
Despite fiscal constraints, OFDA has sought to develop this very role.
Beginning with assigning Tom Frye to General Schroeder in Rwanda and
continuing with the current assignment of Tom Dolan to the J-3 at Pacific
Command in Hawaii, OFDA remains the most visionary of the parties
discussed. They must be encouraged and supported in these endeavors.
The last operational point returns to the obvious: institutions do
not play roles, people do. We can promulgate all the information and
education in the world, but the face-to-face coordination of two to eighty
people is irreducible. This NGO/military relationship is about people.
The ones controlling the operation in theater are the most important
linchpins in the entire endeavor. Good people matter -- they must be
selected carefully.
D. TACTICAL OBSERVATIONS
These observations, meant for those at the proverbial table itself,
derive directly from operational or strategic points. A common enemy
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exists for both the military and the NGOs: the humanitarian task at
hand. One needs the other to accomplish that endeavor. Nevertheless,
just because both are there in the name of humanitarianism does not
mean that they will see eye-to-eye. The principle of altruistic self-interest
governs the relationship. In short, there must be a mutually beneficial
exchange of goods for the relationship to succeed.
The relationship is also about personalities that are not necessarily
concerned about ego or credit. They must be willing to accept the
invisible nature of their contributions. They must additionally recognize
the need for transparency. Only with an integrity based on no secrets can
the trust and cohesion grow that is fundamental to a successful effort.
Finally, two military points. The CMOC Director must have
unlimited access to the JTF commander. Second, there will be times
when the military has to demonstrate a humanitarian intent: not for
humanitarianism's sake, but out of tactical necessity. In northern Iraq,
the Marines immediately began to build a camp to demonstrate to the
Iraqis in the surrounding hills that their intent was peaceful. In
Bangladesh, the Marines did not carry weapons. In Somalia, the Marines
were involved in food distribution. Although generally not a good idea
for the military to be involved in the specific humanitarian tasks of the
mission, sometimes it will be necessary. The NGOs and the rest of the
humanitarian community must understand this necessity.
279
E. MAKING IT BElTER
What, in brief, should be done to make the NGO/military
relationship better? The first step is to assume a worst-case scenario, such
as Somalia. The problem in Somalia was that the humanitarian intent
became separated from the military means. In order to prevent such an
event while effectively addressing the inevitable complex political issues,
a civil-military network must be established.385
A network, by definition, exists at several levels. While there is
one point responsible for the entire net, that same point is not responsible
for every single piece of coordination and implementation. This burden
is shared by the entire network. At the top of the civil-military network
is the Executive Steering Group (ESG). The ESG is the senior policy
group within the intervention. Sitting on it, at the least, are the
Presidential envoy/political overseer (if there is one), the JTF commander,
an OFDA representative, and the NGO selected representative. Such a
Group keeps the political, military, and humanitarian facets of the
intervention strategy integrated.
This Group's existence does not suggest that it becomes the
primary organ of the response or that it supersedes a U.N. HOC/OSOCC.
It simply indicates that the Americans realize the need to speak with one
38-' This discussion based on the I MEF example. Telephone interview with Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni,
USMC, 5 October 1995.
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voice. The ESG would complement any existing infrastructure. Of even
greater importance, however, the ESG would keep the politics isolated
from the CMOC. Hopefully backed by a strategic political resolve, the
ESG would center policy questions on itself as the CMOC was left to
worry about humanitarian coordination and implementation.
The CMOC, in conjunction with a HOC/OSOCC if there is one,
would be responsible for the entire relief effort. The CMOC would be
supported by regional Civil-Military Operations Teams (CMOTS). The
CMOTs, assigned to area/sector commanders would be responsible for
running the local CMOC, if necessary, while advising the military
commander. With an ESG, CMOC, and various CMOTs, a civil-military
network would be established to address the complicated issues of a
complex humanitarian emergency.386 Such a network would thus spread
the weight of the operation and allow for unity of effort.
F. WHERETO?
The U.s. military/NGO relationship is a fundamental trait of our
present and the era into which we are entering. Its proclamation is
twofold: 1) interagency/multinational coordination will only increase; and
2) the role of civilians in military operations, no matter how pure the
''battlefield,'' will also only increase. These traits are not just about
3". The role played by SF, CA, and OFDA in Operation Provide Comfort remain the best working example of
such a nCltwork.
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humanitarian intervention. Witness Haiti continuing and Bosnia looming.
Whether it is humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace making,
peace enforcement, or nation-assistance, the NGO and the military will
interact. It is our -- both communities -- responsibility to understand this
relationship prior to its implementation in the field. Like the locusts
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